Second-Order Diversity by Gerken, Heather K
VOLUME 118 FEBRUARY 2005 NUMBER 4 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
ARTICLES 
SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY 
Heather K. Gerken 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................. ................. I IoI 
I. TERMS OF THE DEBATE................................................. Iio6 
A. First-Order and Second-Order Diversity ............................................ o6 
B. Disaggregated Democracy............................... ..... I............. Io8 
C. Minority, Majority, and Racial Identity............................. ................................... 
110 Iog 
II. MINDING THE GAP: THE NEED FOR AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
To EVALUATE TWO ONGOING LEGAL DEBATES 
.............................................. 
IIII 
A. Juries and the Doctrinal Puzzle Created by Batson............................................... 
I12 
B. Districts and the Debate over Implementing the Voting Rights Act....................... 11 17 
III. MINING THE GAP: THE TRADEOFFS BETWEEN FIRST-ORDER 
AND SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY ..................... ... 
............................................... 
1121 
A. The Tradeoff Between Influence and Control in Disaggregated Institutions ........... I 24 
I. The Benefits of Control: Diffusing Power ........................................ 1126 
2. The Costs of Control: The Loss of Influence at Two Levels of Governance ......... 132 
(a) Districts and the Influence/Control Tradeoff at the Level 
of Disaggregated Governing Units ........................................ 1133 
(b) Juries and the Influence/Control Tradeoff at the Level of Aggregation.......... I136 
3. The Importance of Context for Evaluating the Tradeoff Between Influence 
and C ontrol............................................................................................................. 11 39 
B. Turning the Tables: The Benefits of Destabilization and the Costs 
of Forced Community ......................... ....... ........................... 
I 142 
i. The Values Associated with Turning the Tables: 
Baselines, Identity, and Participation. ......................................... 1142 
(a) Baselines and the Participatory Experience...................... ................... 1142 
(b) Fostering Positive Participatory Habits ...................... ....................11 45 
(c) Destabilizing Political Hierarchies and Identity Categories ............................ 1148 
(i) Winners, Losers, and Group Identity ...................................... 1148 
(ii) Variation and Identity Formation......................................................11 50 
2. Forced Communities and the Costs Associated with Turning the Tables............. 1152 
IO99 
I I00 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. II8:Io99 
3. Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Turning the Tables 
from an Institutional Perspective ........................................... 
........................... 1158 
C. Dissenting by Deciding: The Tradeoffs Between the Benefits of Visibility 
and the Costs of Variation ........... ............................... I I6o 
i. The Benefits of Visibility ........ ..................................................................... 116i 
2. The Costs of Variation ......................................... I 165 
3. Evaluating the Tradeoff Between Visibility and Variation in Context................... 
1168 
D. Cycling: The Costs and Benefits of Varying Institutional Design Strategies ........... 1171 
I. The Values Associated with Cycling ........ ................................ 117I 
(a) Cycling and Experimentation ................................................... 1172 
(b) Normative Cycling ............................................ 1173 
(c) Cycling as a Strategy for Dealing with Political Conflict................................. 1175 
2. The Costs of Cycling: Privileging Conflict over Consensus, 
Instability over Stasis.... ........................................ I76 
3. The Costs and Benefits of Cycling in a Given Institutional Context..................... 1178 
E. Finding the Best Fit.......... .................................... 8o 
i. Balancing Costs and Benefits ........................................... 
Ix8o 
2. Choosing Among Values ......................................... 1183 
IV. SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY AS A FRAMING DEVICE ......................................... 85 
A. Juries and Districts: A Redux. ............................. ...... 1185 
i. Juries, Swain v. Alabama, and Vote-Dilution Claims ............................................ 1185 
2. Georgia v. Ashcroft .................... .......................... 1188 
B. Theories of Institutional Design .......................................................... 189 
i. The Dynamics of Dissent ................................................... 90 
2. M ulticulturalism ....... ............................................... .. .................1193 I I 3 
C O N C L U SIO N 
.................................................................................................... 
.................... I 1195 
SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY 
Heather K. Gerken* 
Much scholarship on democratic design is preoccupied with a single problem: how to treat 
electoral minorities in a majoritarian system. A term often deployed in those debates, 
particularly those focused on demographic difference, is "diversity." When scholars use 
the term, they usually mean that something - a class, an institution, a decisionmaking 
body - should roughly mirror the composition of the population. The problem with this 
debate is that its participants often unthinkingly extend theories about diversity derived 
from unitary institutions to disaggregated ones - institutions in which the governance 
system is divided into a number of equal subparts (juries, electoral districts, appellate 
panels, schools committees, and the like). Thus, despite the prevalence of such 
institutions, scholars have not systematically considered how to tailor our normative 
commitment to diversity to their unique features. This Article is a first step toward 
providing such a conceptual framework. It argues that we can seek at least two kinds of 
diversity in disaggregated institutions - first-order and second-order. First-order 
diversity mirrors the conventional intuition; it is the normative vision associated with 
statistical integration. The notion of second-order diversity, proposed here, posits that 
democracy sometimes benefits from having decisionmaking bodies that look nothing like 
the population from which they are drawn but instead reflect a wide range of 
compositions. The Article then deploys these two notions to examine a recurring set of 
trade-offs we face when designing disaggregated institutions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Much scholarship on democratic design is preoccupied with a sin- 
gle problem: how to treat electoral minorities in a majoritarian 
* Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. I owe great thanks to a number of people who 
closely read one or more drafts of this Article in its many iterations: Bruce Ackerman, Sam 
Bagenstos, David Barron, Dick Fallon, Jerry Frug, Michael Gottlieb, Lani Guinier, Don Herzog, 
Christine Jolls, Nancy King, Andy Leipold, Daryl Levinson, Dan Meltzer, Martha Minow, 
Spencer Overton, Richard Pildes, Fred Schauer, Reva Siegel, David Simon, Carol Steiker, Matt 
Stephenson, Bill Stuntz, Kathleen Sullivan, and Dennis Thompson. For helpful comments and 
criticism, I would also like to thank Ryan Goodman, Jerry Kang, Michael Kang, Sandy Levinson, 
Frank Michelman, Robert Post, Nancy Rosenblum, Margo Schlanger, Guhan Subramanian, 
Robert Tsai, Kenji Yoshino, Jonathan Zittrain, and participants in the Stanford/Yale Junior Fac- 
ulty Forum, the Harvard Law School Constitutional Law Workshop, the Harvard Law School 
Summer Faculty Workshop, the Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics Faculty Fellows 
Workshop, and the faculty workshops at the Arizona State University College of Law, the Univer- 
sity of Iowa College of Law, and the Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. This pro- 
ject was made possible by the generous research funding provided by the Edmond J. Safra Foun- 
dation Center for Ethics. For excellent research assistance, I would like to thank Jason Bordoff, 
Chloe Cockburn, Mark Conrad, Anjan Choudhury, Kate Ferguson, Michael McCarthy, Anton 
Metlitsky, Ben Shultz, Amanda Teo, and Paulina Williams. I am especially indebted to Jessica 
Ring Amunson and Meaghan McLaine, who provided extraordinary assistance in researching and 
thinking through many parts of this Article. Finally, thanks to the patient and remarkably effi- 
cient staff of the Harvard Law School Library, especially Annette Demers and the folks behind 
the mysterious acronym, FRIDA. 
IIOI 
1102 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. II8:io99 
system. A term often deployed in those debates, particularly those fo- 
cused on demographic difference, is "diversity." When scholars use the 
term, they usually mean that something - a class, an institution, a de- 
cisionmaking body - should roughly mirror the composition of the 
relevant population from which it draws its members;' it should "look 
like America," to borrow one of President Clinton's more evocative 
phrases.2 Particularly in the wake of Grutter v. Bollinger,3 "diversity" 
is often invoked in opposition to the term "segregation," as if the con- 
ceptual landscape were binary: our choice is segregation or statistical 
integration. 
The problem with this debate is that its participants often unthink- 
ingly extend theories about diversity derived from unitary institutions 
to disaggregated ones - institutions in which the governance system 
comprises a number of equal subparts (juries, electoral districts, appel- 
late panels, school committees, and the like). Thus, despite the preva- 
lence of such institutions, scholars have not systematically considered 
how to tailor our normative commitment to diversity to the unique 
features of these disaggregated institutions. Instead, we tend to treat 
debates about diversity in this part of the democratic infrastructure 
as if they, too, require a choice between segregation and statistical 
integration. 
This Article attempts to complicate the conceptual landscape, to 
diversify our conception of diversity. It develops a competing norma- 
tive vision, one that represents neither segregation nor integration. It 
is a first step toward providing a conceptual framework for describing 
a recurring set of tradeoffs that we face when designing disaggregated 
institutions. Specifically, this Article claims that there at least two 
types of diversity - first-order and second-order. The idea I term 
"first-order diversity" fits the conventional understanding of diversity; 
it is the normative vision associated with statistical integration, the 
hope that democratic bodies will someday mirror the polity. The no- 
tion of "second-order diversity," proposed here, posits that democracy 
sometimes benefits from having decisionmaking bodies that do not 
mirror the underlying population, but instead encompass a wide range 
of compositions. Second-order diversity involves variation among de- 
cisionmaking bodies, not within them. It favors interorganizational 
1 PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 22-23 (2003). For a detailed analysis of this 
notion and its relationship to our understanding of representative democracy, see HANNA 
FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91 (1967). 
2 Clinton used this phrase in 1992 to describe his Cabinet. Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, Clinton 
Said To Fill Last 4 Cabinet Jobs: Baird, Babbitt, Espy, Petia Chosen, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1992, 
at AI. 
3 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (affirming the constitutionality of affirmative action in higher educa- 
tion). 
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heterogeneity, not intraorganizational heterogeneity. It fosters diver- 
sity without mandating uniformity. 
In sketching this framework, this Article begins to construct a set of 
subsidiary terms - "disaggregated democracy," "overlapping majori- 
ties," "turning the tables," "democratic visibility," "cycling" - that 
connect to a number of debates about institutional design. These de- 
bates range from the legitimacy of peremptory challenges to the best 
districting strategy for implementing the Voting Rights Act, from doc- 
trine governing Sixth Amendment cross-section claims to debates over 
multiculturalism, from unexplored doctrinal connections between dif- 
ferent types of discrimination claims to cutting-edge research on the 
dynamics of dissent. The framework's payoff is a more precise set of 
analytic tools for examining the sorts of democratic tradeoffs that have 
long fascinated legal scholars. 
Some of the arguments offered here are unique to the notion of sec- 
ond-order diversity. Others have already been mined in the legal lit- 
erature, most notably in writings on federalism and local government 
law.4 Scholars in those two fields have devoted considerable energy to 
thinking about the values associated with disaggregation in two areas: 
federal-state relations and state-local relations. But the two literatures, 
preoccupied with these particular institutional contexts, have mostly 
focused on a different set of values from those described here. More- 
over, both literatures have yet to offer a transsubstantive vocabulary 
for identifying and describing what this Article reveals to be a recur- 
ring set of institutional design problems that arises in a range of sub- 
ject areas. 
The notions of first-order and second-order diversity provide such 
a framing device, allowing us to connect the insights offered by feder- 
alism and local government law to a broad array of legal scholarship. 
This framework thus allows us to play a divergent set of literatures 
against one another, to find new grounds of criticism and unexplored 
sources of connection among them. And it helps put some meat on the 
bones of a number of undertheorized design practices, identifying val- 
ues attached to those practices that scholars have thus far neglected. 
This Article begins with two concrete examples of an ongoing legal 
debate - one concerning juries, the other electoral districts. In both 
instances, the emerging scholarly consensus favors designing these de- 
cisionmaking bodies to look more like the populations from which they 
are drawn. In both instances, what is missing from the debate is an 
affirmative account for the heterogeneity that presently exists in the 
4 Even when the arguments offered here find familiar cognates elsewhere, they take on a dif- 
ferent form because of the special nature of the institutions in question. For a discussion of the 
relationship between the arguments offered here and the literature on federalism, democratic ex- 
perimentalism, localism, dissent, and multiculturalism, see infra pp. i Io9, I 127-32, II 82, II 90-94. 
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system, a framework for evaluating what we would lose were we to 
heed the advice of many scholars and move toward a system that is 
more first-order diverse. 
This Article begins to sketch that affirmative account by develop- 
ing a competing notion of diversity, one tailored to the unique struc- 
tural features of juries, districts, and other small, disaggregated institu- 
tions. The analysis runs as follows. There are at least four reasons 
why we might value second-order diversity in some part of the democ- 
ratic infrastructure. First, second-order diversity provides a strategy 
for allocating power to electoral minorities that serves as a counter- 
weight to the influence model that otherwise dominates our system. It 
grants electoral minorities control over some subset of decisions, allow- 
ing them to exert the type of power usually reserved for the majority. 
It thus takes advantage of the disaggregated structure of these institu- 
tions to diffuse power. 
Second, heterogeneity of this sort "turns the tables" on the majority. 
It creates a distinct type of political space, one where members of the 
majority experience what it is like to be deprived of the comfort - 
and power - associated with their majority status. And it is one 
where electoral minorities enjoy the dignity to decide, where they are 
no longer confined to the role of dissenter or junior partner in every 
decisionmaking process. By destabilizing conventional political dy- 
namics, second-order diversity offers individuals a wide array of 
"scripts" for defining their civic and group identities. 
Third, second-order diversity provides a richer, more textured view 
of the democratic order. If every decisionmaking body mirrored the 
population, as with first-order diversity, we would expect the decisions 
rendered roughly to mirror the preferences of the median voter. By 
avoiding the push to the middle in every case, heterogeneity among 
decisionmaking bodies reveals the views of the full democratic spec- 
trum. Second-order diversity not only makes electoral minorities visi- 
ble, it does so in a manner that showcases division and dissent within 
groups, providing a kaleidoscope view of group difference. 
Fourth, second-order diversity allows us to "cycle." By varying the 
composition of decisionmaking bodies, second-order diversity allows us 
to take an experimental approach to designing decisionmaking institu- 
tions; it offers a feedback mechanism, providing additional informa- 
tion about how and when people divide. Further, second-order diver- 
sity allows us to cycle our normative commitments and thus to avoid 
privileging a single theory of democracy or identity over all others. 
And cycling allows us to vary our strategies for dealing with group 
conflict; it ensures that members of opposing groups revisit a political 
conflict in different contexts at different times. It thus avoids the 
problems associated with freezing into place a particular solution to 
group division. 
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There are, of course, costs associated with each of these benefits - 
a flip side to each of the arguments made above - and the notions of 
first-order and second-order diversity provide a framework for identi- 
fying those tradeoffs. For instance, while second-order diversity grants 
electoral minorities control over some decisions, the tradeoff is that 
electoral minorities lose the chance to influence a broader set of deci- 
sions. Although the tradeoff between influence and control is a well- 
worn debate with regard to unitary institutions like legislatures, there 
is something new to be said about that debate because of the unique 
way it plays out in the context of disaggregated institutions. We find a 
similar set of tradeoffs embedded in the other arguments relating to 
second-order diversity. The diffuse participatory benefits associated 
with turning the tables on the majority must be balanced against a 
discrete set of participatory costs. The benefits of visibility must be 
offset against the costs of variation, the loss of uniformity that occurs 
when electoral minorities have the power to issue outlier decisions. 
And the values associated with cycling should be weighed against the 
costs associated with endless experimentation, with the decision to 
make variation and conflict a permanent feature of any institutional 
structure. 
Two caveats are in order. First, although the purpose of this Arti- 
cle is simply to provide an analytic framework for evaluating the 
tradeoffs we face in designing disaggregated institutions, much of the 
Article is devoted to identifying the affirmative case for second-order 
diversity. That is because, for the reasons noted above, the arguments 
in favor of first-order diversity have been thoroughly canvassed in the 
literature. The approach is bottom-up; this Article looks to the hetero- 
geneity we already see in political institutions and tries to determine 
why we might value it. While this Article blends descriptive and nor- 
mative elements - it tries to offer the most attractive explanation 
available for an existing feature of our democratic infrastructure - I 
do not claim that the Article offers a theory for resolving all debates 
about diversity in the democratic system.5 Nor do I suggest that we 
ought to seek second-order diversity in every context possible. The 
purpose of this Article is simply to make the best case possible for sec- 
ond-order diversity and to provide a framework for identifying the 
tradeoffs inherent in the choice to pursue its benefits. 
Second, the argument offered here approaches the question of de- 
mocratic design from a structural rather than a rights-based perspec- 
tive. My focus is on achieving a well-functioning democratic process, 
5 For a more ambitious effort to build a coherent theory of diversity across a wide range of 
institutions and normative debates, see SCHUCK, supra note I. For another recent exploration of 
questions of diversity in a range of institutional settings, see SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING 
WITH DIVERSITY (200oo3). 
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not on preserving the rights of individuals.6 By examining these issues 
from this perspective, this Article necessarily presents an incomplete 
picture. This lens obscures important aspects of disaggregated institu- 
tions even as it brings other, neglected facets into sharper focus - spe- 
cifically, the role these institutions play in facilitating mass participa- 
tion and aggregating community judgments. 
Part I defines the key terms used in this Article. Part II identifies 
two ongoing legal debates that reveal a gap in the literature - the ab- 
sence of an affirmative account for the heterogeneity that presently ex- 
ists in parts of the democratic infrastructure. Part III then considers 
whether an affirmative case can be made in favor of that heterogene- 
ity. It looks to four unusual functions performed by institutions that 
are second-order diverse - four features that seem inconsistent with 
our conventional intuitions about diversity - and considers why we 
might value them. Part III also describes the tradeoffs inherent in the 
choice between first-order and second-order diversity and provides a 
few examples of how those tradeoffs play out in two institutional con- 
texts: juries and electoral districts. Part IV concludes by offering a 
sampling of the potential payoffs of conceptualizing diversity in these 
terms. It provides several examples of ongoing doctrinal, policy, and 
institutional design controversies in which the notions of first-order 
and second-order diversity might usefully frame the discussion. 
I. TERMS OF THE DEBATE 
Because some of the terms in this Article are my own, their mean- 
ing may not be intuitive. This Part defines the key terms used in this 
Article before turning to the main argument. 
A. First-Order and Second-Order Diversity 
There are as many definitions of the word "diversity" as reasons for 
caring about it.' Even when we use the word to talk about the issues 
6 Rights and structural analysis are, of course, related. See Heather K. Gerken, The Costs 
and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80o N.C. L. REV. 1411, 
1443-66 (2002) (exploring connections between individual voting-rights claims and structural con- 
cerns); see also id. at 1444 n.132 (collecting sources on the rights/structure debate in election law). 
For a thorough analysis of the relationship between structural analysis and individual rights out- 
side of the voting rights context, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998). See also Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term- 
Foreword: Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future 
- Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 13 HARV. L. REV. I io (1999); and Roderick M. Hills, 
Jr., Back to the Future? How the Bill of Rights Might Be About Structure After All, 93 NW. U. L. 
REV. 977 (1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra). 
7 As Peter Schuck notes, "[d]iversity, like most other things, means different things to different 
people, so rendering the notion mutually intelligible is difficult." SCHUCK, supra note I, at 19. 
We care about diversity for many reasons, and we place different limits on how "much" diversity 
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with which this Article is concerned - decisionmaking bodies and the 
composition of their membership - a variety of normative commit- 
ments can inform our understanding of the term. Nonetheless, as Pe- 
ter Schuck confirms, when academics use the term "diverse" in de- 
scribing the composition of an institution, they usually mean that its 
composition should be diverse in the first-order sense. As he observes, 
most diversity discourse exhibits a "strong tendency to look to propor- 
tionality [between the relevant body and the population] as the meas- 
ure" of diversity.8 For instance, many believe that, in the best of all 
possible worlds, half of our legislators would be women, all of our 
schools would be racially integrated, and the proportion of African 
American corporate executives in the United States would correspond 
to the proportion of African Americans in the population. Even if 
proponents of first-order diversity would not necessarily endorse the 
steps needed to achieve this goal in the short term, they favor it as a 
long-term aspiration. 
The term diversity is often invoked in opposition to segregation. 
When academics talk about "diversifying" an institution, they usually 
wish to integrate it. As a result, diversity has come to be equated with 
statistical integration. For example, when the University of Michigan 
boasts that its student body is "racially diverse," it means that the stu- 
dent body looks like the underlying population or applicant pool - 
majority white, with a population of students of color that hovers 
around twenty-five percent.9 Concomitantly, a school with a student 
body that is twenty percent women would have trouble claiming gen- 
der "diversity." Given the nation's tragic history with the notion of 
"separate but equal," those who subscribe to the ideal of first-order di- 
we seek in different contexts. Even with regard to the more narrow set of institutional concerns 
discussed here - democratic institutions and the composition of their membership - there is 
likely to be a wide range of views as to what constitutes diversity. Consider, for instance, that 
studies reveal that whites and African Americans think of "diversity" in quite different terms. See 
Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. 
REV. 291, 318 (1997) ("Blacks tend to think of an integrated neighborhood as being from thirty to 
sixty percent black. Among whites who express a commitment to integration, the optimal racial 
composition is around twenty percent black." (citation omitted) (citing Michael H. Schill, Decon- 
centrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 795, 818 (i991); and Reynolds Farley et 
al., Barriers to the Racial Integration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit Case, 441 ANNALS 97, 105 
(1979))); id. at 318-19 (criticizing the Supreme Court for describing majority-minority districts as 
"segregated" merely because they were majority-black). 
8 SCHUCK, supra note I, at 22-23, 164; see also LEVINSON, supra note 5, at 24 (suggesting 
that one common definition of diversity hinges on the notion that an institution ought to reflect 
"the demographic composition of the surrounding society"). 
9 Univ. of Mich., Undergraduate Admissions: Fast Facts, at http://www.admissions.umich. 
edu/fastfacts.html (last visited Jan. I5, 2005) (claiming a "[d]iverse" student body because students 
of color constitute twenty-five percent of its undergraduates). 
I 10o8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. I18:I099 
versity, quite appropriately, tend to resist claims that there is anything 
positive associated with departures from statistical integration. 
In the context of disaggregated institutions, the assumption that our 
choice is either segregation or statistical integration ignores a third 
possibility: that the democratic process may benefit from decisionmak- 
ing bodies that reflect a wide range of compositions. Second-order di- 
versity seeks variation among decisionmaking bodies, not within them. 
It favors interorganizational diversity, not intraorganizational diver- 
sity. Thus, whatever the axis of difference (race, gender, political af- 
filiation), second-order diversity describes a system in which at least 
some decisionmaking bodies look nothing like the population from 
which they are drawn. 
To offer a few concrete examples outside of the governance context, 
neighborhoods are diverse in the second-order sense. They are not sta- 
tistically integrated - few, if any, perfectly mirror the statewide popu- 
lation - and they vary dramatically in their socioeconomic and ethnic 
makeup.10 The nation's system of higher education - with its com- 
plement of traditionally black colleges and the "Seven Sisters," as well 
as its mix of specialized and liberal arts schools - is diverse in the 
second-order sense. And, as I explain below in discussing the two 
main examples presented in this Article, juries and electoral districts 
are second-order diverse as well. 
B. Disaggregated Democracy 
A key attribute of the democratic institutions that are the subject of 
this Article is that they are disaggregated - that is, the governance 
system comprises a number of roughly equal subparts. Juries, electoral 
districts, legislative committees, appellate panels, and school commit- 
tees can all be understood to be disaggregated in this sense. 
"Disaggregated democracy" represents a solution to the problem of 
facilitating participation and aggregating viewpoints in a mass society. 
Because we cannot bring the polity into a room to debate every ver- 
dict, set every policy, or pass every law, there are two main strategies 
for resolving these disputes. The first is to allow everyone to vote for 
representatives and allow those representatives to hash out these ques- 
tions; that is the solution we have chosen in the electoral context. The 
second strategy is to give everyone a chance to participate in the proc- 
ess seriatim; that is the solution we have chosen in the jury context. 
While no single jury is likely to be "representative" in any sense be- 
10 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT 
BUILDING WALLS 3 (1999); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN 
CITIES 4 (I961); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 236-41 
(1990). For a survey of the academic literature on diversity within and among neighborhoods, see 
SCHUCK, supra note I, at 214-18. 
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cause of its size, the jury system, in the aggregate, should give us a rich 
picture of communal norms. 
Other institutions represent a blend of the two strategies. For in- 
stance, those who volunteer for committee work in small town gov- 
ernments or hold a position on a local school committee are, in some 
sense, "representatives" - they have been elected or have volunteered 
to stand in for the whole. But they may think of themselves as doing 
their "stint" - a rotation akin to service on the jury - with the expec- 
tation that their neighbors will do the same in subsequent years. Simi- 
larly, appellate panels are temporary bodies that stand in for the whole 
- they render the decision of "the" court - and yet every member of 
the circuit serves on panels simultaneously or seriatim. Roughly the 
same can be said of legislative committees. 
Given their prevalence, disaggregated institutions as a class are 
surprisingly understudied. While scholars of federalism and local gov- 
ernment law have spent considerable time analyzing the costs and 
benefits of disaggregation in their respective fields, they have largely 
focused on values other than those canvassed by this Article,"1 and 
these scholars' insights have not been generalized to other contexts. 
The lack of scholarly attention to the special features of the institu- 
tions described here - their small size, disaggregated structure, and 
varied composition - may explain why scholars so often unthinkingly 
extend theories about the design of unitary institutions to small, disag- 
gregated ones. One of the main goals of this Article, then, is to tease 
out what makes disaggregated democracy special and what design 
strategy best takes advantage of its unique qualities. 
C. Minority, Majority, and Racial Identity 
Throughout this Article, I use the terms "minority" and "majority" 
to refer to numeric or electoral minorities and majorities. The notion 
of second-order diversity merely requires that the population be di- 
11 This focus derives from the special features of those institutional settings. For example, 
federalism and local government law are preoccupied with a set of governing institutions that are, 
on average, considerably larger than the ones described here. As a result, those institutions are 
often too large to serve as a tool for empowering the wide array of electoral minorities discussed 
here. Put differently, states and local governments can offer local variation, but not the type of 
intralocal variation that second-order diversity facilitates. See infra pp. 1162-63. Further, the 
relatively large size of these institutions precludes the type of direct participation in governance 
made possible by at least some of the institutions that are the focus of this Article. These institu- 
tional features may explain why the constitutive and participatory values associated with federal- 
ism and localism receive relatively little emphasis in the literature. Indeed, much of the intellec- 
tual work of federalism and local government law has focused on the relationship between 
governments - federal versus state, or state versus local. The institutions described here, in con- 
trast, are generally part of the same sovereign or polity as the central institution, thus raising a 
different set of analytic puzzles. See infra pp. II28-29. 
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vided along some axis of difference, and the arguments deployed here 
fit virtually any type of electoral minority - racial, socioeconomic, po- 
litical, religious - however defined. Of course, individuals are multi- 
faceted, and therefore almost everyone constitutes a minority along 
some axis of difference.12 My assumption here is simply that there are 
categories that will be salient to the political process - sufficient 
grounds for dividing the polity on a regular basis - even if the precise 
boundaries of these divisions are either porous or contingent. Even in 
a Dahlian world where "minorities rule"13 and no majority is a perma- 
nent one, permanent minorities may remain. Thus, the term "electoral 
minority" does not refer to someone who happens to be temporarily in 
the minority in a decisionmaking process characterized by constantly 
shifting majorities and fluid coalitional politics. For present purposes, 
the term refers to those trapped in a more stable political dynamic and 
consistently in the political minority on some meaningful subset of 
issues. 
Given the salience of race to American legal discourse, it is difficult 
to separate questions about minority status from debates about racial 
identity. For this reason, I often refer to race when offering an exam- 
ple of how my arguments play out in practice. And the Article is cer- 
tainly informed by a substantive commitment to an antisubordination 
theory of racial equality. Indeed, one way to understand second-order 
diversity is as a process-oriented rather than rights-oriented strategy 
for dealing with the problem of subordination. Nonetheless, I wish to 
bracket the debate about whether race is - or ought to be - a fluid 
identity category. Although a formal, stable conception of racial cate- 
gories permeates most legal debates,14 many commentators argue that 
race is a semifluid category, one that can be shaped by individuals as 
they participate in the political process.'is A full consideration of 
12 The leading proponent of the view that individuals have multiple identities that lead to 
cross-cutting alliances among different groups and majorities that shift on an issue-by-issue basis 
is, of course, Robert Dahl. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND 
OPPOSITION 20-32, 74-80 (1971); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
133 (1956). 
13 DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 12, at 133. 
14 See MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 
59 (1997). 
15 See, e.g., K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, in K. 
ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF 
RACE 30, 78-80 (1996) (arguing that although "racial identification is [hard] to resist" in part be- 
cause racial ascription by others is so insistent, one "can choose how central [one's] identification 
with it will be - choose, that is, how much [one] will organize [one's] life around that identity'); 
Richard T Ford, Beyond "Difference": A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 48 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (arguing in favor 
of a concept of racial identity "not as monolithic" but "as fluid and kaleidoscopic," and arguing 
that "American racial hierarchy creates a mix of racial identities"); see also MINOW, supra note 14, 
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whether we ought to promote a fluid conception of race - or any 
other identity category - is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is 
worth noting that many of the arguments I make in favor of second- 
order diversity fit well with scholarship that places special emphasis 
on the participatory dimensions of racial identity.16 
II. MINDING THE GAP: THE NEED FOR AN ANALYTIC 
FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE TWO ONGOING LEGAL DEBATES 
In order to ground this Article's discussion of the tradeoffs between 
first-order and second-order diversity, this Part examines two ongoing 
legal debates in which these tradeoffs are at stake. The first is a doc- 
trinal puzzle in the law governing jury discrimination; the second is an 
ongoing controversy about the appropriate strategy for implementing 
the Voting Rights Act. Each debate centers on an institution that is 
second-order diverse in practice: juries and electoral districts. In both 
contexts, there is an emerging scholarly consensus favoring policies 
that would, as a practical matter, move these institutions closer to the 
first-order end of the diversity spectrum. And while the costs of the 
heterogeneity we now see in these systems have been identified in both 
debates, the affirmative case for heterogeneity is largely absent. More- 
over, neither literature offers a framing mechanism for identifying the 
at 5o-5 i; IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 99 (2002); YOUNG, supra note 
io. A number of important, often overlapping literatures have explored the fluidity of identity 
categories, including strands of the antiessentialism critiques, intersectionality, Critical Race The- 
ory, and, most recently, Queer Theory. For a sampling, see Johanna E. Bond, International Inter- 
sectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women's International Human Rights 
Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 124-37 (2003); Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: 
Issues in the Ethics of Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW II5, 115-16 (David Kairys ed., 
3d ed. 1998); Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illu- 
sion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I, 20-39 (1994); Angela P. Harris, 
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 58I, 584 (1990); Dan R. Ortiz, 
Categorical Community, 51 STAN. L. REV. 769, 804-05 (I999). For a survey of the way these 
ideas have played out among social anthropologists, see Jonathan Y. Ikamura, Situational Ethnic- 
ity, 4 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 452 (1981). The notion that individuals can choose how central 
a group identification is to their individual identity should be contrasted with the notion of "cov- 
ering," which involves downplaying certain traits associated with a group identity due to social 
pressures. See generally Kenji Yoshino, Covering, iii YALE L.J. 769 (2002) (examining the con- 
cept in the context of sexual orientation). 
16 See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING 
RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11-14 (2002) (arguing that race 
should be understood as a political category); see also YOUNG, supra note io, at 156-91 (exploring 
how group members have participated in the reconstitution of their group identity). For example, 
much of this Article is preoccupied with the connections between identity and participatory ex- 
periences, and one of my primary claims is that we should value second-order diversity because it 
structures the political process in a manner that may help complicate identity categories. Other 
arguments in this Article, however, may be in some tension with a fluid conception of identity. 
The notion of turning the tables, for instance, depends on the existence of a set of socially recog- 
nizable categories of identity even as it seeks to undermine or complicate those categories. 
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tradeoffs embedded in the design choice at issue. Below I sketch out 
the basic terms of the two debates. I return to each of these topics at 
the end of the Article to show that second-order diversity provides a 
helpful conceptual framework for analyzing these issues. 
A. Juries and the Doctrinal Puzzle Created by Batson 
The jury system is a disaggregated institution that is second-order 
diverse in practice, and ongoing debates about the jury have paid little 
attention to that fact. Juries are second-order diverse because they are 
composed using a modified version of what is, at least in theory, a 
random assignment system." Random assignment ensures that a 
number of juries will look nothing like the population from which they 
are drawn. This is because random assignment generates a set of ju- 
ries that falls roughly along a normal distribution curve. Consider a 
state with a 35% African American and 65% white population. Under 
a system designed to achieve first-order diversity, three to four people 
on every jury would be African American. Under a system of random 
assignment, in contrast, about 33% of juries would include five to six 
17 I include the caveat "at least in theory" because the process by which the jury is chosen is 
not nearly as random as one might think. The jury pool is often not representative, as it can ex- 
clude a predictable segment of the population (those who do not speak English, transient indi- 
viduals, etc.). Moreover, for-cause strikes and the peremptory challenges exercised by counsel also 
undermine efforts to achieve a random draw. See, e.g., HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND 
THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 13-35 (1993); 
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, & THE LAW 232-33 (1997); Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Cross- 
Sectional Jury Representation or Systematic Jury Representation? Simple Random and Cluster 
Sampling Strategies in Jury Selection, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 31, 31-32 (i991); Hiroshi Fukurai et al., 
Spatial and Racial Imbalances in Voter Registration and Jury Selection, 72 Soc. & SOC. RES. 33 
(1987); Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Where Did Black Jurors Go? A Theoretical Synthesis of Racial 
Disenfranchisement in the Jury System and Jury Selection, 22 J. BLACK STUD. 196, 200 (1991); 
Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative 
Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 711-19 (1993) [hereinafter King, Racial Jury- 
mandering]; Nancy J. King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-Section 
by Design, 79 JUDICATURE 273, 273-74 (1996); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal To 
Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 
I100 (1994). Nonetheless, at least as an aspirational matter, the system is intended to assign jurors 
randomly. See, e.g., Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. ? 1861 (2000) ("[A]ll liti- 
gants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries se- 
lected at random from a fair cross section of the community ... ." (emphasis added)). 
One commentator summarizes the consensus on the matter when he states that "[t]he logi- 
cal, and desirable, way to impanel an impartial and representative jury - and the method chosen 
by Congress - is to put together a complete list of eligible jurors and select randomly from it." 
JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO 
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 18 (1977) (emphasis added). For a concise history of the develop- 
ment of the jury selection process in the United States, see Nancy Jean King, The American 
Criminal Jury, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 53-59 (1999). 
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African Americans and about 8% will have seven to eight African 
American jurors.18 
The use of jury districts also promotes variation in the composition 
of juries.19 Because jury districts are smaller than the state in which 
they are located and because of the existence of residential segregation, 
the use of jury districts increases the level of heterogeneity in jury 
composition. For instance, imagine that a jury district in a large urban 
area has a 65% African American population. About 4% of the juries 
randomly drawn from that district will contain eleven African Ameri- 
cans, about i i% will contain ten African Americans, and about 20% 
will contain nine African Americans.20 
One doctrinal puzzle in the law governing juries stems from how 
each jury is chosen.21 The law demands that jurors be drawn from a 
18 For a population that is 35% African American and 65% white, a system of random as- 
signment would yield the following probabilities for juries of various racial compositions: 
TABLE I. PROBABILITY OF JURIES WITH CERTAIN RACIAL COMPOSITIONS 
IN A SYSTEM OF RANDOM ASSIGNMENT 
White Jurors African American Jurors Probability 
(Population 65%) (Population 35%) 
12 0 0.6% 
II I 3.7% 
IO 2 10.9% 
9 3 19.5% 
8 4 24.7% 
7 5 20.4% 
6 6 12.8% 
5 7 5.9% 
4 8 2.0% 
3 9 0.4% 
2 io Negligible 
I II Negligible 
0 12 Negligible 
19 Juries are typically drawn from territorially defined districts rather than statewide popula- 
tions. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community 
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 389 (1999) (proposing a system of jury districting that 
would divide jury districts into even smaller subdistricts organized around "communities of inter- 
est"). Residential segregation ensures that individual jury districts depart from the statewide 
population breakdown, and the juries drawn from those districts will vary even more than they 
would if they had been drawn from a statewide pool. 
20 To arrive at these figures, simply reverse the ratios of African Americans and whites in the 
random assignment model above, see supra note 18. 
21 Few scholars have explored the doctrinal tensions between Sixth Amendment cross-section 
claims and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing 
Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 948 (I998) (noting the 
dearth of such scholarship). Much of that literature has been devoted to resolving another ten- 
sion between the two lines of cases: between the antiessentialist impulses of Batson and the prem- 
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"fair cross section of the community."22 But Batson v. Kentucky23 for- 
bids parties to take the direct steps that would be necessary to ensure 
that individual juries comport with the "fair cross-section requirement" 
- specifically, Batson prohibits using peremptory challenges to add or 
subtract jurors so that individual juries reflect the makeup of the 
community.24 Batson thus precludes the actions that would be neces- 
sary to remedy the type of racial and gender imbalances on individual 
juries that the fair cross-section doctrine seeks to avoid in the jury 
ise of the cross-section claim that race and gender matter to jury decisions. See Susan N. Her- 
man, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 
67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1815-33 (1993); Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Er- 
ror, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, Io6 YALE L.J. 93, 96-Io7 (1996); see also 
infra note 27 (collecting additional related sources). 
22 Cross-section claims do not require evidence of intentional discrimination. See Duren v. 
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (I979). Instead, the key to the claim is showing that a group is 
underrepresented in the pool given the makeup of the population. Id. As a result, a cross-section 
claim does more than prevent intentional discrimination; in practice, it functions like a disparate 
impact test that effectively imposes an affirmative duty on the government to produce a pool that 
roughly reflects the population. See id. at 366-67 (vindicating a cross-section claim regarding a 
venire that disproportionately excluded women when the skew was engendered by voluntary in- 
dividual decisions, not affirmative state discrimination); see also King, Racial Jurymandering, su- 
pra note 17, at 747 & n.153; Leipold, supra note 21, at 971. But see Albert W. Alschuler, The Su- 
preme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 184 (1989) (questioning whether cross-section claims embody an effects test 
on the ground that "if any difference between 'systematic' exclusion and 'purposeful' exclusion 
exists, it is subtle'"). Specifically, a prima facie case is established by showing (i) that the group 
excluded is "distinctive"; (2) that the group's representation "is not fair and reasonable in relation 
to the number of such persons in the community"; and (3) that "this underrepresentation is due to 
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. The 
burden then shifts to the state to offer a significant state interest "manifestly and primarily ad- 
vanced by" the system chosen by the state. Id. at 367-68. 
23 476 U.S. 79. 
24 Under Batson, one can challenge the exercise of a peremptory challenge used to exclude in- 
dividual jurors on the basis of race or gender. In Batson, the Court held that the Equal Protec- 
tion Clause forbids the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race through the exercise of peremptory 
challenges. Id. at 89. Batson involved a challenge by an African American defendant to the 
prosecutorial exercise of peremptory challenges against African American jurors. Id. at 83-84. 
Batson now extends to civil cases, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 
(1991); cases in which the juror and the defendant are of different races, see Powers v. Ohio, 499 
U.S. 400, 402 (1991); peremptory challenges exercised by a criminal defendant, see Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992); and peremptory challenges based on gender, see J.E.B. v. Ala- 
bama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). Although cross-section claims have been litigated as equal protec- 
tion claims, the Supreme Court has held that the cross-section requirement does not apply to per- 
emptory challenges. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478-84 (I990). Batson does, however, 
adopt a burden-shifting framework that bears some resemblance to the Court's approach for ad- 
judicating cross-section claims. Under Batson, the party contesting the peremptory challenge 
must establish a prima facie case by showing that the jurors excluded are members of a cogniza- 
ble racial group, the peremptory challenge leaves room for discrimination, or any other facts from 
which a court could draw an inference of discrimination. 476 U.S. at 96. The party exercising the 
peremptory challenge must then offer a neutral explanation to justify it. Id. at 97. 
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pool.25 The problem for courts and scholars is to explain this differen- 
tial approach. 
Many criminal procedure scholars have chosen to resolve this ten- 
sion by arguing, in effect, that the fair cross-section requirement 
should extend to individual juries - that is, they have claimed that 
juries ought to be first-order diverse.26 That is unsurprising, as almost 
any theory that would explain why we care about a pool that mirrors 
the population would also favor a jury that does the same.27 After all, 
25 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 (noting that a criminal defendant has no right to a jury that in- 
cludes members of his own race) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, Ioo U.S. 303, 305 (1880)); see 
also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145 n.19 (noting that the cross-section requirement does not mandate that 
juries be representative of "all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical 
groups of the community" (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946))); Her- 
nandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (noting "the rejected contention that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires proportional representation of all the component ethnic groups of the com- 
munity on every jury"); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950) (noting that "the number of 
races and nationalities appearing in the ancestry of our citizens would make it impossible to meet 
a requirement of proportional representation"); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 207-08 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (holding that Batson forbids district courts from adding and subtracting jurors in order 
to achieve a fair racial and religious mix of jurors). See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Racial 
Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 716 n.58 (1995) (collecting sources); Forde-Mazrui, supra 
note 19, at 368 (noting the Court's "ambivalence concerning the effect of representativeness on the 
quality of jury decision-making"); King, Racial Jurymandering, supra note 17, at 736-37 (noting 
that the Court has rejected arguments for race-conscious jury selection based on its beneficial im- 
pact on minority groups); Leipold, supra note 21 , at 965 (noting that a defendant is "entitled to a 
jury drawn from a fair cross section," but "when actually seating a jury,.. . he may not take those 
same characteristics into account"); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury 
Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 730 (1992) (noting that "the 
Court has consistently . . . refused to order juries of any particular racial composition"). 
26 See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL 
OF DEMOCRACY 129-31 (1994) (describing the rationale for extending the cross-section require- 
ment); King, Racial Jurymandering, supra note 17, at 709 & n.3 (documenting various efforts to 
diversify "jury district populations, juror lists, venires, and juries themselves"); id. at 726-29 & 
n.74. Political theorists have made similar arguments. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC 
JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 97-98 (1989) (proposing 
stratified random sampling). 
27 For instance, one of the most common justifications for cross-section claims is that members 
of different racial groups or genders vote differently, or at least draw upon different backgrounds, 
experiences, and perspectives in judging cases. On this view, fairness to the defendant demands 
that the jury be drawn from a diverse group of jurors to achieve what the Supreme Court has 
termed "diffused impartiality." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (quoting Thiel, 
328 U.S. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 26, at ioi; Al- 
schuler, supra note 25, at 721-23; Herman, supra note 21, at 1822. See generally Sheri Lynn John- 
son, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. i611 (1985) (surveying empirical 
data concerning the relationship between race and jury decisionmaking); King, Racial Juryman- 
dering, supra note 17, at 751 (describing the fairness theory); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like 
a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 12o0, 1209 (1992) (describing the relationship between fair representation and im- 
partiality). As several judges and commentators have observed, proponents of this theory would 
also want the jury itself to mirror the relevant population. See, e.g., McCollum, 505 U.S. at 60-62 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Ex parte Virginia, Ioo U.S. 339, 368-69 (1880) (Field, J., 
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if juries are making "the" law, we would presumably want everyone at 
the table when it is made. 
Policymakers and legal scholars have thus proposed a wide range 
of strategies to ensure diversity within the jury - that is, juries that 
are first-order diverse - including racial quotas,28 stratified selection 
procedures,29 channeling litigant choice,30 and jury subdistricting.31 
Even those scholars who do not argue for juries that are first-order di- 
verse tend to do so largely on pragmatic grounds, either out of concern 
that the techniques for achieving that goal are too costly32 or because 
dissenting); Herman, supra note 21, at 1823; Johnson, supra, at 1655; Leipold, supra note 21, at 
965, 995; Underwood, supra note 25, at 730. 
"Representation" is another notion invoked to support the argument that the pool from 
which jurors are drawn should reflect a fair cross-section of the population. See, e.g., Herman, 
supra note 21, at 1814 (arguing that the Court's approach to Batson hinges on a "representation- 
reinforcement theory"). The idea is that jury verdicts can be trusted if the jury is truly a "repre- 
sentative" body, see, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); Strauder, 0oo U.S. at 308, and 
hence, that members of every community should be included in the venire. This theory is often 
closely related to the argument for first-order diversity described above; representativeness is of- 
ten sought on the ground that jury verdicts ought to reflect the perspective of the entire commu- 
nity. Here again, supporters of this theory favor extending the cross-section requirement to the 
jury itself. As one commentator has noted, if the jury is a representative body, then the "full logic 
of the cross-sectional ideal" indicates it is not just the venire that should include members of each 
community, but the jury itself. ABRAMSON, supra note 26, at 125. 
Another theory used to buttress cross-section claims is, to paraphrase Justice O'Connor's 
oft-quoted line in a voting case, that the jury is one area where "appearances do matter." Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). On this view, whether or not the presence of women and racial 
minorities in the venire has an actual effect on verdicts, people think it does. As a result, public 
confidence in jury verdicts depends upon the juries' being drawn from a diverse pool of jurors. 
See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972); Alschuler, supra note 25, at 721-22; King, Racial Ju- 
rymandering, supra note 17, at 761; see also Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury 
Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1177, II86-90 (1994) (surveying empirical evidence for this claim). Here again, 
the theory plainly favors extending the fair cross-section requirement to juries themselves, so as to 
avoid controversies like those surrounding the juries in the Rodney King and O.J. Simpson trials. 
28 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 25, at 711 (describing the benefits of a quota system); Forde- 
Mazrui, supra note 19, at 357 n.21 (collecting sources). 
29 See King & Munsterman, supra note 17, at 274-76 (canvassing strategies and assessing their 
constitutionality). 
30 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note i9, at 366-67 (describing several proposals for diversifying 
the jury by limiting or expanding litigant choice in the selection of jurors); Deborah L. Forman, 
What Difference Does It Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 75-83 
(1992) (proposing separate pools of men and women to assure proportional representation of 
women on juries). 
31 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 19, at 389-95; Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 
531, 548 (1970). 
32 For instance, both Eric Muller and Andrew Leipold have argued that, in the words of the 
latter, "[a]ll a defendant should expect from the jury selection process is a pool that is in fact ran- 
domly drawn ... " Leipold, supra note 21, at 999; see also Muller, supra note 21, at 141-43. But 
Leipold explicitly acknowledges that his theory of impartiality naturally would require juries that 
also mirror the population: "If a jury is less likely to be impartial when a distinct group is ex- 
cluded from the [venire], it is hard to explain why a jury panel that by chance turns out to be all 
male or all white is nevertheless acceptable." Leipold, supra note 2 1, at 999. Muller and Leipold 
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their approach to the question proceeds on an intentionalist account of 
discrimination.33 
There are two things worth noting about this debate. The first is 
the absence of an affirmative account of the status quo - an explana- 
tion for why we might value the heterogeneity in juries that a random 
assignment system begets. The second is the need for a conceptual 
framework for identifying the tradeoffs involved in the choice to move 
toward a system that is more first-order diverse. The notion of sec- 
ond-order diversity helps remedy both omissions. 
B. Districts and the Debate over Implementing the Voting Rights Act 
Electoral districts, like juries, are disaggregated institutions that are 
second-order diverse in practice. Indeed, districting is one of the rare 
instances in which decisionmakers deliberately seek heterogeneity 
among political bodies,34 although they do so for reasons that have lit- 
tle to do with a normative commitment to the values associated with 
second-order diversity.3" The main reason districters draw districts 
with varying populations is to divide legislative power, fairly or other- 
wise. Rather than spreading members of an electoral minority evenly 
among all districts, as with first-order diversity, districters distribute 
thus try to justify the system on pragmatic grounds, an argument largely based on the view that 
mandating proportional representation on every jury is a "vain and impractical hope." Muller, 
supra note 21, at 141. 
33 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 169, 237-45; Underwood, supra note 25, at 727. 
34 Districters are always self-conscious about how they group voters. See Samuel Issacharoff, 
Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 223; 
Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 83, Ioi (arguing that territorial-based districting requires a self-conscious choice); 
see also BRUCE CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 4-6 (1984) (describing districting 
from the perspective of a reapportionment consultant and arguing that it is inevitably a political 
issue). Even neutral districting commissions like Iowa's must make choices about grouping vot- 
ers, even if they are able to eliminate partisanship from the process. Further, because districts are 
so large, alternative strategies for achieving second-order diversity in districts - such as a ran- 
dom assignment process - would generate almost no variation in district composition. Even the 
use of computer-generated districting plans is not neutral (assuming one adheres to a basic com- 
mitment to compactness and contiguity), because it privileges geography over other sources of 
community and, in any case, requires programming choices that preclude true neutrality. For an 
effort to harness computers to facilitate a fair districting process, see Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exer- 
cise in Line-Drawing: Deriving and Measuring Fairness in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcom- 
ing 2005). 
35 One might argue that heterogeneity in districting simply results from the fact that we define 
political subdivisions in territorial terms. Given the realities of residential segregation and local 
identity, using geography as the basis for distributing political power lends itself to heterogeneity 
among districts. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the choice to organize representation 
along territorial lines was a deliberate one. Indeed, from the early days of the Republic, district- 
ers have used geography as a proxy for interests of many sorts and have deployed territorial lines 
to ensure that minority interests are represented in the legislature. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF 
ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY II56-60 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the history of districting). 
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members of the group unevenly among districts to give them a chance 
to elect candidates to the legislature.36 To offer a rudimentary exam- 
ple, in a state where the population is sixty percent Democratic and 
forty percent Republican, few would suggest that all districts ought to 
mirror that breakdown, because if they did, no district would elect a 
Republican legislator.37 
As with juries, there is an ongoing debate in districting that maps 
onto the notions of first-order and second-order diversity.38 At present, 
the central question in redistricting law concerns the appropriate strat- 
egy for empowering racial minorities under the Voting Rights Act of 
I965.39 Prior to 2000, the doctrine governing dilution claims under the 
Act was reasonably well settled. The inquiry largely centered upon 
majority-minority districts,40 in which voters of color were likely to 
constitute more than half of the voters on election day. The wide- 
spread consensus was that when whites consistently voted in a bloc 
against the preferences of voters of color, the best way to ensure that 
36 Thus, in the words of Richard Pildes, "[t]he very theory of districted elections.., .is that 
democratic institutions are best designed by... fragmenting majoritarian domination. Districted 
elections empower local minorities who would otherwise be swallowed up in a system not self- 
consciously designed to ensure some representation of their interests." Richard H. Pildes, Diffu- 
sion of Political Power and the Voting Rights Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y I 19, 124 (2000). 
37 As a practical matter, the composition of districts hinges on partisan concerns because state 
legislators usually draw the boundaries. Self-interest leads some legislators to maximize partisan 
advantage by packing members of the opposing party into a few districts while creating many 
others where members of their own party are likely to win. Other legislators prefer the bipartisan 
gerrymander, which guarantees safe seats to incumbents on both sides of the aisle. Both strategies 
push districting plans toward the second-order end of the diversity spectrum. Indeed, in a state 
divided, as the nation currently is, evenly between Republicans and Democrats, first-order diver- 
sity would ensure that all districts were evenly divided and thus highly competitive, something 
the party in power is unlikely to favor. 
As with juries, demographic patterns enable districters to achieve variation in district com- 
position. However, because of the size of most districts, we would nonetheless expect less varia- 
tion in the composition of districts than in the composition of juries. After all, if people were 
evenly dispersed along every axis of difference, district composition would not vary at all. But the 
"law of large numbers" reduces variation among districts. Imagine, for instance, the odds of find- 
ing a jury that is seventy-five percent Asian American versus finding a federal congressional dis- 
trict that is seventy-five percent Asian American. 
The law of large numbers also reduces variation among juries, of course, and one might 
worry that juries are large enough that there will not be many juries on which electoral minorities 
are able to exercise even a majority of the votes. The existence of jury districts mitigates this 
problem. So does the "tipping point" dynamic on juries. Electoral minorities need not constitute 
a majority of the jury in order to affect the verdict; they need only have enough members so that 
one of them sits at the "tipping point" of the jury. Put more simply, one need not be in the middle 
of the jury to be the swing decisionmaker. See infra note 62. I am indebted to Louis Kaplow for 
raising this point. 
38 I explore these and other questions in greater detail in Heather K. Gerken, Diversity and 
Districting (Jan. 3, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
39 Pub. L. No. 89-II0o, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
40 See Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 217-25 (describing the consensus at the time). 
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the latter could elect a candidate of their own choosing was to create 
districts in which they enjoyed a majority.41 
Recent changes in voting patterns, combined with political pres- 
sures, have destabilized the Voting Rights Act's doctrinal foundations. 
Specifically, as some white Democrats have shown greater willingness 
to vote for African American and Latino candidates during the general 
election, a number of prominent political scientists and legal scholars 
have advocated creating what they term coalition districts - districts 
with a thirty-three to thirty-nine percent population of voters of color42 
- in which there is an even chance that a coalition of whites and vot- 
ers of color can elect the candidate preferred by members of both 
groups.43 The theory behind the coalition district is straightforward. 
Because white Democrats are more willing to vote for African Ameri- 
can and Latino candidates in general elections than in past decades, it 
is possible for communities of color to elect a "candidate of choice"44 
with a smaller share of the district's population if they form a coalition 
with white voters. Minority voters can thereby spread their votes 
across more districts and thus enjoy greater influence in the legislature. 
To put it in more concrete terms, proponents of the coalition-district 
theory argue that voters of color can have their cake and eat it too: 
41 See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and 
Voting Rights in the 2ooos, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1524-26 (2002). 
42 See Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework 
and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383, 1407-09 (2ool) (studying twenty southern 
congressional elections with black candidates from the 1990s and concluding that in most cases 
blacks needed to constitute only 33-39% of the voters to give a black candidate 50o% of the votes). 
43 Specifically, coalition districts are those in which there is a fifty-fifty possibility that the 
candidate of choice of African American or Latino voters will be elected by a coalition of white 
voters and voters of color. See id. at 1407. The progenitors of coalition districts, a group of 
scholars who often clashed on issues of race and redistricting in the past, are Bernie Grofman, 
Lisa Handley, and David Lublin, see supra note 42. For a general introduction to the social sci- 
ence arguments in favor of coalition districts and their legal and normative ramifications, see 
Pildes, supra note 41, at 1523-39. For an examination of how the coalition-district theory was 
implemented in New Jersey, see Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh Redistricting 
Paradigm Emerges in New Jersey, I ELECTION L.J. 7 (2002). Other academics have gone further 
in challenging majority-minority districts, arguing in favor of influence districts, where voters of 
color cannot realistically elect a candidate of choice given the likely decisions of white voters, but 
instead can only influence that choice. See Pildes, supra note 41, at 1539-40 (describing but not 
endorsing that strategy). The basic argument is that it is better for racial minorities to influence 
many elected representatives than to control a few. Although influence districts have gained some 
adherents, see CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS 207-25 (1995), they have 
not received nearly as much support within the academy as coalition districts. 
44 For a more in-depth discussion of this term and its complexities, see Pildes, supra note 41, at 
1526 n.22. 
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they can elect members to the Congressional Black Caucus and still 
have Mel Watt serve as a committee chair.45 
Quite unexpectedly, the Supreme Court recently endorsed the 
newly minted coalition-district theory in Georgia v. Ashcroft, a case in- 
terpreting Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.46 The Ashcroft majority, 
in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, granted considerable deference to 
the state's judgment that coalition districts best served the interests of 
racial minorities.47 Even more remarkably, while the case elicited a 
vigorous dissent from four Justices, the dissent drafted by Justice 
Souter also endorsed the theory behind the coalition-district strategy.48 
Both within the Court and the academy, then, coalition districts seem 
to be emerging as the new "third way" in race-conscious redistricting. 
At first glance, setting aside important questions about how judges 
can sensibly implement the coalition-district theory,49 one might think 
that there can only be one answer to the question posed by Georgia v. 
Ashcroft. If the purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to empower racial 
minorities, then the coalition-district strategy seems obviously superior 
to majority-minority districting because it allows racial minorities to 
elect more candidates "of choice" to the legislature.50 
Here again, we have a gap in the literature: no one has systemati- 
cally identified the costs and benefits associated with the abandonment 
of majority-minority districts outside the debate about legislative in- 
fluence. Admittedly, the link between that debate and the notion of 
second-order diversity may not be immediately obvious, as the argu- 
ment favoring coalition districts centers on the appropriate strategy for 
empowering racial minorities at the legislative level, not a broader 
normative commitment to first-order diversity.51 Nonetheless, as with 
45 See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 470 (2003) (noting that the switch to coalition 
districts in the state senatorial plan was endorsed by African American legislators in part because 
"[a]t least 7 of the i i black members of the Senate could chair committees"). 
46 Id. at 486-91. 
47 See id. at 482-83. 
48 See id. at 492 (Souter, J., dissenting). While the Ashcroft majority also endorsed influence 
districts as a strategy of minority empowerment, Justice Souter's dissent rejected that conclusion. 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 482-83; id. at 492-93 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
49 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 7, at 300. 
50 But see id. at 294-313 (analyzing the weaknesses of a coalition or influence model as com- 
pared to a majority-minority archetype). I flag "of choice" in scare quotes precisely because what 
constitutes a candidate of choice is hotly contested, requiring both an empirical judgment about 
support and a normative judgment about how much compromise we should expect of African 
American or Latino voters. 
51 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), offered the closest thing one can find to a normative vi- 
sion in districting that privileges first-order diversity. See id. at 648; cf Pildes, supra note 41, at 
1547-49 (drawing a connection between some of the concerns animating Shaw and support for 
coalition districts). Some arguments made in favor of Shaw concern the need to reduce the sali- 
ence of race in politics, something that might lead to the inference that districts should look alike 
and generally reflect statewide population totals. 
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juries, the concepts of first-order and second-order diversity dovetail 
neatly with the debate, providing a framing device for assessing the 
relative merits of the two strategies. The notion of second-order diver- 
sity is useful here because, as a practical matter, the trend toward coa- 
lition districts is essentially a push from second-order diverse districts 
(in which majority-minority districts cause wide variations in the com- 
position of districts) to first-order diverse districts (in which the per- 
centage of racial minorities approaches their percentage of the overall 
population). 
The debate over Ashcroft thus far has largely centered on dividing 
power within a unitary institution - the legislature - and both ma- 
jority-minority districts and coalition districts have largely been con- 
ceived of as byproducts of competing legislative design strategies. By 
conceiving of heterogeneity in district composition as something more 
than a tool of legislative design - as embodying an independent set of 
democratic values - the notion of second-order diversity provides a 
vocabulary for describing the costs and benefits associated with major- 
ity-minority districts beyond those involving legislative control. 
III. MINING THE GAP: THE TRADEOFFS 
BETWEEN FIRST-ORDER AND SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY 
As the preceding discussion suggests, there is a gap in the legal lit- 
erature: we lack an affirmative account of the benefits of heterogeneity 
that we now see in some democratic institutions, as well as a framing 
device for identifying the costs and benefits associated with maintain- 
ing, or abandoning, this existing feature of our democratic infrastruc- 
ture. This Article tries to remedy this omission by developing a con- 
ceptual framework for analyzing the tradeoffs involved in designing 
the disaggregated portions of our democracy. It begins with the prem- 
ise that we ought to take these institutions' unique features into ac- 
count when we consider the law that governs them and the many pro- 
posals to move them closer to the first-order end of the diversity 
spectrum.52 
52 In his work on legislative decisionmaking, Jeremy Waldron argues that "statutes... are es- 
sentially - not just accidentally - the product of large and polyphonous assemblies." JEREMY 
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT io (1999). He therefore claims that "this feature should 
be made key to our understanding of how to deal with them - how to interpret them and how to 
integrate them into the broader body of the law." Id. This Article begins with a weaker version 
of Waldron's premise. It does not claim that the institutional features on which it focuses - the 
disaggregated structure, small size, and varied composition of the institutions in question - are 
necessarily "essential" to the function they perform. Nor does it suggest that the arguments of- 
fered here were the reason that such disaggregated institutions were created. As Hanna Pitkin 
observes, whether institutions are established with a clear purpose or are merely the product of 
historical accident, "institutions develop a momentum or inertia of their own." PITKIN, supra 
note I, at 235. The question addressed in this Article, then, is simply whether "[t]he persistence of 
1122 HARVARD LA W REVIEW [Vol. 118:1099 
This Part mines the territory within the gap that Hanna Pitkin 
identifies between "purpose" and "institutionalization" - between the 
principles that undergird an institution and its structure in practice.53 
It thus looks to the oddities produced by the disaggregated structure, 
small size, and varying composition of the institutions in question - 
the attributes of these institutions that seem inconsistent with our con- 
ventional intuitions about diversity - and suggests why we might 
value them. It considers the questions that would naturally arise 
about a governing institution that is second-order diverse: Why 
wouldn't we want to guarantee electoral minorities a fair share of 
power on every decisionmaking body? Why would we worry if mem- 
bers of the majority constitute the majority on a decisionmaking body? 
Why would we value a governing institution whose decisions vary, 
even conflict? Is there any justification for deliberately ensuring that 
decisionmaking bodies do not reflect a coherent design theory? This 
Part then identifies potential benefits to each anomaly and contrasts 
those benefits with their concomitant costs. In doing so, it begins to 
craft a vocabulary for talking about the tradeoffs inherent in the type 
of legal and policy debates described in Part II. 
Disaggregated institutions that are second-order diverse typically 
perform four functions that distinguish them from institutions that are 
first-order diverse: second-order diversity gives electoral minorities a 
chance to control governmental power, as described in section III.A; it 
turns the table on the majority, creating a unique democratic space 
where members of the majority and minority abandon their usual par- 
ticipatory role, as explained in section III.B; it fosters democratic visi- 
bility, as discussed in section III.C; and it cycles our design strategy, 
normative commitments, and strategies for dealing with conflict, as 
explained in section III.D. This Part then offers a mix of intrinsic and 
instrumental reasons why we might value these functional differences 
and examines the tradeoffs inherent in pursuing such benefits in sec- 
tion III.E.54 
[an] anomaly" in institutional design over time suggests not anachronism, but what Robert Cover 
would term "institutional evolution." Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: 
Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 642 (1981). 
53 PITKIN, supra note I, at 235-36. 
54 These terms are well-developed in the political theory literature, so what I offer here repre- 
sents an extremely rudimentary definition. "Intrinsic" benefits are those we value in their own 
right. "Instrumental" benefits are those we value as a means to an end - here, a well-functioning 
democratic process. One could organize the arguments presented in this Article by type of benefit 
- intrinsic or instrumental - rather than by function. Most of the arguments offered in this Ar- 
ticle are instrumental in nature. For example, this Article argues that we should value second- 
order diversity because it helps electoral minorities develop their participatory sea legs and edu- 
cates members of the majority about the costs their decisions inflict on others, both of which pro- 
mote a well-functioning democratic process. Some of the arguments touch upon intrinsic con- 
cerns. For example, this Article claims that we ought to value in their own right opportunities for 
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The bulk of this Part is devoted to discussing the benefits associ- 
ated with second-order diversity and the costs that one might think of 
as internal to the theory - that is, the costs that arise directly from the 
same design feature as the benefits. This approach merely reflects the 
fact that the case in favor of second-order diversity is underdeveloped 
and I do not have much to say about the other costs associated with 
second-order diversity (which also might be described as the benefits 
of first-order diversity) beyond what has already been set forth in the 
literature. 
Because the purpose of this Part is to sketch the framework at a 
fairly high level of generality, I do not offer a full analysis of the costs 
and benefits of second-order diversity in any particular institutional 
setting. Nonetheless, in order to ground the analysis somewhat, I use 
juries and districts as examples to illustrate how we might think about 
these considerations in particular institutional contexts. These exam- 
ples are useful not only because both structures are second-order di- 
verse in practice, but also because the differences between the two in- 
stitutions - the strategy used for diffusing power, the institutional role 
they play, the democratic outputs they generate, and the tools used to 
achieve heterogeneity - nicely frame some of the arguments offered 
below. Thus, each section includes an analysis of the benefits associ- 
ated with second-order diversity, a brief exploration of its concomitant 
costs, and one example showing how those tradeoffs might play out 
depending on the institutional setting.55 
electoral minorities to elect a champion or craft a decision. Admittedly, one might think that such 
opportunities are actually instrumental - a means to achieve a well-functioning democracy - 
but they can also be described, in some senses, as constitutive of a well-functioning democracy. 
Cf. J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, 40 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 339, 343 (1974) (arguing that 
activities can be "constituents of or ingredients in" a good life rather than means to achieve the 
end of the good life (emphasis omitted)). A third category of arguments - those associated with 
cycling as a strategy for dealing with normative difference or political conflict - are more meth- 
odological in nature, although these arguments, too, could be classified as "instrumental" or "in- 
trinsic" in some rough sense. 
55 Vikram Amar makes a different type of connection between jury service and voting, argu- 
ing that both ought to be understood as "political rights" rather than as "civil rights." See gener- 
ally Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 203 (1995). For a nuanced, historical analysis of these concepts as they played out in the 
wake of the Nineteenth Amendment, see Gretchen Ritter, Jury Service and Women's Citizenship 
Before and After the Nineteenth Amendment, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 479 (2002). Other commenta- 
tors have drawn connections between juries and elections. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Chris- 
tian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both Impartial and Representative: Utilizing Cumula- 
tive Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703 (1998) (proposing to replace peremptory 
challenges with a cumulative voting scheme in order to avoid discrimination in the selection of 
jurors); Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1169, 1172 (1995) (drawing connections between juries and other forms of self-government); 
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 19, at 388-403 (proposing jury subdistricting to achieve more represen- 
tative juries); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. 
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A. The Tradeoff Between Influence and Control 
in Disaggregated Institutions 
One of the functional oddities second-order diversity produces is 
that it grants electoral minorities control over some subset of democ- 
ratic decisions. A central question in democratic design, of course, is 
how much power ought to be allocated to an electoral minority in a 
majoritarian system.56 As long as we agree that the same majority 
should not decide things all of the time, the challenge is to figure out 
how to ensure that electoral minorities get a fair shake in the political 
process.57 In answering that question, of course, we need to know 
more about the system itself, and the notion of second-order diversity 
helps tailor that inquiry to small, disaggregated institutions. 
Specifically, one problem for addressing how best to treat electoral 
minorities is that we usually conceive of democratic bodies as unitary 
- there is one legislature rendering "the" law, one populace voting on 
"the" initiative.58 It is thus quite difficult to discern what power an 
electoral minority ought to have in making "the" decision. Our intui- 
tions about the legitimacy of majoritarian rule lead us to resist propos- 
als to allow electoral minorities to "take turns"59 exercising majority 
power or create a minority veto.60 We thus assume that the best - 
L. REV. 2001, 2016-17 & n.73 (1998) (connecting the Court's struggle with the problem of essen- 
tialism in the jury context to that of districting). 
56 As Ian Shapiro notes, while for certain periods of our history majoritarianism was an op- 
positional ideal, in the United States "[t]he problem was to domesticate and institutionalize an 
idea whose historical use had been to destabilize institutions." Ian Shapiro, Three Fallacies Con- 
cerning Majorities and Minorities in Politics, in NOMos XXXII: MAJORITIES AND 
MINORITIES 79, 80 (John W. Chapman & Alan Wertheimer eds., 1990). He observes that Ameri- 
can theorists have long wrestled with the problem of protecting electoral minorities from majority 
rule. Id. 
57 As Michael Klarman has observed, "majority rule can take a variety of forms - including 
... a majority's enjoying all of the political power or simply a majority of it." Michael J. Klar- 
man, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 525 (1997). 
58 With apologies to those scholars who have labored to debunk the view that the legislature is 
a unitary actor. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 52; Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," 
Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
59 See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 5 (1994); id. at 65-66 (discussing deliberative gerrymandering 
as the "third-generation problem" of voting-rights claims). Guinier's proposal is more radical, 
however, as she suggests taking turns exercising power in unitary bodies, like legislatures, rather 
than disaggregated ones, like electoral districts. If, however, one thinks of legislative acts as a col- 
lection of decisions disaggregated temporally, our two visions of taking turns may dovetail. 
60 Cf Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in DEMOC- 
RACY'S VALUE 163, 178-79 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cord6n eds., 1999) (describing ten- 
sions between majoritarian notions and the minority veto, and describing the latter as a "self- 
defeating extreme"). But see GUINIER, supra note 59, at 16-17 (proposing a minority veto); 
YOUNG, supra note io, at 184 (same); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights 
Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1O77, 1145-54 (1991) (same). 
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perhaps the only - model for distributing power fairly is to give elec- 
toral minorities influence, but not control, over the decision. 
When a democratic institution is disaggregated, there are more op- 
tions for thinking about democratic fairness. The concept of first- 
order diversity dovetails with the influence model traditionally de- 
ployed in unitary systems. Under a system that is first-order diverse, 
members of an electoral minority will have the same share of seats or 
votes on every decisionmaking body. Under certain circumstances, 
this could be an excellent model - depending on the dynamics of the 
decisionmaking process, members of the group could affect every deci- 
sion made. But they will also be destined to be in the minority coali- 
tion should the decisionmakers divide along group lines. Moreover, 
whether the decisionmakers reach a consensus or fragment along 
group lines, we would see the same decisionmaking process reproduced 
again and again. Decisions would reflect the views of the median de- 
cisionmaker, the institutional equivalent of the swing voter. Democ- 
ratic outcomes would be roughly the same. In short, in a system that 
is first-order diverse, we would see one form of democratic compro- 
mise, not many. 
One might think that these observations would not apply to first- 
order diverse institutions governed by a unanimity rule, such as the 
jury. On this view, the only person who matters is the fringe voter, 
who can "hold out" and force the other jurors to acquiesce to her more 
extreme position. While voting rules plainly affect jury deliberations, 
group dynamics matter a great deal as well. Indeed, contrary to this 
theory about hold-outs, "strong social-psychological evidence" suggests 
"that the pressure to conform was nearly irresistible when a single per- 
son was faced with a unanimous majority."61 Thus, the jurors most 
likely to determine the outcome of a case are those at the "tipping 
point" of the jury, not those who hold the most extreme position in the 
group.62 In sum, in institutions governed by a unanimity rule, indi- 
61 Phoebe C. Ellsworth, One Inspiring Jury, ioi MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1396 (2003) (book re- 
view); see also JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 153-55 (1992). 
62 Commentators have summarized the empirical evidence regarding the "tipping point" in 
jury decisionmaking by identifying which jurors are likely to represent the functional equivalent 
of the swing voter. See, e.g., Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decisionmaking: 45 Years of Empirical 
Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 692 (2o01) (finding different 
thresholds for acquittal and conviction, and challenging the traditional hypothesis that the critical 
threshold is the two-thirds mark); see also Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric 
Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation: Jurors' Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 21, 21-22 (1988). For some empirical evidence regarding the complexity of group dy- 
namics on the jury, see Devine et al., supra. For a discussion of the effects of voting rules on jury 
deliberations and verdicts, see id. at 669. See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED 
DISSENT 164-65 (2003); Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experi- 
ment in Jury Reform, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 133-36, 144-48 (1996). 
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viduals who occupy the ends of the democratic spectrum are unlikely 
to prevail. 
Under a system that is second-order diverse, in contrast, some deci- 
sionmaking bodies will mirror the population; others will consist of a 
majority of people from the "left" or the "right," Democrats or Repub- 
licans, fundamentalists or atheists, whites or African Americans. In 
some decisionmaking bodies, moderate Democrats or suburban whites 
will be the swing voters; in others, libertarians, Latinos, rural Republi- 
cans, fundamentalist Christians, or Greens will cast the decisive votes. 
Second-order diversity thus offers an alternative strategy for 
achieving fairness in a disaggregated democracy. Rather than giving 
electoral minorities "influence" over each decision, it gives some elec- 
toral minorities the chance to be in the majority on a decisionmaking 
body and ensures that someone who is not in the middle of the politi- 
cal spectrum will have the chance to be the swing voter. In short, sec- 
ond-order diversity grants some minority group members the power to 
decide, a power usually enjoyed solely by members of the majority.63 
The notions of first-order and second-order diversity provide a 
frame for examining the tradeoff between influence and control in dis- 
aggregated democratic institutions. First, this framing device reveals a 
set of instrumental benefits that have not yet been fully explored in the 
literature. Second, it points to some complexities in the influence/ 
control tradeoff that have often been overlooked by scholars - spe- 
cifically, the fact that the influence/control tradeoff occurs at two levels 
of governance. 
i. The Benefits of Control: Diffusing Power. - Perhaps the most 
obvious reason to value second-order diversity and the control it gives 
to electoral minorities in disaggregated democratic institutions is an in- 
strumental one. The concern one might naturally have about democ- 
ratic institutions that are first-order diverse is that they might give a 
majority faction the power to decide in every case. Second-order di- 
versity may be attractive because it is a useful strategy for diffusing 
political power in a majoritarian system. 
The way that second-order diversity diffuses power in practice will 
depend on the institution in question. For some disaggregated institu- 
tions, second-order diversity frustrates the majority faction simply by 
disaggregating power. For others, it allows electoral minorities to 
63 Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 298 (1980) (con- 
cluding that one argument that favors a "responsive lottery" - a weighted lottery for resolving 
disputes - is that "it gives the egalitarian minority at least some chance of determining the politi- 
cal outcome"); RICHARD S. KATZ, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 44 (I997) ("Would not a bet- 
ter notion of popular sovereignty assure that each individual or group saw its view prevail a fair 
proportion of the time?"). 
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"edit" the law they lack the power to "authorize," by making overlap- 
ping majorities necessary to get something done. 
In one sense, second-order diversity is a structural strategy for 
achieving Madison's goal of thwarting majority factions in a society 
with entrenched group divisions.64 Consider the electoral district. 
Madison and the Federalists favored large districts, even at-large dis- 
tricts, for electing legislators.65 Large districts, of course, preclude 
much variation in population and thus move districts closer to the 
first-order end of the diversity spectrum. That, of course, is why 
Madison favored them; as he recognized, an increase in the size of a 
district makes it less likely that a faction will control it.66 
We might, however, be equally suspicious of big districts or other 
large units of governance because they consistently submerge electoral 
minorities. Second-order diversity thus celebrates heterogeneous deci- 
sionmaking bodies (like small districts) because they give members of 
many groups a chance to exercise power. Put differently, while Madi- 
son sought to resolve the problem of factions by expanding the polity 
- making it large enough so that fluid coalition politics would prevail 
- second-order diversity tries to reduce the dangers of factionalism by 
disaggregating the polity.67 
Given that most disaggregated institutions are, like juries, at the 
lower end of the political hierarchy - they are usually charged with 
implementing or applying a legislative mandate - there is a second 
way in which second-order diversity diffuses power: it grants electoral 
minorities the power to "edit" the law by trimming or softening major- 
ity mandates when they lack the power to "author" the law itself.68 
64 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1o, at 82-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323-25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
65 See THE FEDERALIST NO. Io, supra note 64, at 83; see also Mark A. Graber, Conflicting 
Representations: Lani Guinier and James Madison on Electoral Systems, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 
291, 299-300 (1996). This strategy may be impossible for some disaggregated institutions, like the 
jury, unless we move toward the Athenian practice of convening juries composed of several hun- 
dred, even a thousand, members. See ANTONY ANDREWES, THE GREEKS 179 (1967). For an 
analysis of the differences between the modern jury and its ancient counterpart, see DANIELLE S. 
ALLEN, THE WORLD OF PROMETHEUS: THE POLITICS OF PUNISHING IN DEMOCRATIC 
ATHENS 6-7, 168-79 (2000). 
66 See THE FEDERALIST NO. io, supra note 64, at 83. 
67 For an analysis of how debates about the relationship between size and governance played 
out during the Founding, see AMAR, supra note 6, at 7-17; and Hills, supra note 6, at 981-83. 
68 I borrow these phrases from Philip Pettit. See Pettit, supra note 60, at 164. Pettit, however, 
uses them in a slightly different context, discussing the need to grant electoral minorities the op- 
portunity to "edit" the law by contesting it in an acceptably neutral process - such as a proceed- 
ing before a judge, a jury, or an administrative agency - and thereby to vindicate what he terms 
a "contestatory" or "oppositional" model of democracy. Id. at 183-85. His conception of dissent 
focuses more on elites and less on a populist conception in which the people speak for themselves. 
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Here, federalism,69 the most fully theorized institutional strategy for 
diffusing majoritarian power through a "control" rather than an "influ- 
ence" model, provides a useful counterpoint to the framing argument. 
For these purposes the crucial distinction is that federalism diffuses 
power by creating competing majorities, while second-order diversity 
does so through a system of overlapping ones. 
The argument that federalism provides a strategy for diffusing ma- 
jority power is well developed. Building on the work of academics 
like Herbert Wechsler, who lauded states as guardians of minority in- 
terests from centralized power,70 proponents of federalism claim that it 
reduces the problems associated with centralized power by creating 
"two ongoing levels of government, each with leadership independ- 
ently chosen by the people."71 Proponents thus argue that federalism, 
by "forc[ing] us always to ask why.. . a majority of this demos [is] 
relevant for deciding this issue," facilitates "democratic social coopera- 
tion in many circumstances in which nationalism does not."72 
The notion of second-order diversity strikes a different compromise 
with majoritarianism. Federalism hinges on the existence of state sov- 
ereigns, autonomous realms where the state decisionmaker is preemi- 
nent.73 The disaggregated institutions that are the focus of this Article 
are quite different. These decisionmaking bodies tend to be charged 
with applying or implementing the law enacted by the polity (for ex- 
ample, juries applying the law handed down by the state legislature, or 
school committees implementing state law), and their governing au- 
69 For simplicity's sake, I focus here on the American variant of federalism. For a comprehen- 
sive analysis of the arguments in favor of and against federalism in the United States, see JESSE 
H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980); 
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (3d ed. 1984); 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (I995); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Fed- 
eralism: "Converse-I983" in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (I994); Michael W. McConnell, Fed- 
eralism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987); and Herbert Wechsler, 
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection 
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
70 See Wechsler, supra note 69, at 546-47. For a critique of this view, see Amar, supra note 69, 
at 1240-43. 
71 Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, iii 
HARV. L. REV. 218o, 22I9 (1998); see also McConnell, supra note 69, at 1503. 
72 Stephen G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of 
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 742, 763 (1995); see also Barry Friedman, Valuing Fed- 
eralism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 403 (I997). 
73 Daniel Elazar thus distinguishes federalism from a purely decentralized system: Federalism 
"is often mislabeled decentralization, but should more appropriately be called noncentralization. 
The American federal union differs from a decentralized political system in that constitutional 
limits are imposed on the extent to which the national government can concentrate as well as de- 
volve governmental power and functions." ELAZAR, supra note 69, at 2. Vicki Jackson has simi- 
larly argued that sovereignty is a crucial feature of American federalism. See Jackson, supra note 
7I, at 2219. 
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thority does not exist separate and apart from the sovereign's.74 Their 
decisionmaking power is thus bounded by the majority's choices. 
That is not to say that these institutions should be mistaken for 
subunits of a purely centralized system, in which a unitary body de- 
volves some of its power to administrative underlings. At some level 
of abstraction, of course, states generally have the power to constitute 
and dissolve most types of disaggregated democratic institutions. But 
as a practical matter, these subunits are in some senses constitutive of 
the central authority. The law passed by a legislature cannot exist 
separate and apart from the juries that apply it. Legislators cannot en- 
ter every school in order to ensure compliance with their policies.75 
Further complicating the relationship between disaggregated insti- 
tutions and the central source of power is the fact that the central au- 
thority often cannot choose the membership of the implementing body. 
Thus, as with states in a federal system, the members of a jury or a 
school committee are not bureaucrats beholden to the central power, 
but draw their authority from an independent source.76 
What this means in practice is that one needs overlapping majori- 
ties to get something done.77 In order to convict a defendant, for ex- 
ample, a majority of the legislators needs to agree the conduct is gen- 
erally harmful and a jury must agree to apply that legislative 
prohibition to a particular defendant.78 In order to achieve a particu- 
74 These institutions come closer to what has been termed "cooperative federalism," where 
Congress "invite[s] state agencies to implement federal law." Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitu- 
tional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665, 671 (20oo01); see also 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998); Susan Rose- 
Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-Optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983). 
75 I am indebted to Jessie Amunson for helping me think through this question. 
76 As two well-known critics of federalism have claimed, the difference between federalism 
and mere decentralization is that only in a federal system do "subordinate units possess prescribed 
areas of jurisdiction that cannot be invaded by the central authority, and leaders of the subordi- 
nate units draw their power from sources independent of that central authority." Edward L. 
Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 
911 (1994). 
77 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 15, 39, 133-72 (1993) (exploring the idea of an 
"overlapping consensus" and its role in Rawls's theory of justice). 
78 Cf Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 314 (1988) (positing that juries "guard against arbitrary 
abuses of power by interposing the commonsense judgment of the community"); Rachel E. 
Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory 
Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 36-37 (2003) (arguing that juries "mitigate or temper" unduly 
broad criminal prohibitions, but expressing concern that the jury's ability to do so has recently 
been undermined). Bill Stuntz has suggested that there are actually three overlapping majorities 
in this example - the legislature, the prosecutor (often elected by a majority of the county), and 
the jury majority. That claim is supported by Kathryn Abrams's observation that "[t]he sub- 
stance of prosecutions and the range of educational and legislative tasks undertaken by the prose- 
cutor vary demonstrably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction - variations that arise not only from 
the demographics of each area but also from the expressed preferences of its citizens." Kathryn 
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lar educational policy in a school, a legislature must pass the law and a 
school committee must decide how to implement it."9 The majorities 
in these subunits are not autonomous in the way states are under a 
federal system. Absent an unusual feature granting the lower body 
veto power - like the power of the jury to nullify - the lower body is 
partially constrained by the wishes of the centralized majority. None- 
theless, in the gap between the rule and its interpretation lies the need 
for a second majority, a significant source of political power that a cen- 
tralized authority, at least in the long term, cannot eliminate. Put dif- 
ferently, second-order diversity takes advantage of the democratic pos- 
sibilities associated with interstitial decisionmaking. 
To add a further twist, the "overlapping majorities" in question in- 
tersect in intriguing ways with separation-of-powers issues.80 Separa- 
tion of powers, of course, also turns on a requirement of overlapping 
majorities. After all, the point of the separation of powers is that "no 
simple majority of any single body of deciders can do anything with- 
out the concurrence of a majority of some other body of deciders."81 
In the context of second-order diverse institutions, however, the sepa- 
ration-of-powers analysis takes on an interesting overlay. There are at 
least some disaggregated institutions in which the relevant decision- 
making bodies perform the kind of check we generally understand a 
tripartite governing scheme to perform. Juries, for instance, check leg- 
islative overreaching, and school committees can cabin the policies of 
the legislature. 
Abrams, Relationships of Representation in Voting Rights Act Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
1409, 1418-19 (1993). On this view, jurors "edit" or "trim" prosecutorial excesses (or, put differ- 
ently, trim the county majority's decision, as implemented by the prosecutor). Cf W. William Ho- 
des, Lord Brougham, the Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1075, 1095 (1996) (arguing that juries sometimes nullify to "censure... prosecutorial mis- 
conduct in particular, especially misconduct in the charging decision"); Alan Scheflin & Jon Van 
Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 
1980, at 5 i, 88 (arguing that acquittal signals defects in "prosecutorial practices"). 
79 Cf. David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in 
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 730 (1992) ("The tradition of local control of 
public schooling itself can be seen as a manifestation of the first amendment value of checking 
monolithic government control over the exchange of ideas and information."). 
80 I am indebted to Bruce Ackerman for suggesting this line of inquiry and to Anton Metlitsky 
for helping me think through the question. For a general outline of the arguments in favor of the 
separation of powers, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison); and THE FEDERALIST 
No. 51 (James Madison). For a thorough analysis of the concept's current doctrinal and theoreti- 
cal underpinnings, see I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ?? 2-I to 
2-IO, at 118-206 (3d ed. 2000). For an intriguing effort to debunk the common assumption under- 
lying the separation of powers - the notion that each branch will, if left unchecked, seek to in- 
crease its power - see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 
ii8 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005). 
81 Frank I. Michelman, "Protecting the People From Themselves," or How Direct Can Democ- 
racy Be?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1724 (1998) (citing Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct 
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. I503, 1528 (1990)). 
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In a system that is second-order diverse, the majority on the deci- 
sionmaking body exercising that checking function may be quite dif- 
ferent from the one being checked. A jury majority, for instance, 
might be quite unlike the legislative majority it checks. In a typical 
separation-of-powers scenario, in contrast, an executive elected by a 
statewide majority generally checks a legislature elected by roughly the 
same majority.82 Even if these institutions "represent" the polity in dif- 
ferent ways,83 variation in the composition of the "majority" of one of 
the governing branches in the usual separation-of-powers scenario 
stems primarily from temporal variation, the variation that results 
from staggered elections.84 When institutions are second-order diverse, 
however, the separation-of-powers structure does not merely cabin the 
overreaching of other branches, but empowers electoral minorities. 
In sum, some of the decisionmaking bodies at issue here are unique 
hybrids, exhibiting traits associated with federalism, separation of 
powers, and centralization.85 They are sometimes autonomous, some- 
times dependent on and policed by a central authority, and sometimes 
constitutive of the governance system itself. They tame majoritarian- 
ism not by creating a system of competing majorities, but by mandat- 
ing agreement by overlapping ones. 
Second-order diversity is necessary to take advantage of the unique 
opportunities these disaggregated institutions offer for diffusing power. 
Just as a federal system would do little to fracture national majorities 
if every state precisely mirrored the nationwide population, so too 
overlapping majorities do not have much bite when subunits are first- 
order diverse; the subunits will simply mirror the majority found in 
the central decisionmaking body. Second-order diversity diffuses 
power by ensuring that different majorities prevail in at least some of 
82 Cf. Levinson, supra note 8o, at 952 (suggesting that the arguments in favor of the separation 
of powers make more sense "in a system of governance in which each of the branches represents, 
and is drawn from, a distinct estate," and noting the danger that other lines of affiliation - for 
instance, party loyalty - may undermine the "checking" function of a tripartite system). 
83 See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 184-86 (1991). 
84 Bruce Ackerman argues that "one of the most distinctive features of the separation of pow- 
ers" is "the fact that the different lawmaking powers often operate on a staggered electoral sched- 
ule. Even if party A wins big at time one, it may have to win n times more before it can gain ple- 
nary lawmaking authority." Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, I13 HARV. L. REV. 
633, 644 (2000). Ackerman argues that this feature of U.S. constitutional design leads to a number 
of problems that other constitutional schemes avoid. Id. at 644-64. 
85 For this reason, part of the federalism debate is orthogonal to the debate over second-order 
diversity. One way to frame the federalism debate is that it pits a national, centralized authority 
that is first-order diverse against a decentralized governance structure that is second-order di- 
verse. The debate here, in contrast, focuses on the same set of institutional subunits - subunits 
that are constitutive of, rather than wholly dependent on or independent of, the whole - and 
considers whether first-order or second-order diversity represents the best organizational strategy. 
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the subunits, thus granting electoral minorities power to edit or trim 
the central majority's mandates. 
2. The Costs of Control: The Loss of Influence at Two Levels of Gov- 
ernance. - If there are benefits to granting electoral minorities some 
degree of control in disaggregated democratic institutions, there are 
also costs to doing so: these costs - the loss of minority influence 
within those structures - are the flip side of the benefits. While that 
tradeoff has been thoroughly explored in thinking about the distribu- 
tion of legislative power, the complex nature of that tradeoff has not 
yet been fully probed in the context of disaggregated institutions gen- 
erally. Specifically, the notion of second-order diversity highlights 
what many commentators have overlooked in examining these ques- 
tions - namely, that the tradeoff between influence and control can 
take place at two levels of governance in disaggregated institutions: 
first, at the level where decisions are aggregated; and second, at the 
level of the disaggregated decisionmaking unit. 
In order to show that the influence/control tradeoff can take place 
at both of these levels, I will use districts and juries as examples. At 
first glance, one might think they are poor examples for these pur- 
poses. Districts, after all, are designed to elect representatives who 
will be grouped with representatives elected from other districts. The 
influence/control tradeoff, then, would seem to concern only the distri- 
bution of power at the legislative level - that is, at the level of aggre- 
gation. The tradeoff between influence and control for juries, in con- 
trast, would seem to involve only the composition of individual juries 
- a tradeoff that takes place only at the level of disaggregated units 
- as there seems to be no mechanism for "aggregating" jury verdicts. 
The notion of second-order diversity casts doubt on both of these 
assumptions. 
Scholarship on electoral districts has largely focused on the best 
districting strategy for distributing power between the majority and 
minority. In debating this question, scholars have focused almost ex- 
clusively on those tradeoffs at the legislative level - whether it is bet- 
ter for minorities to influence many legislators or to control a few86 - 
86 Much ink has been spilled over the relative merits of these two strategies. Political theorists 
have provided the terminology for the debate - descriptive versus substantive representation. 
See, e.g., PITKIN, supra note I, at 6o-91, 112-43. Among empiricists, the debate has been quite 
heated with regard to districts drawn to augment the power of racial minorities during the 199os. 
Some political scientists have debated whether there is a tradeoff between descriptive and sub- 
stantive representation - that is, whether the creation of more majority-minority districts during 
the 199os ultimately harmed the interests of voters of color, as such schemes packed racial minori- 
ties, "bleached" adjoining districts, and thereby helped the Republicans attain a majority in state 
and federal legislatures. See, e.g., SWAIN, supra note 43; Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. 
Dunn, The Demise of Racial Redistricting and the Future of Black Representation, 48 EMORY 
L.J. I209 (1999); Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive 
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and envisioned districts largely as a tool for distributing legislative 
power. First-order diversity is the byproduct of the view that it is bet- 
ter for electoral minorities to influence many legislators. Under this 
model, every legislator would have roughly the same constituency and, 
at least in theory, would look out for the interests of the members of a 
minority group. The main alternative is to grant electoral minorities 
controlling electoral power over a smaller number of legislators, who 
in turn can exercise influence within the legislature on group members' 
behalf. The side effect of this theory for allocating legislative seats is a 
set of districts that is second-order diverse. One particularly stark way 
to think about this tradeoff in the context of race is this: are African 
Americans better off electing a sizeable Congressional Black Caucus 
(something achieved through majority-minority districts, which push 
electoral schemes toward the second-order end of the diversity spec- 
trum) or pursuing an influence model (the creation of districts that are 
more first-order diverse) that might result in the election of fewer Afri- 
can Americans to Congress but allow the Democrats to keep power in 
the House? 
(a) Districts and the Influence/Control Tradeoff at the Level of Dis- 
aggregated Governing Units. - What has often been missed in the de- 
bate about influence and control in the districting context - and what 
is highlighted by the notion of second-order diversity, with its empha- 
sis on disaggregated power - is that the influence/control tradeoff 
embedded in the choice of first- or second-order diversity takes place 
at two levels in the districting context. It occurs first with the election 
of a representative who can influence legislative outcomes, and second 
with the election of a representative who can distribute certain politi- 
cal goods and engage in useful agenda-setting activities whether or not 
Black Representation in Congress?, go AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794 (1996); Grofman et al., supra note 
42; Lisa Handley et al., Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Rela- 
tionship Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Can- 
didates, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 199oS 13 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998); Karlan, 
supra note 7; David Lublin, Racial Redistricting and African American Representation: A Cri- 
tique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Con- 
gress?", 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 183, 185-86 (i999); Kenneth W. Shotts, Does Racial Redistricting 
Cause Conservative Policy Outcomes? Policy Preferences of Southern Representatives in the I98os 
and i99os, 65 J. POL. 216 (2003); Kenneth W. Shotts, Racial Redistricting's Alleged Perverse Ef- 
fects: Theory, Data, and "Reality", 65 J. POL. 238 (2003). At the level of institutional analysis, 
scholars have debated whether racial minorities are more likely to obtain political goodies by hav- 
ing a small number of officials beholden to them in the legislature than by having political influ- 
ence in a larger number of districts. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 59, at 66-69, 75-76, 80-82; 
Karlan, supra note 7, at 300-02, 317-20; Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreading: The Role of 
Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 217 
(1989) [hereinafter Karlan, Maps and Misreading]. The debate hinges on assessments of whether 
electoral minorities can take advantage of those unique features that distinguish the legislative 
process, such as logrolling, a norm of collegiality, the presence of repeat players, and the many 
ways in which the legislative process mitigates collective action problems. 
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he can garner majority support for a piece of legislation. Indeed, it 
may be precisely because we are preoccupied with the notion of a leg- 
islature as unitary87 that we focus on the power to control more than 
half of the votes.88 The notion of second-order diversity is useful be- 
cause it directs our attention to the many instances in which legislative 
power is disaggregated or in which individual districts function like 
independent governance units. 
There are several ways in which legislators are, in effect, roughly 
equal in wielding legislative power - when power does not hinge on 
garnering more than half of the votes on the floor. One example of the 
power afforded to individual legislators is agenda setting. Legislators 
can serve as "conversational entrepreneurs"89 - generating awareness 
of an issue and framing it for public debate90 - by serving on a legis- 
lative committee, giving a speech on the legislative floor, sponsoring a 
bill, endorsing a candidate, publicizing what the majority is doing, 
demanding information from another governmental actor, or even 
hounding administrative agencies to reach a particular result.91 In all 
of these capacities, legislators can serve as agenda setters. And, de- 
pending on the dynamics of legislative decisionmaking, these agenda- 
setting powers can be especially important for members of the electoral 
minority who lack the votes to pass their preferred legislation. 
There is another way in which control over a district might assist a 
minority group in agenda setting. Elections tend to be centers of po- 
litical energy - loci for organizing, lobbying, and learning about is- 
sues. Community groups and political structures are often organized 
loosely on a district-by-district basis, as groups within the community 
build relationships with the incumbent and as the incumbent reaches 
out to build ties within the community.92 When minority group mem- 
87 See supra pp. 124-25. 
88 For an interesting analysis of the power of submajorities in the legislature and elsewhere, 
see ADRIAN VERMEULE, SUBMAJORITY RULES: FORCING ACCOUNTABILITY UPON MA- 
JORITIES (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 54, 2004). 
89 ROBERT W. BENNETT, TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 36-37 (2003). 
90 For a sampling of the literature regarding the role political elites play in framing issues and 
an analysis of its relation to racial politics, see DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND 
REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 
49 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1999); DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY 
COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 163-95, 281-85 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 
1996); and Michael S. Kang, A Supralegal Theory of the Political Party (Dec. I, 2004) (unpub- 
lished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
91 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
i8i, 19I (1998). 
92 Consider, for example, what took place in Greensboro, North Carolina, after the city 
switched from an at-large to a districted city council. Representatives elected from the two pre- 
dominantly African American districts ensured that residents of their districts served on ap- 
pointed boards and commissions, thus building a network of representation for those communities 
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bers dominate a district, they can harness these built-in organizing ap- 
paratuses for their own causes. They may even be able to use elections 
within the district as a dress rehearsal of sorts - a chance to adapt 
and define their message until it is convincing enough to be accepted 
by the polity as a whole.93 
Moreover, districts can sometimes function a bit like independent 
governance structures; the Chicago ward system is a well-known ex- 
ample.94 In these instances, an individual legislator can assist mem- 
bers of her district whether or not she can command a majority when 
a bill is passed.95 Whether one envisions constituent services as power 
or pork, individual election districts sometimes allow representatives to 
distribute political goods independently of one another. 
While these powers are often limited at the level of Congress 
or state legislatures, if one looks to other governing bodies elected 
where none had existed before. Mark Binker, Council Marks Anniversary, Still Strives To Be Re- 
sponsive, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro), Nov. 30, 2003, at AI, available at 2003 WL 5662467. 
Community members began to organize along district lines, and, in the words of one reporter, "the 
influence of changes brought by the district system can be found throughout the city," including 
"the rise of neighborhoods as platforms for political power," as demonstrated by the recent crea- 
tion of a "neighborhood congress... organized to flex the grass-roots muscles on behalf of 
neighborhood concerns." Id. But see GUINIER, supra note 59, at 83 (arguing that district-based 
political organizing undermines the impetus for broader, community-based organizations). 
93 The political dynamics stemming from regional concentrations of minorities may explain 
why it is easier to build a political movement in a district than in a state. For example, prior to 
the passage of the controversial anti-gay amendment to the Colorado Constitution invalidated in 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), gays and lesbians were building an equality movement one 
city at a time, building energy in places like Denver and Boulder - where a higher percentage of 
people supported gay rights than in the population statewide - so that they could eventually per- 
suade the state as a whole to forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See id. at 
623-24. As Nicholas Zeppos argues, "[1]ocal democratic majorities, like other evolving competi- 
tive systems, may.. . require time to develop strength on their own before inclusion into a larger 
arena." Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Dynamics of Democracy: Travel, Premature Predation, and the 
Components of Political Identity, 50 VAND. L. REV. 445, 452 (1997). Indeed, as Zeppos notes: 
It may be [the Supreme Court's] broader acceptance of the political significance of these 
local political-geographic lines - represented in Romer v. Evans by the political actions 
of towns like Aspen, Denver, and Boulder - that made Justice O'Connor and Justice 
Kennedy willing to set aside the statewide initiative and restore the governmental ac- 
tions of these local political communities. 
Id. at 455. 
94 Individual Chicago aldermen exercise astonishing power over public works projects within 
their wards under a system known as "aldermanic prerogative," an informal political deal by 
which the aldermen grant Mayor Daley "unilateral control of the city" in exchange for "virtual 
dictatorial power within their wards." Patrick T. Reardon & William Gaines, Council of Favors, 
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1997, ? I, at i. As a result, "[a]ldermen have gained so much power in their 
respective wards that no public action takes place there without their consent." John J. Betancur 
& Douglas C. Gills, Community Development in Chicago: From Harold Washington to Richard 
M. Daley, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., July 2004, at 92, 99. 
95 Even in the case of a typical legislator, we often underestimate the importance of the om- 
budsman service to legislative constituents. See Morris P. Fiorina & Roger G. Noll, Majority 
Rule Models and Legislative Elections, 41 J. POL. io8i, IO92-93 (1979). 
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through districts - city councils, school boards, special-purpose agen- 
cies - there are more instances in which districts function partially as 
mini-governance units. For instance, as Pam Karlan points out, a 
number of districted governing structures, like county commissions, 
grant specific powers to one or two rotating "chairs," thereby allowing 
individual members to wield significant power even when they cannot 
garner a majority of votes on the commission itself.96 
Thus, districts reveal the tradeoff between influence and control in 
its most complex form. The debate about second-order diversity in 
districting concerns not only whether electoral minorities will have in- 
fluence or control over some votes at the legislative level, but also 
whether they will exercise influence or control over the disaggregated 
portions of legislative power, such as agenda setting or the chance to 
preside over a mini-governance unit. The tradeoff in each case is 
comparable: more control in some districts generally means less influ- 
ence in others. What the notions of first-order and second-order diver- 
sity add to the existing literature is a framing device that highlights 
that the tradeoff inheres at two levels of governance. 
(b) Juries and the Influence/Control Tradeoff at the Level of Aggrega- 
tion. - Even if the tradeoff between influence and control takes place 
at two levels of governance in districting, one might wonder whether 
districts are unique in this regard. It seems likely that for most other 
disaggregated institutions, the tradeoff between influence and control 
takes place only at the level of the disaggregated unit. The jury sys- 
tem, indeed, seems at first blush to present a prime example of this 
phenomenon. Although we are not accustomed to thinking of juries in 
terms of distributing power,97 when we press on the democratic under- 
96 Karlan, Maps and Misreading, supra note 86, at 241, 244. 
97 Despite the jury's historical roots, see AMAR, supra note 6, at 81-118 (discussing the histori- 
cal view that juries represent an important source of local autonomy), we tend to resist the notion 
that juries represent a strategy for diffusing power rather than for finding truth. See MARIANNE 
CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING CONCEP- 
TIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE 51-54 (1994) (offering a survey of jury stud- 
ies and our evolving conception of the juror's role in the second half of the twentieth century); 
George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575 (1997) (providing an in-depth 
historical analysis of the jury's evolving role as a truth-finder). The conception of the jury as an 
instrument for diffusing power suggests that juries are tools for aggregating democratic judg- 
ments, with all the intellectual baggage that accompanies that notion. Aggregation tends to sug- 
gest that preferences are involved, that jurors will engage in logrolling, compromise, and the other 
hallmarks of interest-based bargaining. As a result, many resist the idea that the jury should be 
political - or that jurors should be understood as representatives - in any sense. For example, 
the leading proponent of the jury as a forum for democratic participation, Jeffrey Abramson, 
firmly resists any normative or policymaking proposal that would suggest jurors are on a jury in 
order to represent a group rather than to deliberate to reach a just and impartial result. See 
ABRAMSON, supra note 26, at Io2, I39-41, I43-76. Similarly, the suggestion that juries are edit- 
ing rather than merely applying majority mandates runs counter to the role we expect juries to 
play within the system, suggesting that the role the jury plays is, in Abramson's scathing terms, a 
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pinnings of juries, they turn out to offer a useful example of the influ- 
ence/control tradeoff in disaggregated institutions. 
It is not surprising that we would initially think that the influ- 
ence/control tradeoff takes place only at the level of individual jury 
verdicts. Although it is easy to grasp the disaggregated qualities of 
electoral districts,98 the disaggregated qualities of juries have largely 
been overlooked. As noted above, we tend to think of most decision- 
making bodies as unitary. We thus envision each jury as self- 
contained: a temporary body that renders a verdict in a single case and 
then dissolves. On this traditional view, juries - and jury verdicts - 
bear no relationship to one another, except that each verdict represents 
an independent and self-contained pronouncement of "the law." 
Our atomized view of juries helps explain why the metaphor most 
often invoked to describe the jury's democratic role is that of the legis- 
lature.99 The legislature does not, of course, dissolve after rendering a 
decision. But it is a unitary lawmaking body. If juries were truly leg- 
islatures, then each verdict would be "the law" and we would pre- 
sumably want members of every relevant group to be at the table 
when it was made. Given this conventional view of juries, it is unsur- 
prising that many legal scholars seek to do just that.100 
Thinking of individual juries as disaggregated - as decisionmak- 
ing bodies located within a larger system - gives us a different per- 
spective on what constitutes "the law." On this view, juries look a bit 
less like legislatures. Instead, "the law" is what emerges from the col- 
lective decisions of many juries, in roughly the same way that "the 
price" emerges from the collective decisions of many market partici- 
"nakedly political one." Id. at 125; see also Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 
Nw. U. L. REV. 877, 904-47 (1999) (noting the differences between these competing views of the 
jury's role, particularly as they relate to jury nullification). Indeed, far from conceiving of juries 
as important sources of local autonomy, today we are more likely to associate the notion that ju- 
ries are editing majoritarian mandates with all the controversy associated with nullification. 
Cf Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury's Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA. L. REV. 123, 134 
(1985) (arguing that the debate over jury nullification is intense because "[a]s the jury's power is 
increased to encompass a greater degree of policymaking, essentially a legislative function, the 
tension increases and raises questions about our fundamental notions of the allocation of power in 
a democracy"). Talking about the distribution of power comes quite naturally in the districting 
context, however. 
98 Despite this fact, courts sometimes ignore the disaggregated qualities of districts. See 
Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, I14 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 
1689-1716 (2001). 
99 See AMAR, supra note 6, at 94 ("[A]nalogies between legislatures and juries abound."); see 
also id. at 94-95, Ioo, io4; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 19, at 376-79; King, Racial Jurymandering, 
supra note 17, at 741; Muller, supra note 2zI, at 148. But see AMAR, supra note 6, at Io2-o3 (de- 
scribing differences between juries and legislatures). 
100 See supra pp. iii5-16. 
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pants.101 Juries are thus a tool for aggregation - of community 
judgments, interpretations of the law, whatever democratic judgments 
we think juries render - when we cannot all sit at the same table to 
hash out such questions.102 
101 Analogizing the anticipated penalty for a crime to its "price," Judge Frank H. Easterbrook 
observes that "[t]here are thousands upon thousands of criminals, attorneys, judges, and prosecu- 
tors making independent decisions .... [T]he collective set of interactions determines the price." 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL. STUD. 289, 298 
(1983). For a criticism of Easterbrook's general argument that questions the extent to which jury 
verdicts affect prosecutorial decisions, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a 
Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL. STUD. 43, 66 (1988). 
One might argue that there is no difference in this respect between a system that is first- 
order or second-order diverse - that is, attorneys will agree to a plea based on whatever the "me- 
dian" jury is likely to find in a given case. If all that matters is the middle, a system that is first- 
order diverse provides a similar picture of "the law" as one that is second-order diverse. It seems 
more likely, however, that attorneys will take into account both the likelihood of obtaining a ver- 
dict from a jury in the middle of the political spectrum and the chance of getting a verdict from a 
jury on the ends of the political spectrum. Moreover, prosecutors and defendants may also be risk 
averse - the former because of the scarce resources available to prosecute crimes and the political 
costs of failed prosecutions, the latter because of the high costs of criminal conviction. This aver- 
sion to risk would likely force both prosecutors and defendants to consider a wider range of possi- 
ble juries than simply an anticipated "median" verdict. One treatise instructing practicing attor- 
neys how to assess the risk of an adverse verdict confirms this hypothesis. See Mark B. Victor et 
al., Evaluating Legal Risks and Costs with Decision Tree Analysis, in SUCCESSFUL PART- 
NERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL ? 12:20 (Robert L. Haig ed., 2000), avail- 
able at http://www.litigationrisk.com/ACCA%2oChapter%2o012%20(2004%version).pdf (instruct- 
ing lawyers to consider the "high," "low," and "most likely" jury verdict to arrive at an appropriate 
assessment). I am indebted to Louis Kaplow for raising this point. 
102 There is, of course, ample reason to be cynical about the extent to which jury decisions de- 
termine the law in light of the dominant role plea bargaining has taken in the criminal process. 
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 78, at 34; Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence En- 
hancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, iio YALE L.J. 1097, 1148-50 (2001); Stephanos Bibas, 
Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); Robert E. Scott & 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, ioi YALE L.J. 1909, 1911-12 (1992); William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 
(2004). Nonetheless, what is crucial for these purposes is that, to the extent criminal verdicts have 
some effect on parties' decisions, one can make the case that jury verdicts shape the law in the 
aggregate rather than as a unitary decisionmaking structure akin to a legislature. For instance, 
relying upon Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser's conception of "bargaining in the shadow 
of the law," Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979), and the literature it has spawned, Daniel Richman ar- 
gues that "[i]f citizens have any voice in the fine-grained decisions that prosecutors make about 
resource allocations, they have it not because of appointive or electoral politics but because prose- 
cutors make charging - and plea bargaining - decisions in the shadow of jury verdicts." Daniel 
C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 939, 941 (I997). As Richman points out, "prosecutors... do not operate within the 
framework of a single case." Id. at 969. To the contrary, a prosecutor making a charging decision 
must take into account the myriad of possible juries that might be empaneled, thereby demanding 
prosecutorial attention to the wide range of groups that might represent a meaningful voting bloc 
on the jury. See id. at 975. Thus, Richman suggests, we should not conceive of individual jury 
verdicts as "some general community judgment." Id. at 974. Instead, we should focus on the ef- 
fect of jury verdicts, in the aggregate, on prosecutorial decisions that lead to - or avoid - a trial. 
Id. at 974-75; see also LEVINE, supra note 61, at 170-71 (describing jury verdicts as "legal bench- 
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If we understand "the law," as shaped by jury verdicts, to be the 
aggregation of many jury verdicts, then the influence/control tradeoff 
takes place not only at the level of individual jury verdicts, but also at 
the level of jury verdicts in the aggregate. For instance, to the extent 
that one thinks that prosecutors bargain "in the shadow of the law," 
basing plea bargaining decisions on their sense of the verdicts that ju- 
ries (in the aggregate) will render,'03 then one has to consider whether 
electoral minorities benefit more from influence or control at the ag- 
gregated level (jury verdicts taken together) than at the disaggregated 
level (individual jury verdicts). In other words, as with the legislature, 
the only way to attain first-order diversity among jury decisions in the 
aggregate is to create juries that are second-order diverse. 
Put more concretely, the choice for electoral minorities is whether 
they want to influence the decisions rendered by a lot of juries - for 
instance, soften all verdicts a bit - or control the decisions rendered 
by a few. Is one likely to achieve "better" results when bargaining 
takes place in the shadow of jury verdicts if the median of jury ver- 
dicts moves slightly in one's preferred direction (as we would expect to 
occur with first-order diversity) or if the "ends" of the jury verdict 
spectrum embody dissenting views (as with second-order diversity), 
thus creating the risk of outlier verdicts?104 
3. The Importance of Context for Evaluating the Tradeoff Between 
Influence and Control. - Although the notion of second-order diver- 
sity provides a lens for identifying some often overlooked concerns in 
the influence/control tradeoff in disaggregated institutions, it does not 
provide a framework for resolving that tradeoff - that is, it does not 
tell us when and where control is a better option than influence for 
electoral minorities, let alone the democratic system as a whole. Put 
differently, the notion of second-order diversity gives us an analytic 
framework for identifying the costs and benefits of each approach, but 
it does not tell us how to weigh them against one another. 
marks" that reveal "the law as modified by the jurors' political perspectives"); cf GUIDO 
CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 63-64 (1978) (observing that "if a series of 
juries is viewed as representative, then the pattern of decisions which emerges from that series 
can also be taken to reflect the values of the community," but expressing doubt regarding both 
propositions). 
103 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 102. 
104 As I argue elsewhere, the influence/control debate described here may have analogs in the 
context of decisionmaking cascades. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 14-15, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
That is, to the extent that the influence/control debate takes place in districting circles because 
there is a formal mechanism for aggregating the democratic outputs of electoral districts - legis- 
latures - there may be informal aggregation mechanisms in the context of other types of deci- 
sionmaking institutions. See id. (manuscript at I5-23). 
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Any such assessment would, of course, require a more contextual- 
ized understanding of how power is divided within the institution in 
question. Consider the districting example again. There are plainly 
contexts where the costs of second-order diversity swamp the benefits. 
Imagine, for instance, that pushing districts toward the first-order end 
of the diversity spectrum would flip a state legislature from Republi- 
can to Democrat (where Democrats are the party of choice for the mi- 
nority in question), as was thought to be the case by many legislators 
in Georgia v. Ashcroft.5os The value of having one's own party in 
power at the legislative level is quite significant. It is thus easy to 
imagine why an electoral minority would prefer the benefits associated 
with majority status at the legislative level over unfettered control at 
the district level, especially if state legislators serve as little more than 
ombudsmen for their constituents. As one of my colleagues puts it, 
why would any electoral minority "settle for being emperors of second- 
rate empires"? 06 
There may be instances, however, when the calculus is different. 
For example, in those instances when legislative control is not at stake 
- when ceding control over districts will, at best, win a few more 
seats for the party favored by the minority but will not ensure a legis- 
lative majority - the benefits associated with control at the district 
level might seem weightier. The power of individual legislators to help 
set the agenda - demand debate or a vote on an issue, request infor- 
mation from an agency, deliver a speech on the floor - might seem 
quite crucial for a minority group, especially when the group's favored 
party cannot defeat the majority on the floor.1'7 As Adrian Vermeule 
notes of "submajority rules" that empower legislative minorities, legis- 
lators' agenda-setting powers can be "accountability-forcing" devices 
that enable minorities to "focus the majority's attention on an issue," 
counteract "the ability of entrenched majorities to exploit various low- 
visibility techniques for disposing of cases in unprincipled ways," and 
105 539 U.S. 461, 469-71 (2003). 
106 E-mail from Samuel Issacharoff, Harold R. Medina Professor in Procedural Jurisprudence, 
Columbia Law School, to Heather K. Gerken, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School 
(Oct. 2, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
107 See VERMEULE, supra note 88. Consider a concrete example: African American aldermen 
on the Chicago City Council were able to force Mayor Daley, who exercises virtually unilateral 
control over city affairs because the council is packed with his supporters, to give more city con- 
tracts out to African American and Latino contractors. After well-publicized calls by African 
American aldermen for more racial diversity in the pool of contract recipients, Daley appointed 
an African American to be in charge of contracts and significantly increased spending on city pro- 
grams that aided minority-owned firms. See Laurie Cohen & Jennifer Peltz, Watchdogs To Keep 
an Eye on Chicago Contracts, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 2000, at NI; Fran Spielman, Daley Rebuilds 
Inner Circle, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 25, 200ooo, at 6; Fran Spielman, Daley Shifts Gears in Effort 
To Clean Up Contracts Mess, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at 8. 
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"collect and publicize information that the majority would prefer not 
to admit into the public record."108 
Control at the district level might also seem more significant if the 
interests of minority group members and their party are not closely 
aligned - when an electoral minority is, in effect, a disempowered 
minority within its own party. Second-order diversity among districts 
would, for instance, make it easier for minority representatives to act 
independently of the party's preferences in the hopes of brokering a 
better deal for their constituents by, for example, defecting on certain 
votes. Moreover, depending on their level of dissatisfaction with the 
party with which they are aligned, electoral minorities might even 
value electing their "own" representative because he can use his 
agenda-setting power to police not only the activities of the majority 
party, but also those of the group's purported allies. 
The influence/control tradeoff may also vary with the type of mi- 
nority in question. While a sizeable African American community 
with enough votes to swing the legislature from Republican to Democ- 
rat might have every reason to privilege power at the legislative level, 
smaller minority groups may make a different assessment. For in- 
stance, a small or diffuse group capable of controlling, at best, one seat 
may prefer to have at least one legislator articulating its concerns than 
to have modest influence over a number of representatives. 
Similarly, the value of control at the district level may vary with 
the level of government and the purpose of the governing institution. 
For instance, at higher levels of government - state legislatures or 
Congress - electoral minorities may think that individual representa- 
tives provide little to their constituents save White House tickets and 
the occasional bit of pork. If this were the case, they might well prefer 
even modest increases in influence at the aggregate level, where bills 
are passed. 
The calculus might change, however, at the local level, especially 
when there is only one party in power or when a district's health de- 
pends heavily on its individual representative. Consider the Chicago 
ward example again. Although aldermen exercise extraordinary con- 
trol over what takes place within their own wards,109 the dominance 
of the Democrats - specifically, the Daley Democrats - on the City 
Council means that the aldermen's votes do not matter much. In the 
words of two observers of Chicago's City Council, "[n]othing comes up 
that does not have the stamp of approval of Daley. And never during 
108 VERMEULE, supra note 88, at 8, 12, 14. 
109 See supra note 94. 
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the meeting is a vote taken for which the result - always an over- 
whelming administration victory - is ever in doubt."110 
Control at the district level might also seem important for local 
agencies like the one challenged in Presley v. Etowah County Commis- 
sioner.111 Prior to the changes reducing board-member power in an- 
ticipation of the appointment of an African American board member, 
individual board members presided over their own fiefdoms, making 
policy decisions and doling out patronage independently of one an- 
other.112 Thus, in situations where political preferences find their 
strongest expression at the level of disaggregated local institutions 
rather than at the legislative level, second-order diversity may be 
useful. 
In sum, any assessment of the influence/control tradeoff demands a 
nuanced, contextual assessment of the institution and community in 
question. Sometimes the benefits of second-order diversity will be 
marginal at best; at other times, they may be significant enough to af- 
fect our calculus. What the notions of first-order and second-order di- 
versity provide here is not a solution to this longstanding problem of 
democratic design, but a framing device for talking about the full 
range of costs and benefits involved in such assessments. 
B. Turning the Tables: The Benefits of Destabilization 
and the Costs of Forced Community 
A second unusual characteristic of second-order diversity has less 
to do with the type of instrumental concerns addressed above - div- 
vying power among members of the polity - and more to do with the 
unusual participatory dynamic that second-order diversity generates. 
By granting electoral minorities control over some decisionmaking 
bodies, second-order diversity turns the tables on members of the ma- 
jority, depriving them of the powers and comfort usually conferred by 
their majority status. Second-order diversity thus destabilizes existing 
political dynamics, creating a unique political space in which electoral 
minorities no longer play the role of "influencer" or "dissenter" but en- 
joy the power to decide. 
i. The Values Associated with Turning the Tables: Baselines, Iden- 
tity, and Participation. - (a) Baselines and the Participatory Experi- 
ence. - Debates about the treatment of electoral minorities usually 
center on how to distribute power - and the tangible goods that 
power brings - fairly among members of the polity. Scholars have 
110 Reardon & Gaines, supra note 94. 
111 502 U.S. 491, 510 (1992) (holding that a reduction in the power of county commissioners in 
anticipation of the ascension of a black commissioner is not a change "with respect to voting" in 
violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act). 
112 Id. at 497. 
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thus devoted considerable energy to thinking about the best system for 
ensuring the fair distribution of tangible political goods - government 
services, funding, pork - between the majority and minority. 
Much less attention has been devoted to distributing participatory 
experiences among citizens.113 One way to think about second-order 
diversity from a participatory perspective is as a competing or com- 
plementary strategy to the influence model. Rather than confining 
electoral minorities to the role of "influencer" or "dissenter" on every 
decisionmaking body, second-order diversity distributes participatory 
experiences more symmetrically. It grants electoral minorities a chance 
to enjoy the same type of participatory experience - the sense of effi- 
cacy or agency associated with being in charge - that is usually re- 
served for members of the majority. Instead of being the junior part- 
ners to every decision, electoral minorities occasionally enjoy the power 
of seniority. 
It is not difficult to imagine why members of the electoral minority 
would desire a chance to be in charge for reasons that have nothing to 
do with political outcomes or the distribution of tangible goods. For 
instance, if being part of the majority or casting the swing vote on a 
jury enables one to map out the common terrain for the group's deci- 
sion, members of the electoral minority may value the chance to ex- 
perience that sense of efficacy regardless of the verdict. Or imagine a 
decisionmaking body like an electoral district, where citizens gather to 
elect a representative. Here again, if a member of an electoral minor- 
ity has a sense that members of the majority have been able to elect a 
champion, someone fighting on their behalf, she might relish the 
chance to elect a champion of her own for purely dignitary reasons. 
As Anne Phillips has observed, "[p]olitics is not just about self-interest, 
but also about self-image."114 
Further, granting electoral minorities decisive power in implementing 
the majority's will is a sign of trust, an acknowledgment of equal status.115 
113 Iris Marion Young cautions against conceptualizing nonmaterial goods in distributive terms 
out of concern that "the distributive paradigm tends to conceive of individuals as social atoms" 
and thus fails to appreciate that such goods are often "relations and processes in which the actions 
of individuals are embedded." YOUNG, supra note io, at 27. However, the notion of second- 
order diversity - with its emphasis on the relationship between identity and power and on the 
comparative treatment of groups - seems at least consistent with the spirit of Young's effort to 
conceptualize political dignity in relational terms. 
114 ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 79 (i995); see also JUDITH N. SHKLAR, 
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 56 (I99I) ("The deepest impulse for de- 
manding the suffrage arises from the recognition that it is the characteristic, the identifying, fea- 
ture of democratic citizenship in America, not a means to other ends." (emphasis added)). 
115 DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 9-Io (2002) (describing the principle of equal respect). 
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Many proponents of the "politics of recognition"116 have argued that it 
is important for members of traditionally subordinated groups to par- 
ticipate in the political process, as such inclusion represents a symbol 
of equality. Presence in politics signifies "a public acknowledgement of 
equal value.""'17 It conveys the "social meaning" that minorities have 
"the ability to rule.""'8 
Second-order diversity goes one step further: it posits that provid- 
ing electoral minorities not just a vote, but a working majority, is simi- 
larly a sign of trust. It thus extends the argument underlying calls for 
inclusion - that the vote matters for dignitary reasons - to the exer- 
cise of decisionmaking authority. It grants electoral minorities not only 
the dignity to participate, but the dignity to decide. It enables elec- 
toral minorities to wield the same power and authority as members of 
the majority, rather than merely to cast a vote. 
Consider the jury as an example. Granting electoral minorities the 
power to render a verdict gives them a chance to "take turns standing 
for the whole."'19 When they decide a case, the verdict they render is 
the decision of "the" jury. It is easy to imagine valuing such participa- 
tory opportunities regardless of the verdict eventually rendered. In- 
deed, even if one attaches no intrinsic value to symmetry in the distri- 
bution of participatory experiences, one can easily imagine an 
instrumental justification for prizing it. Turning the tables promotes a 
healthier democratic process for reasons that sound in the language of 
process. It may help electoral minorities feel that they have gotten a 
116 There are as many different versions of this theory as there are theorists, and their views of 
identity and the role it ought to play vary dramatically. Some find group identity to be a mean- 
ingful category; others focus simply on the experience or social status shared by group members; 
others posit that shared experiences will lead to common interests or perspectives; and still others 
question the very usefulness of such categories. For a helpful introduction to identity theory and 
the history of its development, see Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in 
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1994). For additional reflections on the politics of recognition, both supportive and critical, see 
MINOW, supra note 14, at 30-58; MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF 
RECOGNITION, supra; PHILLIPS, supra note 114; NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP 
AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 319-48 (1998); MELISSA S. 
WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF 
LIBERAL REPRESENTATION (1998); YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, at 
I21-53; YOUNG, supra note io, at 44, 183-91; and Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent 
Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent "Yes", 61 J. POL. 628 (1999). 
117 PHILLIPS, supra note 114, at 40; see also BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: 
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 120 (1984) ("Where democracy is end as well as 
means, its politics take on the sense of a journey in which ... the relations among travelers are as 
vital as the destinations they.. . are seeking."). For a general defense of the right to vote as a 
symbol of inclusion, see SHKLAR, supra note 1•4. 
118s Mansbridge, supra note 1ii6, at 628. 
119 George Kateb, The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy, 91 ETHICS 357, 
360 (I98I). 
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"fair shake" from the majority, and thus feel more invested in the po- 
litical process.120 
One need not think that second-order diversity provides the only - 
or even the best - model for distributing political power to value its 
presence within the democratic infrastructure. As noted before, in 
most democratic institutions the influence model is the sole paradigm 
we use to measure the fair treatment of electoral minorities. The ques- 
tion, then, is whether it is useful to pursue an alternative strategy - as 
a complement or counterweight to the influence model - by turning 
the tables on the majority somewhere in the political system. Second- 
order diversity takes advantage of the special attributes of disaggre- 
gated decisionmaking institutions to create such an alternative. First- 
order diversity in disaggregated institutions, in sharp contrast, simply 
reproduces the same influence model that already dominates unitary 
bodies. 
(b) Fostering Positive Participatory Habits. - A second reason 
we might value the opportunity to turn the tables is that it helps 
members of the entire polity - those in the majority and minority - 
practice better participatory habits. 
First, second-order diversity ensures that members of the majority 
sometimes lose the comfort of majority status, Some members of the 
majority will feel the sting of defeat, the bitter aftertaste that comes 
from compromising too much, or the frustration of not being heard. 
On a jury, for instance, the small size and intimate nature of the delib- 
erations might make a significant impression on a majority group 
member who finds himself on the losing side. Imagine, for instance, 
120 Positive participatory experiences generated by second-order diversity could help integrate 
electoral minorities into the political system by granting them a "stake" in the political process and 
pushing them to connect their own democratic aims with those of the polity more generally. Cf 
Shapiro, supra note 56, at io8 (noting that one value of pluralism is its assurance that no "group 
will lose so often as to have no commitment to the system"). Indeed, one of the central assump- 
tions of most participatory theorists is that participation teaches all of us to take the needs and 
concerns of others into account. See, e.g., BARBER, supra note I 17, at 136 ("The test of legitimacy 
is whether an individual value has been changed in some significant way to accommodate larger 
- that is, more common or public - concerns."); ROBERT E. GOODIN, REFLECTIVE 
DEMOCRACY 3 (2003) (summarizing basic tenets of participatory theory); CAROLE PATEMAN, 
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 27, 29-31 (1970) (same); Gerald E. Frug, The City as 
a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1067-73 (1980) (arguing for more "city power" as a vehi- 
cle for participatory democracy and fostering morals and values). Some have offered a more 
pragmatic variant of this claim. Justice Souter, for instance, has suggested that granting racial 
minorities the power to elect genuine candidates of choice will reduce, not exacerbate, racial divi- 
sions. In his view, political division among white ethnics has declined precisely because members 
of those groups were granted a real stake in the decisionmaking process. See Bush v. Vera, 517 
U.S. 952, 1074-76 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). Nancy Rosenblum has offered a more limited 
variant of this hypothesis, suggesting that certain seemingly antiliberal private associations, like 
militias, may sometimes be preferable to having political extremists with no ties to anyone. 
ROSENBLUM, supra note II6, at 273-77. 
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the experience of a white man who thinks of himself as "tough on 
crime" and finds himself on a jury with ten African American jurors 
who are deeply suspicious of prosecutorial overreaching or police mis- 
conduct. We might similarly think that those who feel comfortable in 
the liberal environs of Austin notice that their votes are swamped by 
Republicans' in Texas state-level elections. 
One would hope that such experiences deepen majority members' 
awareness of the costs their decisions impose on those who cannot 
muster more than half of the votes. At the very least, turning the ta- 
bles forces members of the majority to realize that they could be in the 
minority on some decisionmaking body, knowledge that could reduce 
their incentive to ride roughshod over minority interests.121 Second- 
order diversity, in effect, creates an iterated game in which all players 
must accept the possibility that they either may wield, or may have to 
submit to, the majority's power. This possibility increases the incen- 
tives for people on both sides of the political divide to listen to one an- 
other. Turning the tables, then, may help foster the norm of reciproc- 
ity among those who usually wield majoritarian power. 
In order to provide a sense of why turning the tables might be ef- 
fective, consider two intriguing examples outside the governance con- 
text. The first is the Buraku Liberation Movement in modern Ja- 
pan.122 The Burakumin are the descendants of Tokugawa Period 
outcasts and remain the object of significant discrimination in Japan. 
One technique they use to combat discrimination is "denunciation," 
which involves the temporary abduction of the discriminator. The Bu- 
rakumin isolate the discriminator in a large room, where he is sur- 
rounded - and shouted at - by numerous Burakumin in an effort to 
elicit a renunciation of the discriminatory practice in question.123 In 
defending denunciation against state efforts to moderate (but, interest- 
ingly, not to forbid) the practice, the Burakumin have argued that the 
discomfort inflicted upon their targets is necessary because the dis- 
criminator can learn the error of his ways only when he experiences 
121 Although Madison hoped that our constitutional structure would refine and enlarge public 
opinion to focus on the common good, strands of his argument focus on a similar set of arguments 
to those offered here. See THE FEDERALIST NO. Io, supra note 64, at 82-84; see also GUINIER, 
supra note 59, at 4, 17 (arguing that the Madisonian ideal is possible only when voter groupings 
are fluid and temporary); Jane J. Mansbridge, Living with Conflict: Representation in the Theory 
of Adversary Democracy, 91 ETHICS 466, 471 (1981) (arguing that majority rule precludes optimal 
equality unless "citizens' interests so crosscut one another that minorities can hope 'that one day 
they will not lose out and will be deferred to in turn"' (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, 
OBLIGATIONS 47 (1970))). And Madison, of course, is not the only one to suggest that eliminat- 
ing an individual's privileged status would promote a well-functioning society. See, e.g., JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971). 
122 FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 78-123 (1987). I 
am indebted to Kenji Yoshino for suggesting this example. 
123 See id. at 86-96 (describing a denunciation that took place in 1969). 
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the isolation of being in the minority - that is, when he "begins to 
stand in the shoes of a Burakumin."'124 Consistent with this claim, at 
least one scholar argues that this political strategy has had powerful, 
albeit mixed, effects on Japanese society.125 
Another example suggestive of the participatory benefits that might 
be associated with turning the tables can be found closer to home: the 
United States military. As a recent Note in the Harvard Law Review 
argues, the military has had tremendous success in achieving racial in- 
tegration.126 The integration observed by social scientists exists not 
just in the military workplace, where African Americans serve in the 
upper echelons of leadership at a rate unseen in any corporate setting, 
but appears in more informal settings as well.127 Thus, for instance, 
African American culture "is part and parcel of the institutional cul- 
ture," and interracial socializing is much more common than elsewhere 
in the country.128 Drawing on the concept of turning the tables pro- 
posed in an earlier version of this Article, the Note's author credits the 
military's success, at least in part, to the fact that the military "'is the 
only place in American life where whites are routinely bossed around 
by blacks'"129 and members of every racial group experience what it is 
like to be at the "bottom of the ladder."'30 
A second, less obvious benefit to second-order diversity is that it 
may allow members of the electoral minority to develop a different set 
of participatory skills. Members of a minority group, perhaps recog- 
nizing that they lack the power to govern, often decline to participate 
in a decisionmaking process because the exercise appears futile. Sec- 
ond-order diversity may help counter this trend. For instance, Archon 
Fung's research suggests that there may be a tipping point in deci- 
sionmaking bodies - the more poor people and people of color are in- 
volved in the decisionmaking process, the more likely it is that mem- 
bers of these groups will take an active role in the process.'31 By 
124 Id. at IIO; see also id. at 89 (quoting a Burakumin leader as asking the object of the denun- 
ciation, "Do you understand the pain of being downtrodden that Burakumin experience?"). 
125 Id. at 103-23. 
126 See Note, Lessons in Transcendence: Forced Associations and the Military, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1981, 1988 (2004). 
127 Id. (citing CHARLES C. MOSKOS & JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ALL THAT WE CAN BE: 
BLACK LEADERSHIP AND RACIAL INTEGRATION THE ARMY WAY (1996)). 
128 Id. at 1990 (citing MOSKOS & BUTLER, supra note 127). 
129 Id. (quoting MOSKOS & BUTLER, supra note 127, at 2). 
130 Id. 
131 See ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOC- 
RACY 99-131 (2004) (describing data showing that when Hispanics constitute a minority within a 
neighborhood, they are underrepresented at community policing meetings, but that they turn out 
in large numbers once Hispanics make up at least half of the population of the neighborhood). 
Gerald Frug suggests a reason for this dynamic. See Frug, supra note 120, at Io7o ("Power and 
participation are inextricably linked: a sense of powerlessness tends to produce apathy rather than 
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creating decisionmaking bodies with large concentrations of electoral 
minorities, second-order diversity could help members of those groups 
overcome their reluctance to get involved in the process of governance. 
Turning the tables may thus give electoral minorities the chance to get 
their participatory sea legs. 
Moreover, even those electoral minorities accustomed to taking part 
in the democratic process can acquire a new set of participatory habits 
in a system that is second-order diverse. That is because, rather than 
playing the role of "dissenter" or "influencer" on every decisionmaking 
body, they sometimes will enjoy the power to decide. Minority group 
members will thus have a chance to forge an affirmative agenda, 
spearhead a compromise, deal with dissenters, and enjoy the sense of 
efficacy (and discomfort) that accompanies the power to make a deci- 
sion. They will have a chance to craft a verdict in the face of dis- 
agreement or organize the community to rally behind a candidate and 
her platform in an electoral district. Because turning the tables gives 
electoral minorities a chance to step into the shoes of the majority, they 
may, as a result, become more willing to trust - and participate - in 
the majoritarian process. In short, second-order diversity helps foster 
habits on both sides of the political divide that are likely to produce a 
healthier democratic process. 
(c) Destabilizing Political Hierarchies and Identity Categories. - 
A third set of reasons we might value the opportunity to turn the ta- 
bles on the majority stems from the relationship between participation 
and identity. Whereas first-order diversity risks reinforcing existing 
political hierarchies, second-order diversity may destabilize the power 
dynamics associated with participation for members of both the minor- 
ity and majority. And even setting aside categories like "majority" and 
"minority," second-order diversity generates a wide range of participa- 
tory experiences for all individuals, thereby providing them more 
choices in defining their civic identities. 
(i) Winners, Losers, and Group Identity. - One reason to value 
the chance to turn the tables on the majority is that it may help un- 
dermine political divisions that correspond with identity categories. 
Many democratic theorists believe that participation allows an indi- 
vidual to constitute her identity, to define her political self and her re- 
lationship to the community.132 From a constitutive perspective, there 
participation, while the existence of power encourages those able to participate in its exercise to 
do so."). 
132 See, e.g., BARBER, supra note 117, at 120, 152; C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND 
TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 99 (1977); YOUNG, supra note io, at 92; Ellen D. Katz, Race 
and the Right To Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. REV. 491, 512-14 (2000); Frank I. 
Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 
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are reasons to value a system that turns the tables, letting the usual 
losers win and allowing the presumptive winners to lose. Specifically, 
if being part of a permanent political minority is qualitatively different 
from being part of a permanent majority, the former experience might 
lead one to define one's relationship to the community differently than 
the latter. This phenomenon may be particularly worrisome when, as 
is often the case, one's status as an electoral minority coincides with 
one's status as a racial or ethnic minority. 
Admittedly, the term "constitutive" is typically used in a more ab- 
stract way, describing the way participation shapes an individual's re- 
lationship to the polity as a whole. The term is generally not used to 
take into account the possibility that political outcomes - specifically, 
the experience of repeatedly losing - might taint one's view of that 
relationship. Nor is the term often used to explore the possibility that 
membership in a group - especially a group that is often defeated in 
politics - might shape an individual's relationship with the polity as a 
whole. 
The term, as employed here, thus moves away from such an atom- 
ized view of individuals. It picks up on Melissa Williams's observa- 
tion that membership in a marginalized group is defined "from within 
the group's or culture's own history and values" and "defined from 
without" by societal structures.133 It posits that civic identity may 
similarly be shaped by the complex interaction between political suc- 
cess and group identity. This argument thus flips the claim, made by 
some political theorists, that one's group identity influences the way 
that one participates in the political process. It claims that individu- 
als' participatory experiences may help shape group identity. The 
definition thereby acknowledges the significance of instrumental con- 
cerns - those associated with the distribution of political power 
among groups - to the individual's participatory experience.134 Put 
FLA. L. REV. 443, 478-79 (1989). For an analysis of the intellectual roots of this vision, which 
began with Mill and Rousseau, see PATEMAN, supra note 120, at 24-33. 
133 WILLIAMS, supra note i16, at i85. 
134 In arguing that constitutive experiences are refracted through group identity, I do not mean 
to suggest that a group is somehow a monolithic entity whose sense of identity is easily defined or 
that automatically absorbs each experience of its members. I envision something much less sys- 
tematic: the simple possibility that members of a group interact with one another and, in doing so, 
convey information about their democratic experiences, which gradually helps shape each other's 
sense of themselves and their group identity. My assumption is that these interactions eventually 
take on a common shape within the group as a whole; they eventually become part of the story 
that serves as a narrative for members of the group to explain themselves and their relationship to 
the world. Group narratives, in my view, thus bear some resemblance to the conversations that 
Jane Mansbridge terms "everyday talk." In Mansbridge's words, "[e]veryday talk produces results 
collectively, but not in concert.., through the combined and interactive effects of relatively iso- 
lated individual actions." Jane Mansbridge, Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System, in 
1150 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. II118:099 
simply, in the presence of salient and persistent group identities, in- 
strumental notions like "winner," "loser," and "swing voter" can carry 
symbolic baggage with them. 
A different way of making this point is to note that if every deci- 
sionmaking body is first-order diverse, there is a risk that members of 
both the majority and the minority will "normalize" their participatory 
experiences. We might expect members of the majority to assume that 
their views are universal, or at least to grow complacent about their 
status.135 Similarly, we might anticipate that members of the minority 
will understand themselves solely as outsiders - dissenters or junior 
partners on every decision - and thus treat all of the majority's 
choices with skepticism.136 
Second-order diversity is attractive, then, because it creates a dis- 
tinct type of political space. It is one where members of the majority 
are temporarily deprived of the comfort - and power - associated 
with their majority status. It is one where members of the electoral 
minority are not permanent dissenters, but sometime participants in 
the governance process. Second-order diversity thus destabilizes the 
power dynamics associated with a "normal" participatory experience. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the notion of turning the tables de- 
pends on the existence of social categories even as it seeks to under- 
mine them. The notion of turning the tables is, of course, meaningless 
in a world without readily recognizable social distinctions. One way to 
think of turning the tables is as a process-based strategy for combating 
subordination, using the processes that tend to reinforce status ine- 
qualities to erode them. That response is not a complete one, however; 
as I explore in section III.B.3, the tools used to turn the tables may 
sometimes undermine the effectiveness of the strategy itself. 
(ii) Variation and Identity Formation. - Setting aside the some- 
what rigid paradigm described above - a system involving "winners" 
and "losers" - second-order diversity may be useful because it gener- 
ates compromise along all parts of the political spectrum. It thus en- 
sures that an individual enjoys a wide variety of participatory experi- 
ences over the course of a civic life.137 
DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 211, 212 (Stephen 
Macedo ed., 1999). 
135 Cf Mansbridge, supra note 116, at 641. To the extent that members of the majority group 
assume the universality and neutrality of their views, turning the tables may thus further Iris 
Marion Young's goal of forcing "the dominant culture . . to discover itself for the first time as 
specific." YOUNG, supra note io, at 166; see also id. at 169-72. 
136 I am indebted to Lani Guinier for suggesting this line of analysis. 
137 This argument bears some connection to those made by Nancy Rosenblum in lauding "[t]he 
possibility of shifting involvements among associations - the experience of pluralism by men and 
women personally and individually." ROSENBLUM, supra note 116, at 17. 
2005] SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY I 15I 
There are several reasons we might value the opportunity to offer 
individuals a wide variety of participatory experiences. First, granting 
individuals from the edge of the political spectrum a chance to com- 
promise with those who share similar views may generate an impor- 
tant - albeit atypical - type of experience. We usually think that 
democratic compromise means members of opposing camps finding 
common ground. That is, indeed, the type of compromise we see in 
institutions that are first-order diverse - decisions are rendered by a 
few people from the ends of the political spectrum compromising with 
lots of people from the middle. Turning the tables means that those 
individuals on the ends of the political spectrum will sometimes be 
concentrated in a decisionmaking body. It gives them a chance to 
spend their time building on common assumptions and refining a prin- 
ciple rather than quarreling over which principle ought to apply in the 
first place. Such experiences may offer an important source of partici- 
patory energy by allowing group members to perfect a political plat- 
form or by increasing individuals' confidence in their views.138 But 
only the presence of second-order diversity somewhere in the democ- 
ratic infrastructure creates such participatory opportunities. 
Further, to the extent that one constitutes one's civic identity 
through participation, there are reasons to value the chance to do so in 
a wide range of participatory contexts. If we believe that personal 
identity is or ought to be fluid,139 second-order diversity may be attrac- 
tive because it creates conditions in which civic identity can be fluid as 
well. Variation in the composition of disaggregated bodies creates the 
opportunity for the unexpected to happen. It places individuals in a 
political dynamic that may differ markedly from the dynamic they 
routinely experience, which may in turn lead individuals to privilege 
different parts of their identity at different times. An individual might 
find herself in the majority on a jury, a swing voter in electing a local 
representative, and a consistent loser in electing her governor. Put dif- 
ferently, the variety of participatory opportunities second-order diver- 
sity engenders may offer individuals more "scripts,"140 to use Anthony 
Appiah's term, for defining their civic identity. 
In sum, second-order diversity may help vary participatory experi- 
ences over the course of a civic life. It ensures that an individual will 
encounter a variety of power dynamics over time, perhaps leading her 
138 Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 159 ("Even if group polarization is at work - perhaps be- 
cause group polarization is at work - enclaves can provide a wide range of social benefits, espe- 
cially by enriching the number of available facts and arguments. And when members of such 
groups eventually speak in more heterogeneous groups, they often do so with a greater degree of 
clarity and confidence." (second emphasis added)). 
139 See supra pp. IIIo-II. 
140 Appiah, supra note m5, at 97. 
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to privilege different aspects of her identity at different times. It may 
thus help reduce the salience of certain lines of political division by 
complicating each individual's sense of her own identity. 
2. Forced Communities and the Costs Associated with Turning the 
Tables. - As with other attributes of second-order diversity, there are 
costs associated with turning the tables. One might, for instance, dis- 
favor efforts to destabilize identity categories. As noted elsewhere,141 
there is a lively debate on this topic in the academy, one that extends 
well beyond the scope of this Article. Even if one has no view on this 
debate, there is another set of costs associated with second-order diver- 
sity that arises directly from the design feature that allows us to turn 
the tables: individuals are forced into a participatory experience they 
would not choose. 
Because we associate the jury with a particularly rich and intense 
participatory experience, the jury ought to provide a particularly vivid 
example of the costs associated with turning the tables.142 Jury ser- 
vice, of course, allows individuals to take part directly in the democ- 
ratic process, without the mediation of a representative negotiating on 
their behalf.143 We also value the process by which jurors decide. Ju- 
rors do not merely vote individually on a verdict. The verdict is a col- 
lective democratic act.144 Jurors try to reach agreement through dis- 
141 See supra pp. IIIo-ii. 
142 Although I believe that districts can also be the site of an important participatory experi- 
ence, most scholars do not think of voting in these terms. The notion that voting is a thin partici- 
patory experience dates back at least to Mill. PATEMAN, supra note 120, at 30; see also BARBER, 
supra note 117, at 187-88 (arguing that "[v]oting... is already the least significant act of citizen- 
ship in a democracy," and comparing the act of voting to "using a public toilet"); SHKLAR, supra 
note 14, at 27 (concluding, despite a robust endorsement of voting as an "affirmation of citizen- 
ship," that the right to vote and not the exercise of voting carries deep significance for most vot- 
ers). For a sketch of the argument that districts may provide an important participatory experi- 
ence, see Gerken, supra note 38, at 15-20. 
143 See ABRAMSON, supra note 26, at I-2; LEVINE, supra note 61, at i6. 
144 I use the term "collective" rather than "deliberative" in order to leave room for the notion 
that the political act in which juries are engaged is properly democratic even if it involves old- 
fashioned foot-stamping, even if the discussions are not framed as a means to achieve the common 
good but involve logrolling and other hallmarks of interest-based bargaining, even if the jurors 
understand themselves to be "representing" the interests of their communities rather than the 
common good, or even if they cannot achieve consensus and must resort to voting. For critiques 
of conventional conceptions of deliberative democracy that touch on these and other concerns, see 
WALZER, supra note 121, at 59; Mansbridge, supra note 134, at 225-26; and William H. Simon, 
Three Limitations of Deliberative Democracy: Identity Politics, Bad Faith, and Indeterminacy, in 
DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 134, at 
49, 51-52. In my view, juries need not be deliberative - at least in the most commonly used 
sense of the term - in order to be democratic. For a useful exploration of the relationship be- 
tween a liberal pluralist conception of democracy and deliberative democracy, see AMY 
GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 27-49 (2004); 
Michelman, supra note 132, at 447-50; and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 
YALE L.J. 1713, 1714, 1719-23 (1988). See also Jon Elster, Introduction, in DELIBERATIVE 
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cussion,145 something that can involve hours of face-to-face interaction 
and thus result in a political experience of unusual intensity. Further, 
the jury wields genuine democratic power.146 It engages in the process 
of compromise and does not simply vote up or down on a charge, 
thereby relegating juries to a Schumpeterian validation or rejection of 
the decision of an elite.147 As a result, at least since de Tocqueville, 
most commentators have ascribed a rich democratic role to the jury. 148 
DEMOCRACY I, 8 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (noting the wide range of definitions of deliberative de- 
mocracy). 
145 See BARBER, supra note 117, at 267 ("Without talk, there can be no democracy."); Catha- 
rine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 
88 MICH L. REV. 2348, 2406-07 (1990). Juries thus epitomize one element of the deliberative 
ideal, the Habermasian hope "that democracy revolves around the transformation rather than 
simply the aggregation of preferences." Elster, supra note 144, at i; see also GUTMANN & 
THOMPSON, supra note 144, at 33. Thus, one of the most interesting aspects of the jury as a de- 
mocratic institution is that the end result of jury decisionmaking looks different from a simple 
aggregation of the views of the jurors going into deliberations. The verdict is shaped by group 
dynamics, individual arguments, and everything else that makes group decisionmaking such a 
complex and unpredictable process. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 26, at 140; LEVINE, supra 
note 6i, at 15o-67; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205, 206. 
146 We do not value the jury merely because its decisions have real-world effects, although that 
is plainly important. Cf John Gastil et al., Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of the Con- 
nection Between Jury Deliberation and Political Participation, 64 J. POL. 585, 593 (2002) (finding 
evidence that the number of criminal charges heard by juries positively correlates with voting 
behavior and speculating that such correlation extends to the gravity of the alleged offense). We 
care about jury participation because the jurors' decisions involve the exercise of discretion. See 
ABRAMSON, supra note 26, at 6; VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 157 
(1986) (citing cases that make this claim); Wells, supra note 145, at 2402-10o. 
147 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 270-72 (1942). 
To be sure, jurors do not engage in what Nancy Rosenblum would term "long-term" or "compre- 
hensive" judgments. Nancy L. Rosenblum, Political Parties as Membership Groups, ioo COLUM. 
L. REV. 813, 825, 838 (2000). Nonetheless, as Stephen Schulhofer observes, jurors do not "merely 
raise [their] hands and vot[e] up or down on binary issues .... Very few criminal cases involve 
only one count, and when there are several counts, compromise verdicts are always a possibility." 
Schulhofer, supra note IoI, at 76; see also LEVINE, supra note 61, at 156-57; Andrew G. Deiss, 
Comment, Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Trial Jury in a Pluralist America, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 323, 323 (1996). Even on the thinnest view of the jury's role, when only one ques- 
tion is before the jury and the jurors are merely applying law to facts, jurors are jointly engaged 
in an interpretive act. See Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: 
Toward a Theory of Jury Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199, I201-02 
(1986); Lawrence M. Solan, Jurors as Statutory Interpreters, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1281, 1285- 
88 (2003). Together jurors must hash out how to apply a general principle to the facts of a given 
case. And they often must make discretionary judgments - for instance, judging the "reason- 
ableness" of an action - along the way. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 78, at 69-74; see 
also Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. 
L. REV. 1041, 1052-57 (1995). As Dennis Thompson and Amy Gutmann observe in terming such 
decisions "everyday politics" or "middle democracy," when "resolving moral conflict in politics, the 
interpretation matters just as much as the principle." GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 144, 
at 35, 40. 
148 Scholars have, for instance, termed it the "lower house" of the judiciary, AMAR, supra note 
6, at ioo; a "bottom-up" or "incremental" lawmaker, Steven Hetcher, The Jury's Out: Social 
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Perhaps the best way to understand the participatory costs associ- 
ated with turning the tables - or at least to understand why these 
costs cannot be avoided in this context - is to think of the jury as a 
"forced community."149 The jury system assembles people from differ- 
ent backgrounds and forces them to work together on a shared task. 
The forced nature of the community prevents an individual from mak- 
ing a choice; individuals cannot opt out of whatever experience the 
system randomly assigns them. And if we think juries afford an im- 
portant participatory experience, we might worry about the type of 
experience second-order diversity forces upon some members of the 
polity. Heterogeneity in jury composition means that for every African 
American who sits on a jury with a large number of African Ameri- 
cans, another African American will sit on a jury where she is the only 
one. For every jury of ten women, another will contain only two. Thus, 
while second-order diversity may help members of the polity as a whole 
define their relationship to the community through the diffuse system of 
Norms' Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 652 (2003); Marder, supra note 
97, at 909; a policymaker, Gary J. Jacobsohn, Citizen Participation in Policy-Making: The Role of 
the Jury, 39 J. POL. 73, 74-76 (1977); Lisa Kern Griffin, "The Image We See Is Our Own": Defend- 
ing the Jury's Territory at the Heart of the Democratic Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 332, 361-65 
(1996); Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 78, at 69-7 I; or a feedback mechanism by which the peo- 
ple "inform lawmakers about the 'harmony, or lack thereof, between the laws and the people,'" id. 
at 364 (quoting Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 78, at 69). 
149 I model this phrase on one Jerry Frug uses when he celebrates cities as "fortuitous associa- 
tions" that pull together a group of individuals and require them "to get along." FRUG, supra note 
io, at 174. Cynthia Estlund similarly posits that the workplace represents another locus of com- 
pelled integration and lauds it as such. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER 3-5 
(2003). Rick Hills offers a different angle on this debate, arguing in favor of allowing what he 
terms "private governments" - private associations, unions, political parties - to exert coercive 
pressure on their members. Roderick Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Govern- 
ments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 146-47 (2003). For a spirited challenge to the practice of forcing 
unwanted members on private associations, see ROSENBLUM, supra note i6, at 158-9o. 
Many of the small, disaggregated institutions on which this Article focuses are "forced 
communities" in at least a weak sense. Consider districts, for example. Individuals are not given 
a choice about the district in which they will vote. And, if we are concerned that "exit" is not a 
meaningful option where local governments or states are concerned, see, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra 
note 69, at 37-38 (arguing that the exit option is overstated in federalism literature), "exit" is likely 
to be an even less realistic option where districting is concerned. After all, even if one were will- 
ing to absorb the costs associated with moving in order to avoid being included in a particular 
type of district, districts are redrawn every ten years, thus creating the possibility that the move 
would prove futile. Richard Briffault has proposed taking advantage of the fact that decennial 
line-drawing reduces any realistic incentive to move, arguing that local boundaries should be re- 
drawn every ten years to combine more and less affluent areas and to reduce the incentive of the 
more affluent to move to avoid such groupings. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The 
Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. I, 72 (1990). 
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interactions by which we define our group and civic identities,150 it 
may impose a heavy cost on individuals.151 
One way to frame an assessment of this tradeoff is the voice/exit 
paradigm.152 "Voice" and "exit" are the two main strategies individu- 
als adopt when they disagree with a group or organization of which 
they are a part: they can protest (voice) or they can leave the group 
(exit). What makes the jury interesting as a locus of democratic par- 
ticipation is that exit is not an option.s53 
Perhaps counterintuitively, the fact that juries are forced communi- 
ties is one of their main attractions from the perspective of second- 
order diversity. Even setting aside the possibility that restrictions on 
exit encourage voice,154 thereby promoting some of the participatory 
aims of second-order diversity, the forced nature of the community 
guarantees that second-order diversity in the jury system will provide 
a set of democratic benefits that other decisionmaking institutions 
cannot. After all, we can presume that members of the majority 
would be quite reluctant to choose the uncomfortable experience of 
losing. A robust exit option for juries could undermine the goals of 
second-order diversity altogether. 
If a forced community is necessary for the full achievement of sec- 
ond-order diversity's participatory benefits, it is also the main source 
of its participatory costs. We worry, of course, when individuals do 
not get to make choices about their participatory experiences.155 In- 
deed, from a constitutive perspective, the notion of a "forced commu- 
nity" seems like a contradiction in terms and, in any case, seems 
unlikely to promote democratic values. Further, because the jury is a 
forced community, we cannot invoke one of the best arguments offered 
in favor of community variation by scholars of federalism and local 
government law: that we can make everyone better off by allowing in- 
dividuals to choose among a varied range of participatory experi- 
150 See supra pp. 1142-45. 
151 Consider a debate that has taken place in the voting rights context. Samuel Issacharoff and 
Alex Aleinikoff have observed that one of the concerns that may explain the Court's Shaw juris- 
prudence is the notion of "filler people" - individuals deliberately placed within a district with 
the knowledge that they will lose. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redis- 
tricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 6oi (I993). 152 These terms are drawn from the influential work of Albert Hirschman. See generally 
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3-5 (1970). 
153 Passive participation, however, may represent a form of exit. Hirschman describes "acqui- 
escence or indifference" as a form of voice, but he does so in a context where he assumes that exit 
is a realistic option. See id. at 31. 
154 See id. at 34. 
155 Cf BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE & EQUALITY 112-93 (2001) (analyzing the question of forced 
association from the traditional liberal perspective); ROSENBLUM, supra note i1i6, at 158-90 (ar- 
guing against forcing a private association to accept unwanted members). 
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ences.156 Indeed, this argument seems to cut the other way with re- 
spect to jury participation, as we deliberately force an unwelcome par- 
ticipatory experience on some in order to grant an enjoyable participa- 
tory experience to others. The theory thus bears an uncomfortable 
resemblance to trading off the rights of individuals. 
The argument that we are trading off individual rights is under- 
mined, however, by the disaggregated nature of the jury system. 
Every jury is going to have winners and losers on it, people who dis- 
agree more or less with the verdict rendered. Rather than imposing 
those costs systematically on electoral minorities, the democratic sys- 
tem is likely to be healthier if members of both the minority and ma- 
jority sometimes feel the triumph of prevailing as well as the sting of 
defeat. 
Put differently, when decisionmaking power is disaggregated, 
thinking of fairness in purely individualist terms ignores the ways in 
which individual claims to fairness are connected to the relative treat- 
ment of groups.157 It is difficult to imagine an individual right to be 
on the winning side of a jury verdict or election. That is because 
every decisionmaking body is likely to contain both "winners" and 
"losers." The only way to determine whether one has been treated 
fairly is to assess whether one is less likely than someone from another 
group to have a chance at winning. The individual injury, then, neces- 
sarily rises and falls with the treatment of other members of one's 
group. To have any critical force, the baseline for measuring individ- 
ual fairness in disaggregated systems must be the relative treatment of 
groups, not individuals.158 
The perception of trading off rights may be inevitable with such a 
baseline. Here, for instance, some electoral minorities will find them- 
selves isolated on a jury or in a district because of a scheme that grants 
other members of that group decisionmaking power. The question, 
then, is how to balance the tradeoff between individual and group - 
how to measure the diffuse group-wide and polity-wide benefits of 
second-order diversity against the costs of episodically demoralizing 
156 The seminal argument is made by Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi- 
tures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). Consider Michael McConnell's oft-cited example: 
[A]ssume that there are only two states, with equal populations of ioo each. Assume 
further that 70 percent of State A, and only 40 percent of State B, wish to outlaw smok- 
ing in public buildings. The others are opposed. If the decision is made on a national 
basis by a majority rule, i io people will be pleased, and 90o displeased. If a separate de- 
cision is made by majorities in each state, 130 will be pleased, and only 70 displeased. 
The level of satisfaction will be still greater if some smokers in State A decide to move to 
State B .... 
McConnell, supra note 69, at 1494. For a further exploration of the notions of voice and exit as 
they relate to second-order diversity and localism, see infra note 209. 
157 See Gerken, supra note 98, at 1681-88. 
158 See id. at 1683-84. 
2005] SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY 1157 
experiences for individuals. One part of that calculus will involve an 
assessment of the relative weight of those individual costs.159 A sec- 
ond question is how those costs balance out over time, both for indi- 
vidual group members and for the polity as a whole.'60 If, as one po- 
litical theorist has speculated in a different context, "one [participatory 
experience] can compensate for the deprivations and degradations of 
another,"161 should that change our calculus of the costs here?162 
The final question to ask is more fundamental. In a world with 
forced political communities, second-order diversity may be the fairest 
strategy for designing disaggregated institutions. And the problem of 
individuals' losing out - being stuck with a participatory experience 
that is not to their liking - is inevitable in a disaggregated system no 
matter what we decide is "fair." The harder question, however, is 
whether we ought to have forced communities in the first place.163 If 
159 The main question to ask, of course, is an empirical one: what kinds of participatory experi- 
ences are likely to exacerbate the isolation of a minority group member, and what kinds of experi- 
ences are likely to empower her? For instance, if it turns out that African Americans in a jury 
district with a twenty-five percent African American population feel silenced on any jury consist- 
ing of three or fewer black jurors, then silencing will occur whether or not some juries have only 
one or two African Americans on them (as with second-order diversity) or all juries have three 
jurors on them (as with a system that is first-order diverse). There may therefore be benefits to 
designing a system where at least some African Americans sit on juries with larger concentrations 
of African American jurors. Conversely, if it turns out that increasing the number of African 
American jurors to five or six accomplishes little and the costs of having only one or two African 
American jurors are great, second-order diversity may not be the best strategy. 
160 For instance, even if an African American is an isolated minority on a jury, does the fact 
that she has a chance to vote in a majority-minority district or serve on a seventy-five percent 
African American school committee compensate for that disempowering experience? 
161 ROSENBLUM, supra note 116, at i6 (discussing voluntary associations). 
162 And how great will the benefits be if second-order diversity is confined to only one part of 
the democratic infrastructure - if, for instance, one's varied experiences derive solely from jury 
membership and are spaced a decade apart? Further, if we turn to a less individualistic assess- 
ment of these costs and benefits, how do we assess the more nebulous effects of varied participa- 
tory experiences within a group? See supra note 134 (discussing the possibility that group mem- 
bers will be indirectly affected by one another's participatory experiences). Will an African 
American governed by a predominantly white school committee be affected by the fact that else- 
where African Americans are setting educational policy? Such a claim would, of course, raise a 
number of questions related to the debates over virtual representation. For a survey of these de- 
bates, see A.H. BIRCH, REPRESENTATION 5 I-53 (1971); and PITKIN, supra note I, at 168-89. It 
is worth noting, however, that debates about virtual representation inhere in a system that is first- 
order diverse as well. 
163 Indeed, one of the primary attacks on territory-based districting stems from the forced na- 
ture of the electoral community, leading scholars to propose granting individuals greater auton- 
omy in defining their community identities (for example, by implementing proportional represen- 
tation systems or softening residency restrictions for local elections). See, e.g., FRUG, supra note 
io, at Io6-07; GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 16, at 168-222. See generally Richard Thompson 
Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1999); Richard Thomp- 
son Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 10o7 HARV. L. REV. 
I84I, I909-Io (I994). For an interesting exchange touching upon this and related issues, see Rich- 
ard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
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our ability to achieve second-order diversity depends on forcing people 
from different backgrounds to work together, is the game worth the 
candle? Why not give everyone the option of exit that is available, at 
least in theory, in the context of federalism and local government law? 
The notion of second-order diversity does not provide an answer to 
that question. As noted above,164 the goal of this Article is to see 
whether a normatively attractive case can be made for an exist- 
ing feature of our democratic design, and the theory thus does not offer 
a complete answer to debates about other possible design strategies. 
While a defense of the forced community as a strategy for democratic 
design is beyond the scope of this Article, I offer two observations 
about that debate. First, as a purely empirical matter, there may be 
some instances in which we have little choice but to rely on forced po- 
litical association to achieve our broader democratic aims.'65 Second, 
as a purely normative matter, we might conclude that forced commu- 
nities sometimes make sense as a democratic design strategy even 
when not dictated by necessity.166 
3. Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Turning the Tables from an 
Institutional Perspective. - As with the tradeoffs discussed in the 
previous sections, context matters in assessing the tradeoff between the 
costs and benefits of turning the tables. For instance, consider just one 
difference between the tools we used to generate the wide variety of 
participatory experiences described above. As noted above,'16 the 
state creates heterogeneous juries through a random assignment sys- 
tem, whereas districts are created through self-conscious choice. These 
two strategies implicate a distinct set of costs and benefits and high- 
light the tensions inherent in the argument that turning the tables can 
erode social categories even as it depends on them. 
1115, 1156-62 (1996); and Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Rich- 
ard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1188-94 (1996). 
164 See supra pp. I0o5-o6. 
165 Thus, while one could easily imagine avoiding the problem of the forced community in dis- 
tricting - when a proportional representation system offers a readily available alternative for 
electing representatives - juries might not function if we allowed jurors to choose the jury on 
which they served. Once we have concluded that a forced community is our best or only option, 
we can address the question with which this Article is preoccupied: whether first-order or second- 
order diversity represents the superior design strategy. 
166 Should we follow this line of analysis, we must deal with a difficult structural question: how 
do we weigh the individual costs of forced communities generally (and forced communities that 
are second-order diverse in particular) against the more diffuse benefits that forced communities 
generally (and second-order diversity in particular) afford? Thus, in assessing whether we are 
willing to force individuals into a given political community with the knowledge that some will 
find the experience frustrating or disempowering, we must also consider the benefits that accrue 
to all members of the polity - those associated with complicating identity categories, fostering 
better participatory habits, and destabilizing the "normal" political baseline. 
167 See supra pp. 1112-13. 
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Specifically, if we think of juries - and, to a lesser extent, districts 
- as forced communities, the tool we use to determine the member- 
ship of those communities may matter a great deal. For example, we 
might value a random assignment system because it allows the state to 
be neutral in the way that has attracted so many theorists to lottery 
systems for distributing political power and goods.168 The random as- 
signment system used in the context of juries conveys no message 
about community identity.169 Random assignment is simply premised 
on the notion that some differences will emerge among jurors. It does 
not identify which differences will emerge (for instance, it does not as- 
sume that race or gender will divide juries), let alone place a particular 
individual on a jury based upon his or her group membership. It thus 
avoids the inference that the state is treating an individual "as the sur- 
face to which a certain label can be applied."'70 Indeed, precisely that 
168 For discussions of the use of lottery as a decisionmaking procedure, see NEIL DUXBURY, 
RANDOM JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING (Ig99); ELSTER, supra 
note 26, at 62-67, 78-I22 (1989); and BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESEN- 
TATIVE GOVERNMENT 8-84 (1997). For a proposal to use a two-tier lottery system in order to 
foster greater jury deliberation, see Lichtman, supra note 62, at 135-36. Many scholars have ad- 
vanced arguments in favor of randomness in the context of electoral systems. See ACKERMAN, 
supra note 63, at 285-89, 298 (discussing a "responsive lottery" as an alternative to majority rule); 
BARBER, supra note 117, at 291-92 (proposing filling local offices by lot); JOHN BURNHEIM, IS 
DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE? THE ALTERNATIVE TO ELECTORAL POLITICS 9-12, Iio-19 (1985) 
(proposing a lottery system for choosing public officials to ensure "a representative sample of the 
people concerned" (emphasis omitted)); DUXBURY, supra, at 163-64 (proposing randomized reso- 
lution of majority-minority divisions on occasion); Akhil Reed Amar, Lottery Voting: A Thought 
Experiment, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 195 (same); Dennis C. Mueller et al., Representative 
Democracy Via Random Selection, 12 PUB. CHOICE 57, 6o-6i (1972) (advocating a system of 
random selection of representatives); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows 
at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90o COLUM. L. 
REV. 2121, 2197 (i990) (suggesting use of a lottery as a means of setting an agenda and avoiding 
potential problems identified by social choice theory); Richard H. Thaler, Illusions and Mirages in 
Public Policy, 73 PUB. INT. 60, 72 (1983) (proposing that congressional committees be assigned 
randomly to avoid the problems associated with self-selection); Robert Weissberg, Collective vs. 
Dyadic Representation in Congress, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 535, 544 (1978) ("If one's constitutional 
goal were simply the best institutional representation of mass opinions, the optimal solution is 
clearly a random sample of about 1500 citizens . . . ."); Richard Zeckhauser, Majority Rule with 
Lotteries on Alternatives, 83 Q. J. ECON. 696 (1969) (discussing the use of lotteries or alternatives 
as potential choices in the context of a majoritarian system); Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing 
Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1283 (1984) (proposing choosing representa- 
tives through random selection of a single decisive vote out of all votes cast). For historical ac- 
counts of the use of a lottery to choose office holders, see DUXBURY, supra, at 26-34; ELSTER, 
supra note 26, at 78-86; and MANIN, supra, at 8-93. For an effort to connect the debate over 
elections by lot to the debates of the Framers, see ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 35, at I 151- 
55. 
169 See Pauline T Kim, The Colorblind Lottery, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 23 (2003) (noting the 
argument that using chance is superior to using race as deciding factor); see also DUXBURY, su- 
pra note 168, at 51-53. 
170 Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in MORAL CONCEPTS 153, 159 (Joel Feinberg ed., 
1969). For an extended criticism of state efforts to promote diversity (in the first-order sense) and 
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concern has animated much of the opposition to peremptory chal- 
lenges, which undermine efforts to achieve a random draw. 
In the districting context, however, districters cannot avoid deliber- 
ately grouping together voters based upon some part of their identity, 
be it race, socioeconomic status, or geography.171 They must choose, 
therefore, who is going to be a member of the forced community and 
decide the axis along which the tables will be turned.172 As the con- 
troversies over racial gerrymanders suggest, it is one thing for the state 
to group people using a random assignment system, another to do so 
through deliberate social engineering.173 To be sure, the placement of 
particular types of people within a district does not mean that they 
must coalesce. It does, however, depend on the assumption that race 
(or socioeconomic characteristics or geography) is a salient feature in 
the lives of voters. Thus, to the extent we value second-order diversity 
because it may help destabilize identity categories, the tool used to at- 
tain this goal might affect our assessment of this tradeoff, as some 
strategies used to achieve the type of destabilization second-order di- 
versity promises may, in fact, risk reifying identity categories in the 
long run. 
C. Dissenting by Deciding: The Tradeoffs 
Between the Benefits of Visibility and the Costs of Variation 
If the arguments in the previous two sections dealt with the input 
side of the democratic equation - the fair distribution of decisionmak- 
ing authority and participatory experiences - then this section focuses 
on democratic outputs. Specifically, this section addresses another un- 
usual feature of second-order diversity: it allows electoral minorities to 
issue a decision that differs from what the majority would prefer. The 
result is a varied, sometimes conflicting, set of democratic outcomes 
that make differences within the polity visible to the polity. 
the costs those efforts may entail, see SCHUCK, supra note I, at 134-202. These tensions have 
certainly been evident in the doctrine governing jury discrimination claims. As some scholars 
have observed, there is a tension between the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section doctrine, which 
is premised on the notion that a juror's race and sex may affect how she views a case, and Batson 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which is premised on traditional anti-essentialist grounds. See 
supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
171 Although independent commissions can reduce the extent to which self-interest taints deci- 
sions about how to group voters, as long as those commissions do not district randomly, at some 
level they must make choices about which groupings matter. See supra notes 34, 37. 
172 The best defense that can be offered against this claim is that such choices are inherent in 
the use of territorial-based districting as a strategy for electing representatives. See Gerken, su- 
pra note 6, at 1452-55. Thus, even if one preferred first-order diversity as a design strategy, one 
would still have to choose what axes of difference to consider in designing individual districts. 
173 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648-49 (I993). 
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Consider the difference we would expect in the outputs of democ- 
ratic systems that are first-order and second-order diverse. If every 
decisionmaking body mirrored the population, as with first-order di- 
versity, we would expect their democratic outputs - whether in the 
form of a jury verdict, a school committee decision, or an elected rep- 
resentative - to be roughly the same. We would expect those deci- 
sions to reflect the views of the rough equivalent of the "swing" or me- 
dian voter. 
Second-order diversity avoids a push to the preferences of the me- 
dian decisionmaker in every case. Because second-order diversity var- 
ies the composition of decisionmaking bodies, we would expect varia- 
tion in democratic outputs as well. Some democratic outputs will 
reflect the views of those in the middle, while others will reflect the 
perspectives of those closer to the ends of the political spectrum. What 
that means in practice is that second-order diversity allows dissent to 
take the form of a decision. Those who differ with the majority on a 
given issue can express that disagreement not by making an argument, 
but by adopting an outlier position. Thus, while first-order diversity 
can give us a clear sense of the views of the median of the political 
spectrum, second-order diversity can give us a richer picture of 
the views of the community as a whole. We can see the ends as 
well as the middle, the spread as well as the median of the political 
distribution. 
In the districting context, for example, first-order diversity tends to 
generate a set of moderate candidates who cater to the median voter. 
Second-order diversity is necessary to elect a representative like 
Barney Frank, Charles Rangel, or Tom Delay - someone capable of 
articulating the views of those closer to the edge of the political spec- 
trum. Similarly, if we think that one's views on a criminal case are 
connected to one's race or gender, then second-order diversity is neces- 
sary to generate the type of outlier verdicts that would reveal the exis- 
tence of such divisions. A jury system that is first-order diverse, in 
contrast, should produce a more homogeneous set of verdicts and is 
thus likely to submerge evidence of such disagreement. 
The notions of first-order and second-order diversity help identify 
the benefits associated with variation in democratic outputs. Here 
again, I begin with the benefits associated with such variation, turn to 
its attendant costs, and end with an example of how those tradeoffs 
can vary by institutional context. 
i. The Benefits of Visibility. - The primary benefit afforded by 
variation in democratic outputs is "democratic visibility." By granting 
electoral minorities a chance to issue outlier decisions, second-order di- 
versity gives members of the electoral minority a chance to call atten- 
tion to themselves and their views. It thus offers us a more complete 
and textured view of the democratic order. 
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Second-order diversity offers a type of visibility that cannot be re- 
produced by a poll or a survey. It is visibility with a political conse- 
quence - a verdict rendered, a policy implemented, a candidate 
elected - which may force others to act, reevaluate, and engage with 
the decision and those who rendered it. It thus allows electoral mi- 
norities to engage in the type of agenda setting that is usually difficult 
for those outside the political mainstream to achieve. 
Further, because second-order diversity grants electoral minorities 
the power not just to articulate their views, but to resolve democratic 
controversies in the best way they see fit, it allows them to remap the 
politics of the possible. It grants them at least a limited opportunity to 
put their ideals into practice, to move from abstract principles to con- 
crete action, and to show how a governance alternative would actually 
work. Second-order diversity can thus not only generate debate, but 
change how that debate takes place. 
Consider, for instance, what has been taking place in San Francisco 
at the time of this writing. The city - where many more people sup- 
port gay marriage than do people statewide or nationwide - spent 
several weeks marrying gay and lesbian couples until a court put a 
halt to its activities.'74 During that period, newspapers across the 
country carried stories about elderly lesbian couples or gay lovers of 
forty-five years marrying one another. As a result, we, as a nation, 
now have a concrete practice, not just an abstract issue, to debate. 
And we have also had a chance to observe reactions to this action 
throughout the country, providing us a far richer sense of what mem- 
bers of the majority think about the issue than a poll or a theoretical 
debate could offer. Thus, regardless of one's views on gay marriage 
and on whether visibility in this instance has furthered a cause or re- 
sulted in a backlash, San Francisco's decision to issue marriage li- 
censes has fundamentally altered the political landscape. For good or 
for ill, the debate about gay marriage is different than it was a year 
ago, and second-order diversity may help explain the democratic dy- 
namic behind that fact. 
One can imagine a number of reasons why making electoral mi- 
norities visible in this fashion can help foster a healthier democratic 
process. To begin, second-order diversity makes electoral minorities 
visible to the majority. It gives the majority a chance not only to see 
the existence of difference, but to examine how those differences affect 
concrete governance choices. It thus may allow ideas from the ends of 
the political spectrum to bubble up into the mainstream.175 A system 
174 See Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Forced To Halt Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. I2, 
2004, at AI. 
175 Cf Cover, supra note 52, at 673-74 (praising "polycentric norm articulation"). 
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that is first-order diverse, in contrast, could systematically submerge 
those differences. 
Further, second-order diversity creates space for electoral minorities 
to contest the decisions of the majority and voice disagreement in a 
manner visible to the entire polity.176 By rendering a contrary decision 
or electing a representative to serve as the group's champion, members 
of a minority group can remind the majority that differences exist. Of- 
fering some opportunities for contestation is attractive as a procedural 
matter, as it is more likely to be viewed by everyone - especially the 
minority group - as "fair."177 And it may reduce complacency on the 
part of the majority by pointing out the costs of the majority's deci- 
sions. Consider the decision by Benton County, Oregon, which de- 
cided in the wake of San Francisco's action not to issue marriage li- 
censes to anyone because Oregon state law precluded the county from 
marrying gay and lesbian couples. One advocate of the policy wryly 
observed, "It's not altogether bad for a heterosexual couple that has 
always thought of marriage as an inalienable right to be told no. It 
might make them think how same-sex couples get told no all the 
time.' )178 
Second-order diversity makes electoral minorities visible not only 
to the polity, but to each other, thereby providing an important source 
of political energy. The choice made by a decisionmaking body domi- 
nated by a minority group signals to other group members that a criti- 
cal mass exists somewhere within the system and provides a decision 
around which the group can coalesce. Witness, for example, the politi- 
cal energy that has been generated around San Francisco's decision. 
We have already begun to see its effects, as officials in Sandoval 
County, New Mexico; New Paltz, New York; and Portland, Oregon, 
have tried to follow suit.179 
The visibility afforded by second-order diversity may be especially 
important to small or diffuse minority groups, like members of the 
Green Party, Naderites, or Asian Americans. Members of such groups 
have little hope of wielding decisionmaking power within a state or 
even within most local governments should the electorate divide along 
176 Second-order diversity thus provides chances for contestation that differ from the opportu- 
nities provided by first-order diversity and the influence model, in which contestation takes place 
largely within the decisionmaking body. See Gerken, supra note 104 (manuscript at 9-24). 
177 See Pettit, supra note 60, at 178-80. For a comparison of Pettit's conception of contestation 
and my own, see supra note 68. 
178 Kate Zernike, Gay? No Marriage License Here. Straight? Ditto., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
2004, at A8 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179 See Joshua Akers, Clerk Says She Was Doing Job by Issuing Licenses, ALBUQUERQUE J., 
June IS, 200oo4, at I, available at 2004 WL 82119090; Alan Cooperman & David Von Drehle, Same- 
Sex Marriage Vaulted Into Spotlight, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2004, at Ai; Gay Marriage Chronol- 
ogy, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, May 16, 2004, at 4, available at 2004 WL 601i929z10. 
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these lines. Small, disaggregated decisionmaking bodies provide one of 
the few places in the democratic infrastructure where members of such 
groups have a chance to exercise control in making democratic judg- 
ments - a rare chance to achieve intralocal, not just local, variation in 
decisionmaking. But only second-order diversity takes advantage of 
the potential democratic values associated with this institutional fea- 
ture. A system that is first-order diverse, by contrast, would render 
these groups invisible even within small decisionmaking bodies. 
Finally, in canvassing the benefits associated with the visibility 
second-order diversity generates, it is worth noting what kind of visi- 
bility it offers. Second-order diversity not only ensures that electoral 
minorities are seen; it fosters visibility of a particular sort. Visibility in 
a disaggregated system comes from a set of disaggregated data points. 
A jury system that is second-order diverse, for instance, might produce 
a wide variety of verdicts rendered by predominantly African Ameri- 
can juries. A districting system that is second-order diverse might re- 
sult in both John Lewis and Cynthia McKinney representing majority- 
black districts, or elect Republican congressmen whose politics range 
from Tom DeLay's to Chris Shays's. 
Second-order diversity thus offers us a kaleidoscopic view of minor- 
ity group members, a view that is constantly shifting and composed of 
many distinct parts. We may be able to discern a pattern - the exis- 
tence of politically salient groups - within the kaleidoscope, but we 
can also discern dissent and division, change and instability, external 
connections and internal differences in those patterns. Put more sim- 
ply, under a system that is second-order diverse, visibility takes the 
form of a pattern, not a point. When an institution is second-order di- 
verse, one cannot identify "the" group perspective, yet one also cannot 
fail to notice group differences where they exist.180 
180 Second-order diversity thus, in some senses, represents a middle ground between those who 
believe that group identities exist and those who believe that the notion of group identity is utterly 
incoherent. See supra section I.C, pp. iio9-Ii. It bears some resemblance to the description of 
the term "critical mass" offered by one current law school dean in Grutter, who noted that there 
must be enough members of a minority group in a law school class to make clear to the majority 
that group members do not share a single point of view. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 
2334 (2003) (describing testimony in the district court by Kent Syverud); see also LEVINSON, su- 
pra note 5, at 15 (arguing that "[o]ne way of interpreting Harvard's [affirmative action] policy is 
simply the recognition that no sane person could in fact believe that there is a singular 'black 
point of view' or 'black experience"'); Mansbridge, supra note II6, at 636 (asserting that "a vari- 
ety of representatives is usually needed to represent the heterogeneous, varied inflections and in- 
ternal oppositions that together constitute the complex and.. . contested perspectives, opinions, 
and interests.., of any group"). Indeed, the first and - as far as I am aware - only use of the 
term "second-order diversity" is Alex Aleinikoff's description of what the Grutter participants 
later termed "critical mass." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continu- 
ing Significance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325, 371I (I992). 
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2. The Costs of Variation. - There are, of course, costs to the visi- 
bility second-order diversity provides. To begin, visibility itself can be 
costly; for instance, it can make electoral minorities a target of public 
outcry or exacerbate group tensions.181 Even if one thinks that de- 
mocratic visibility is, on balance, a democratic good, there is a set of 
costs associated with specifically using governance decisions to gener- 
ate visibility: variation in democratic outputs. 
Here it seems useful to use the jury system as an example, as it 
seems to reveal the costs of variation in a particularly stark form. The 
jury system, of course, tolerates - even guarantees - a certain 
amount of variation among jury verdicts. Juries work with standards 
like "reasonableness" that leave room for discretionary judgments.182 
Moreover, the application of law to facts necessarily involves interpre- 
tation and thus engenders some inconsistency. 
Nonetheless, as with most decisionmaking bodies, consistency mat- 
ters, particularly to those most affected by the decisions. Jury verdicts 
represent an extreme example of the discrete, individual costs that can 
arise from variation. After all, verdicts, especially in the criminal con- 
text, can have a dramatic effect on the fate of individuals. Some of 
these costs are reduced by the process of judicial review; because the 
case made by a prosecutor needs to be within a certain evidentiary 
range to survive appellate scrutiny, juries simply choose who among 
those "within the range" are punished.'83 Still, even variation "within 
the range" can impose weighty costs. Further, it is quite likely that a 
number of individuals not directly affected by a verdict may suffer as 
a result of variation in jury outputs, as it is more difficult to order 
one's conduct if the legal system is unpredictable. 
Because the discrete, individual costs associated with variation are 
intuitively easy to grasp, I'd like to focus here on another, more diffuse 
set of costs associated with variation: the costs associated with what 
Ronald Dworkin has termed "checkerboard" decisionmaking.8s4 
181 While canvassing all of the costs and benefits of democratic visibility is beyond the scope of 
this Article, it is worth noting that one's assessment of these questions often boils down to one's 
views on transparency - whether a healthy system requires the submergence or acknowledgment 
of evidence of group conflict. For an analysis of these competing impulses and an argument that 
"strong democracy" requires the transformation - rather than the suppression or tolerance - of 
conflict, see BARBER, supra note 117, at 118-19, 135, 151-52. For a discussion of agnostic views 
of politics, see Cover, supra note 52, at 67 1-72; and infra p. 1174. 
182 See SCHUCK, supra note i, at 36 (noting that standards "such as 'reasonableness' encour- 
age[] diverse, context-sensitive outcomes at the expense of predictability," and arguing that the 
common law's "pronounced contextuality assures that it will reflect the remarkable heterogeneity 
of American life"); Hetcher, supra note 148, at 640 (arguing that juries infuse negligence standards 
like the reasonable person with informal social norms). 
183 See Andrew G. Deiss, supra note 147, at 341 (arguing that "on any given set of facts there is 
a range of [verdicts] that could be considered just"). 
184 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 179 (1986). 
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Here again, the jury system provides a particularly acute example. 
That is because our normative vision of the court, and thus the jury, as 
an "impartial" decisionmaker runs directly contrary to the argument 
made in favor of visibility - that we ought to value the fact that dif- 
ferent juries will render different verdicts in similar cases.185 Variation 
in verdicts, of course, raises questions about the existence of judicial 
objectivity. 
Here, then, is a particularly clear example of Pitkin's gap between 
purpose and institution, principle and practice.186 We think that juries 
are supposed to "represent," or stand in for, the community. But their 
institutional features - their small size, disaggregated structure, and 
varied composition - are in tension with efforts to paint jury deci- 
sions as unitary embodiments of "the" law or "the" community's judg- 
ment, with those terms' many normative connections to the jury's role 
as a truth-finder.s87 
Put differently, the notion of second-order diversity highlights the 
distinction between the two definitions of the word partial. We worry 
about different juries rendering different verdicts because we fear it is 
a sign that one of the juries was partial - in the sense of biased."88 
The notion of second-order diversity recasts jury verdicts as partial in 
a different sense - as a fraction of the whole. 89 It suggests that a 
verdict is best understood as one data point in figuring out what the 
"law" is or ought to be. And that notion may be difficult to reconcile 
with our normative vision of the role the jury ought to play. 
185 See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 21, at 955, 960-66 (contrasting Supreme Court decisions that 
assume that "excluding certain groups from the jury pool might change the outcome of cases" 
with later decisions taking the opposite view); Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllo- 
gism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
419, 442-48 (1992) (describing the tension between the view of a juror's duty as "discovering ob- 
jective facts" and the view that "honest jurors of different backgrounds" would differ in their as- 
sessments of the facts). 
186 See supra p. 1122. 
187 For one analysis of this tension, see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1051 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). Several authors explore the related tension between "representativeness" and judging. 
See Abrams, supra note 78, at 1419-21; Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, 
Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 97-99 (1997) (exploring 
these questions as they relate to judging and race); Frank I. Michelman, Dilemmas of Belonging: 
Moral Truth, Human Rights, and Why We Might Not Want a Representative Judiciary, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 1221, 1249-50 (2000) (cautioning against assigning an overtly political role to the 
judiciary because the courts ought to "shroud moral disagreement in the pale cast of legal 
thought" and thereby "numb the sting of political disagreement over questions of fundamental 
political morality"). 
188 For an exploration of the slippery nature of the notion of impartiality, see Minow, supra note 
27; and Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, IoI 
HARV. L. REV. Io (1987). For an analysis of these terms in the context of jury discrimination 
claims, see CONSTABLE, supra note 97, at 36-38. 
189 See supra section III.A.2.b, pp. I136-39. 
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The diffuse costs associated with variation in democratic outputs 
may be generalizable well beyond the jury. For instance, as Ronald 
Dworkin points out in criticizing "checkerboard" legislation, there are 
good reasons to value integrity in the decisionmaking process.190 
Sometimes we care about integrity on the type of process grounds 
noted above - we expect juries to treat similar cases similarly. But 
Dworkin argues that this concern is related to a broader argument - 
we value integrity because there are issues for which we seek to estab- 
lish a principle for the political community.191 In such cases, we are 
unwilling to tolerate variation because it involves an underlying com- 
mitment that, in effect, defines the community and the standards by 
which all of its members are expected to live.192 
While identifying such principles is beyond the scope of this Arti- 
cle, it is worth noting two things. First, dissent and disagreement in 
this context are bounded. As noted above, because disaggregated insti- 
tutions tend to be at the lower end of the political hierarchy,'93 juries 
and their counterparts usually render decisions within a range that is 
acceptable to the majority. Thus, when the type of community- 
defining principles Dworkin discusses can be identified, the majority 
generally retains the ability to restrict the scope of minority decision- 
making to ensure that it comports with such larger principles. 
For those issues and instances in which the costs of variation are 
intolerable, the majority can identify a narrow range of "acceptable" 
deviation. 
Second, the question in some contexts may not be whether any in- 
consistency is acceptable, but what level of inconsistency is toler- 
able.194 For example, it is possible that at least some decisions ren- 
dered by disaggregated bodies like juries fall into a category that 
Frederick Schauer suggests will inevitably generate checkerboard deci- 
sions: those "where questions of degree predominate, and where seem- 
ingly arbitrary lines are necessary to settle temporarily, but not to re- 
solve in any deeper sense, intrinsically competing policy objectives."'19 
190 See DWORKIN, supra note 184, at 178-9o. 
191 See id. at 179, 184-85, 189-90. For a thoughtful set of reflections on the relationship be- 
tween variation and community, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND 
STEROTYPES 278-98 (2003). 
192 See DWORKIN, supra note 184, at 179, 184-85, 189-9o. 
193 See supra pp. 127-28. 
194 As Harry Kalven wrote, "the law has a great capacity to tolerate inconsistencies; perhaps 
the most difficult thing for the beginning law student to grasp is this sense of tolerable inconsis- 
tency." HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-5 (1965). 
195 Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitu- 
tional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 990 (1995). 
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Finally, there may even be instances where inconsistency is not only 
tolerable, but preferable, as I explore in section III.D.196 
3. Evaluating the Tradeoff Between Visibility and Variation in 
Context. - While second-order diversity provides a framework for 
identifying the tradeoff between the benefits of visibility and the costs 
of variation in democratic outputs, it does not determine the weight we 
ought to accord to these arguments. That tradeoff simply cannot be 
assessed in the abstract. Consider, for instance, how markedly the 
visibility/variation tradeoff differs when we consider districts rather 
than juries. Because the two institutions render such different democ- 
ratic outputs - a candidate and a verdict - they nicely illustrate how 
these costs and benefits can vary. 
If we begin with the visibility side of the equation, districts and ju- 
ries promote visibility in quite different fashions. For instance, the 
jury verdict is one of the rare instances in which the people speak for 
themselves rather than through a representative,197 and its real-world 
consequences can help electoral minorities force other political actors 
to engage with their concerns.198 Nonetheless, the form a jury decision 
takes limits its effectiveness in promoting visibility. As a practical 
matter, verdicts are little more than data points. We rarely know 
much about a jury save its composition and the verdict rendered. 
Even if jury verdicts are a rich source for empirical studies by schol- 
ars, "visibility" within the polity often depends on individual verdicts 
in highly publicized cases. In such instances, however, members of the 
community may not know enough about the case to understand what 
the verdict signifies to those who rendered it.199 Indeed, there is a risk 
196 One obvious example is Lee Bollinger's seminal work lauding the benefits of differential 
regulatory strategies for the mass media. See Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Pub- 
lic Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. I (1976). 
I explore other examples in section III.D, infra, pp. I171-79. 
197 Cf. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 78, at 69 ("Jury verdicts provide significant information 
about the harmony, or lack thereof, between the laws and the people. This information, when fed 
back to the legal system and to the community, can serve to bring the law and its administration 
in line with popular sentiment . .. "). 
198 See Mark Curriden, The American Jury: A Study in Self-Governing and Dispute Resolution, 
54 SMU L. REV. 1691, 1694 (2o01) (discussing an empirical study that identified large numbers of 
cases in which jurors "used their verdict to send a message about a broader political or social is- 
sue" and found that "[j]ury verdicts do have an impact" on political actors based upon the identi- 
fication of "250 specific cases in which jury verdicts led to some change"); Marder, supra note 147, 
at 1059 ("The reach of the jury's decision extends beyond the individual parties before it and 
sends a powerful message about issues.., .in our society."); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Ver- 
dicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Dis- 
charge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 51I, 513 (2003) (concluding that "[v]erdicts matter .. to public policy makers" and "[s]tories 
about jury verdicts can have a profound effect on public opinion and public policy"). 
199 For this reason, Andrew Leipold argues that jury nullification is an "unwieldy instrument 
for legal reform. At the heart of any successful reform effort is the ability to convey a clear mes- 
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that when the public knows nothing about a verdict except for the 
composition of the jury and the outcome, it will fill in the gaps of its 
knowledge with inferences about the group in question. In such cir- 
cumstances, verdicts seem as likely to reinforce stereotypes as to de- 
bunk them. 
The districting system generates a different set of democratic out- 
puts: the election of political leaders.200 Districts are much larger than 
juries, so community leaders play a crucial role in electoral politics - 
framing issues, rallying support for candidates, and building coali- 
tions.201 Community leaders thus must serve as political - or, to use 
Robert Bennett's term, "conversational"202 - entrepreneurs to gener- 
ate support for a candidate. 
The visibility afforded to electoral minorities in districting, then, 
may be quite crucial. In essence, districts are a place where we link 
the fate of the electorate with the fate of the political elite.203 It is not 
simply that elected leaders can speak on behalf of group members or 
provide an obvious rallying point; elected leaders actively help group 
members coalesce. Put differently, second-order diversity in districting 
creates incentives for "conversational entrepreneurs" to foment democ- 
ratic debate at the ends of the democratic spectrum as well as in the 
middle. It is, in effect, an institutional mechanism for ensuring that 
democratic conversations take place throughout the polity. Such op- 
portunities might be particularly valuable for minority groups who 
have dropped out of the broader democratic conversation or are 
unlikely to be heard in it. 
Further, while an electoral scheme admittedly produces fewer de- 
mocratic outputs than a jury system, they take a more complex form. 
Candidates have platforms - sets of issues on which they have staked 
out positions. Thus, as with other institutions that are second-order 
diverse, identity takes the form of a pattern, not a point, in districting. 
Consider, for instance, the votes on which the Congressional Black 
Caucus (CBC) unites and divides, those on which CBC members agree 
with each other but not with the party, those on which they resemble 
generic Democrats, those on which they vote with conservative House 
sage, but because general verdicts in criminal cases are opaque, any message that the jurors hoped 
to send can easily be lost." Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A 
Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. Io9, 127 (1996); see also Marder, supra note 97, at 
926 (arguing that juries that acquit in response to social conditions provide only minimally effec- 
tive feedback to the government). 
200 I explore these ideas in more detail elsewhere. See Gerken, supra note 38. 
201 Kang, supra note 90, at 8-•I. 
202 BENNETT, supra note 89, at 37. 
203 Cf id. at 36 ("[T]he routine use of single-member legislative districts..,. establishes easily 
identifiable constituency relationships that serve to direct and focus primary [democratic] conver- 
sational interactions."). 
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members, and those on which no clear pattern is identifiable.204 This 
type of variation helps us see whether group members occupy a dis- 
tinct political space or whether their internal divisions correspond to 
those of the party or polity at large. 
On the flip side of the visibility/variation equation, the costs of 
variation in districting are also quite different from the costs of varia- 
tion in jury verdicts. It is hard to identify the type of discrete costs of 
variation in districting that we see in the jury context; after all, the 
fate of third parties does not directly depend on the outcome of an 
election. Further, concerns about the diffuse costs of variation in the 
jury context - the costs stemming from the appearance of variation, 
described above205 - seem less likely to arise in the districting context. 
In elections, we are comfortable with disagreement and dissent; they 
are tolerated as being "just politics." Indeed, we design districts on the 
assumption that they will generate inconsistent outcomes in order to 
ensure first-order diversity at the legislative level. 
Nonetheless, there are ways in which heterogeneity in district com- 
position can also impose a diffuse set of costs on the electorate. Those 
costs have been thoroughly canvassed in the debate between advocates 
of territory-based districting and proponents of proportional represen- 
tation (PR) systems.206 One concern has to do with the potential dan- 
gers of extremism. If districts are at the far end of the second-order 
diversity spectrum, they may elect a set of candidates who are incapa- 
ble of engaging in productive compromise at the legislative level, thus 
leading to the paralysis and instability that critics of PR systems fear. 
The likelihood that any territorial-based districting scheme will rou- 
tinely result in the parade of horribles sometimes associated with PR 
schemes is fairly slim, however. Even where there is significant varia- 
tion in district composition, the size of most districts and the dynamics 
of a winner-take-all system reduce the chances that extreme candidates 
will be elected, let alone hold sway in the legislature. 
204 For an overview of CBC voting patterns, see DAVID A. BOSITIS, THE CONGRESSIONAL 
BLACK CAUCUS IN THE I03RD CONGRESS 31-46 (1994); and CANON, supra note 90, at 150-54. 
205 See supra pp. I1112-16. 
206 For an analysis of these tradeoffs, see GARY W. COX, MAKING VOTES COUNT (1997); 
ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (Bernard Grofman & Arend Li- 
jphart eds., 1986); ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THEIR IMPACT 
ON WOMEN AND MINORITIES (Wilma Rule & Joseph F. Zimmerman eds., 1994); AREND 
LIJPHART, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF TWENTY-SEVEN 
DEMOCRACIES 1945-1990 (1994); AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: 
GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES (1999); G. 
BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN 
AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS (2000); DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF ELECTORAL LAWS (1971); KENNETH SHEPSELE, MODES OF MULTIPARTY ELECTORAL 
COMPETITION (I99I); and REIN TAAGEPERA & MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART, SEATS AND 
VOTES: THE EFFECTS AND DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (I989). 
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The more likely costs of heterogeneity stem not from instability, but 
from stasis. Heterogeneity among districts can eliminate competition; 
indeed, the heterogeneity we already see in the districting system stems 
largely from the incumbents' desire for safe districts, and many worry 
about the concomitant loss of the energy generated by political compe- 
tition.207 Such concerns would favor a variant of second-order diver- 
sity that includes a "diverse portfolio" of districts - some that com- 
pete for the median voter and some that compete for the votes of those 
closer to the ends of the political spectrum.208 
D. Cycling: The Costs and Benefits 
of Varying Institutional Design Strategies 
The final functional oddity that second-order diversity produces is 
that it can result in a set of decisionmaking bodies that seem to em- 
body no coherent theory of design. In a system that is second-order 
diverse, some decisionmaking bodies will be dominated by women, 
some by Latinos, some by the poor. The composition of some will be 
conducive to measured deliberation; others will promote old-fashioned 
foot-stamping. Some decisionmaking bodies will be the type one 
would design if racial equity were the overriding value; others will 
privilege religious differences. At any given moment, a jury that fos- 
ters an interracial coalition will be replaced by one granting racial mi- 
norities a measure of decisionmaking independence. In any given dis- 
tricting scheme, a district that groups together communities that have 
nothing in common save their zip code will coexist with one that delib- 
erately clusters voters who share the same racial or socioeconomic 
status. Put differently, second-order diversity allows us to cycle our 
strategies for designing decisionmaking bodies. 
i. The Values Associated with Cycling. - There are three related 
reasons why we might value the opportunity to cycle. First, cycling 
207 For competing views on the value of competition and the forms it can take, compare Sam- 
uel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 620-30 (2002), 
with Nathaniel Persily, Reply: In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial 
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 668-69 (2002). 
208 Counterintuitively, second-order diversity along political lines may result in a set of legisla- 
tors that includes more moderates than we see today. If one seeks heterogeneity in district compo- 
sition - a full sense of the political spectrum - one might conclude that what is missing in the 
districting context are districts that mirror the state population - that is, districts that cater to 
the median voter. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in 
American Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 421-31 (2004). After all, while many states are 
closely divided politically, few seats at the congressional level are remotely competitive. See id. at 
424-26; Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the 
Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, I ELECTION L.J. 7, 182-84 (2002). In some states, 
then, the part of the political spectrum that is not visible is the middle, and at least one vision of 
second-order diversity in districting would result in more competitive districts that cater to voters 
in the middle of the political spectrum. 
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embeds an experimental approach into the system by ensuring that the 
composition of decisionmaking bodies varies. It thus generates impor- 
tant information about where and how people divide. Second, second- 
order diversity allows us to cycle our normative commitments, thereby 
avoiding the need to privilege a single theory of identity - or democ- 
racy - over all others. Finally, cycling provides a particularly useful 
strategy for dealing with conflict, as it avoids freezing particular politi- 
cal dynamics permanently into place. 
(a) Cycling and Experimentation. - One reason we might find cy- 
cling valuable is that it allows us to experiment and thus to gain im- 
portant information about the dynamics of our democracy. For in- 
stance, in a jury system that is first-order diverse, decisionmaking 
dynamics are likely to be fairly static. We would expect to see roughly 
the same line-up of supporters and dissenters in every case and minori- 
ties exercising approximately the same amount of influence over each 
verdict. First-order diversity, in short, generates one form of democ- 
ratic compromise, not many. 
Second-order diversity, in contrast, ensures that decisionmaking 
dynamics on juries vary. On some juries, the dissenters or influencers 
may be electoral minorities; on others, members of the majority will 
play those roles. The jury equivalent of the "swing" voter will differ 
from decision to decision. Second-order diversity thus tells us not only 
when and where people divide, but how group dynamics can mute or 
amplify those divisions. It therefore can reveal not only lines of divi- 
sion and connection that first-order diversity conceals, but the ways 
that known group divisions manifest themselves - or fail to emerge 
- when internal power dynamics vary.209 And we can see lines of di- 
vision - subtle fractures in groups that seem unified in the normal po- 
209 This argument finds some support in the federalism literature, in which a number of schol- 
ars have argued that the states are what Justice Brandeis termed "laborator[ies]," New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), or are engaged in a dialogue 
with the national government about governance questions. See SHAPIRO, supra note 69, at 103 
(stating that one of the best arguments in favor of federalism is that the states can engage the na- 
tional polity in "a continuing dialogue about the proper resolution of the clash of interests between 
individuals and groups"); Amar, supra note 69, at 1233-36 (describing "the 'laboratory' perspec- 
tive" as one of the five main visions of federalism); Friedman, supra note 72, at 398 ("[T]he spirit 
of state experimentation is one of creative response to immediate necessity, often addressed to 
solving a real problem staring the official in the face.'"); McConnell, supra note 69, at 1498-99 (ob- 
serving that "federalism has been thought to advance the public good [because] state and local 
governmental units. .. have greater opportunity and incentive to pioneer useful changes"). But 
see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 76, at 924-25 (arguing that federalism does not encourage experi- 
mentation because no state has the incentive to take the necessary risk). One key difference be- 
tween federalism and second-order diversity is that experimentation in federalism is promoted, in 
part, by the ability of individuals to exit, whereas experimentation under a system that is second- 
order diverse is often achieved by preventing exit. See supra notes 149-166 and accompanying 
text. 
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litical process - and unexpected connections that would be invisible 
under a system that is first-order diverse.210 
For instance, imagine trying to figure out which group divisions 
"matter" for purposes of composing the jury. In a world where people 
have multiple facets to their identity, it is difficult to determine which 
identities matter. Virtually every community divides along some lines. 
But political identity is also multidimensional, and different dimen- 
sions may matter in different contexts and at different times. For in- 
stance, does race matter more than socioeconomic status in affecting a 
person's view on a verdict? Religion more than socioeconomic status? 
Does the nature of the case - civil versus criminal, drug crime versus 
sex crime - affect how these divisions play out? Does the composi- 
tion of the jury mute or amplify such divisions? 
Second-order diversity provides an empirical safety net of sorts. It 
leaves an opportunity for lots of decisionmaking preferences to domi- 
nate.211 Creating a wide range of juries may allow some lines of cohe- 
sion or division to gain prominence and others to recede from view. In 
the aggregate, however, a fairly complete picture will emerge that re- 
flects the multiple identities, connections, and fissures within a given 
community. 
If we seek such information from juries, however, it is necessary to 
vary their composition. After all, when sorting through a large num- 
ber of data points, patterns matter. And patterns are easier to discern 
when we can see a broad swath of the democratic spectrum, not just 
the middle slice. 
(b) Normative Cycling. - A second reason we might value second- 
order diversity is as a strategy for cycling our normative commitments. 
Varying the composition of decisionmaking bodies enables us to avoid 
privileging a single theory of identity - or democracy - over all 
others.212 
Normative cycling of this sort is attractive when, as here, it is diffi- 
cult to determine not only which differences matter, but whether - 
and how - we should recognize those differences in the first place. 
It is a useful strategy in those instances when we are skeptical of 
our ability to choose among conflicting normative values.213 Just as 
210 Cf. Cover, supra note 52, at 664-72 (lauding jurisdictional redundancy for revealing both 
agreement and division within the polity). 
211 Cf Kang, supra note 90, at 8-11 (lauding the use of a random diversification sytem); Licht- 
man, supra note 62, at 141 & n.38 (same). 
212 The notion of cycling, of course, sounds many of the themes of pluralism. See generally 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE PRACTICE OF VALUE (2003) (exploring values pluralism); William A. Galston, 
Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 
WM. MARY L. REV. 869 (1999) (discussing political pluralism). 
213 Cf DUXBURY, supra note 168, at 71 (arguing in favor of lottery-based decisionmaking in 
the face of incommensurable choices because it is "the most honest and practical thing to do"); 
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money managers favor a diverse portfolio to maximize returns on in- 
vestments in an unpredictable world,214 so too we might favor a di- 
verse portfolio of decisionmaking bodies in trying to achieve a well- 
functioning democracy. 
Normative cycling can also be attractive when we are confident of 
our normative judgments but those norms either clash in theory or 
cannot be implemented together in practice. It is, in essence, "a choice 
not to choose" in the manner lauded by Guido Calabresi and Philip 
Bobbitt in Tragic Choices.215 Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that in a 
world where one is forced to choose between "essential yet conflicting 
values," cycling is a viable strategy.216 By alternating the values we 
privilege, we avoid rejecting a fundamental one.217 In the words of 
Richard Pildes, "[w]hen values are diverse but important, the preserva- 
tion of this tension between values - rather than the total triumph of 
one set of values - fosters the richness of a complex society with mul- 
tiple aspirations."218 Normative cycling thus signals a reluctance to 
indulge in absolutes, a recognition of the variety of normative com- 
mitments that undergird any democratic system, and an acknowledg- 
ment that our identities are multiple and complex. 
Imagine, for instance, we were thinking about the problem of dis- 
tricts and race. On the one hand, we might believe that African 
Americans ought to enjoy a measure of electoral independence, akin to 
that enjoyed by white voters, to elect a champion of their own (a goal 
furthered by majority-minority districts). On the other hand, we might 
also think that African Americans, like other members of the polity, 
"are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find 
common political ground"219 (a view that might favor a coalition- 
district strategy). We might find it hard to choose between these views 
simply because we do not know which strategy best serves African 
Americans in practice. Or we might find it difficult to choose among 
the normative commitments that undergird any assessment of what 
strategy is "best" for racial minorities. In either case, cycling could be 
a sensible strategy. Rather than choosing among these competing vi- 
ELSTER, supra note 26, at 38 ("[T]he use of lotteries to resolve decision problems under uncer- 
tainty presupposes an unusual willingness to admit the insufficiency of reason."). 
214 See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). 
215 CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 1o2, at 41. 
216 Id. at 195-96. 
217 Id. 
218 Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional 
Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 724 (1994); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism 
and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. Io103, 1142-43 (2002). 
219 Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994). 
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sions of minority empowerment, second-order diversity allows us to 
pursue a mix of empowerment strategies. 
(c) Cycling as a Strategy for Dealing with Political Conflict. - A 
third reason to value the cycling that second-order diversity facilitates 
is that it may represent a sensible strategy for dealing with political 
conflict over time. Disaggregated bodies tend to be temporary - ju- 
ries meet and dissolve, districts are redrawn every ten years, school 
committee members face regular elections. Second-order diversity al- 
lows not only for variation within such institutions, but for variation 
over time. And temporal variation may offer a useful strategy for 
dealing with group divisions. 
Specifically, second-order diversity avoids the problems associated 
with freezing into place a permanent "solution" to intergroup conflict. 
By constituting and reconstituting a decisionmaking body in an end- 
less cycle, second-order diversity allows members of opposing groups a 
chance to revisit the conflict in different contexts and at different 
times. It does not ossify a particular set of power relations, but instead 
ensures that political dynamics vary over time. 
Consider a jury system that is second-order diverse in a polity that 
is racially divided. African Americans and whites will encounter each 
other on juries where they each may enjoy more, fewer, or the same 
number of votes as members of the other group. They will come to- 
gether to resolve cases that stem from shared problems (like teenage 
drug use), conflicts that polarize the polity (perhaps a racially tinged 
policing incident), issues that divide each group internally (capital pun- 
ishment), and questions that neither group cares much about (a low- 
level shoplifting incident). They will come together when the broader 
political context is polarized along group lines and when it is relatively 
harmonious. And precisely because the political environment - 
whether it is defined in terms of power, issues, or political atmospher- 
ics - is temporary, there may be greater freedom for participants to 
experiment with their own identity choices, as well as with different 
strategies for addressing the conflict.220 
Put differently, cycling can be understood as a temporal strategy for 
dealing with the problem of faction. To return to the discussion of 
Madison, while Madison's solution makes it difficult for the members 
of any small group to hold power, it nonetheless allows the majority 
itself to hold permanent sway. Second-order diversity turns Madison's 
strategy on its head, ensuring that members of all groups have a 
220 Indeed, while the temporary nature of the interaction may undermine chances that partici- 
pation will create long-term affective ties, as Nancy Rosenblum points out in discussing voluntary 
associations, "[p]recisely because [such associations] are not minicommunities and involve only 
weak ties, small groups may be a training ground for ordinary interactions." ROSENBLUM, supra 
note I i6, at 361. 
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chance to exercise power, but only temporarily. Cycling ensures that 
intergroup relations are constantly in a state of flux and that no par- 
ticular power dynamic is frozen into place. 
2. The Costs of Cycling: Privileging Conflict over Consensus, Insta- 
bility over Stasis. - If there are benefits to cycling, are there also costs 
to this design strategy? After all, at least at first glance it might seem 
difficult to resist calls to pursue a dynamic view over a static one, an 
experimental strategy over a permanent one, a multifaceted solution 
over a unidimensional one. 
A first cut at this question might involve asking whether cycling 
ought to be a permanent strategy. That is, it is one thing to envision 
democratic institutions as "little laboratories"221 helping us choose the 
"right" answer that we will eventually impose uniformly. It is another 
to seek variation for its own sake. One might reasonably think that 
there is not much to be said for an experiment that lasts forever. 
The weak argument in favor of cycling would suggest that the ex- 
periment ought to end when an answer is reached. That is, to the ex- 
tent that experimentation has revealed better and worse strategies for 
creating decisionmaking bodies that contribute to a well-functioning 
democratic process, we would implement the better strategies and 
avoid the worse ones going forward. And second-order diversity 
would still be useful in a more limited sense, because we could con- 
tinue to experiment within the range of design strategies we have 
found useful. Put differently, second-order diversity does not require 
us to abandon social engineering of all sorts or indulge in normative 
values we have rejected. After all, a money manager creating a di- 
verse portfolio does not invest mindlessly; she organizes her invest- 
ments around a clear goal (profit) and avoids strategies unlikely to 
achieve that goal. On this view, then, second-order diversity simply 
suggests that, no matter what normative choice we have made, we 
should be flexible in our approach. 
Imagine, for instance, that our goal is to foster vibrant interracial 
coalitions. We might initially create a mix of influence, coalition, and 
majority-minority districts to assess which best achieves that goal. 
Such a mixed system would reveal how racial coalitions form in dis- 
tricts that are majority white and in districts where voters of color en- 
joy an electoral majority.222 Under a system that is first-order diverse 
- made up entirely of coalition or influence districts - we would 
221 See supra note 209. 
222 We would thus be deprived of the type of study produced by David Canon, who found that, 
despite predictions to the contrary, majority-minority districts "appear to break down racial barri- 
ers rather than erect[] them" and to result in new interracial coalitions built by representatives 
elected in those districts, thereby promoting the "politics of commonality." CANON, supra note 90, 
at 2 63-64. 
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have a less heterogeneous sample to study: we would have information 
about what takes place in districts that are at least sixty percent 
or more white, but not the reverse. Nonetheless, when the next redis- 
tricting cycle begins, we might want to reevaluate the experiment and 
rely on a narrower range of district design strategies to empower 
minorities. 
A stronger variant of the cycling argument, however, would counsel 
against a uniform design strategy even in the long run. On this view, 
cycling "signal[s] respect for difference,"223 as do legislatures on Jeremy 
Waldron's view: with their unstable and multiple legislative pro- 
nouncements, legislatures allow us to acknowledge that "[t]he commu- 
nity for which law is made is essentially plural . . . and in its essence 
incapable of representation by a single voice."224 A decision to pursue 
second-order diversity in a given institutional setting thus requires one 
to embrace a vision of democracy that, like Robert Cover's view of 
federalism's jurisdictional structure, rests on acceptance of "a messy 
and indeterminate end to conflicts which may [not] be tied neatly to- 
gether by a single authoritative [decision]" and an institutional design 
that "permits the tensions and conflicts of the social order to be dis- 
played."225 
Returning again to the question of districting, the strong variant of 
the cycling argument would suggest that we ought to preserve a mix of 
influence, coalition, and majority-minority districts even if one strategy 
emerges as the most effective method for empowering minorities. On 
this view, even if we thought, for example, that coalition districts best 
served the aims of the Voting Rights Act, we would nonetheless insist 
on majority-minority districts capable of electing someone like Cynthia 
McKinney to Congress. Or, to shift to the example of juries, even if we 
were confident that a particular type of jury best served a particular 
end, the strong variant of the cycling argument would nonetheless fa- 
vor creation of a number of juries that would render outlier verdicts 
and thus undermine any chance of reaching a consistent, stable set of 
results from the jury system. 
The stronger vision of cycling, of course, runs contrary to a certain 
set of commitments in legal scholarship - orderliness, finality, and 
predictability. A robust commitment to second-order diversity thus 
demands a normative commitment to deliberative conflict, a willing- 
ness to embed disagreement into the decisionmaking process, and a re- 
jection of the values associated with consensus and uniformity in at 
least part of the democratic infrastructure. It is an approach premised 
223 WALDRON, supra note 52, at 196, 213. 
224 Id. at 60. 
225 Cover, supra note 52, at 682. 
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on the permanence of division and one that, in turn, ensures that those 
divisions are visible.226 Acceptance of the strong view of cycling might 
demand that we not only "celebrate the perpetuity of contest,"227 con- 
sistent with an agonistic view of politics,228 but perhaps move toward 
treating "law as a part of political contest rather than as the instru- 
ment . . . of its closure."229 
3. The Costs and Benefits of Cycling in a Given Institutional Con- 
text. - Any evaluation of the tradeoff between the costs and benefits 
of cycling will turn on the institutional context, perhaps even on which 
subsidiary justification for cycling appeals to us most. Here I focus on 
a single justification for cycling - experimentation - and suggest 
how the costs and benefits of experimentation hinge on the tools we 
use to achieve heterogeneity. 
Imagine, for example, that we cycle because we want a feedback 
mechanism, a source of information about how well our democracy is 
functioning. One might think that the jury is a better site for experi- 
mentation than districts. Juries are (at least in theory) randomly as- 
signed. In contrast to districts, whose design involves the exercise of 
deliberate choice at some stage in the line-drawing process, a random 
assignment process helps remove the human element in the composi- 
tion of juries, thus allowing unexpected fissures and cross-community 
connections to emerge. Put differently, we might value random as- 
signment for the same reason social scientists value it. At least since 
Dewey failed to beat Truman, there has been widespread consensus 
among social scientists230 that random selection represents the optimal 
strategy for producing a representative sample because it guarantees 
that all sources of difference - including those one might not antici- 
pate - are able to emerge.231 As one leading text explains, "[i]n a 
world in which there are many potential confounding variables, some 
of them unknown, randomness has many virtues."232 
The problem with random assignment, however, is that we cannot 
control what kinds of decisionmaking bodies it generates. A random 
226 See supra section III.C.I, pp. 1161-64. 
227 BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 14 
(I993). 228 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (I958). 
229 HONIG, supra note 227, at 15. 
230 This consensus developed after purposive sampling - a system in which a social scientist 
handpicks a representative sample - resulted in an incorrect prediction of the winner of the 1948 
presidential election. See Martin R. Frankel & Lester R. Frankel, Fifty Years of Survey Sampling 
in the United States, PUB. OPINION Q., Winter I987, at SI27, SI28-29. 
231 See ALAN STUART, THE IDEAS OF SAMPLING 4-5 (I984); cf Frederick F. Stephan, Prac- 
tical Problems of Sampling Procedure, I AM. SOC. REV. 569, 580 (I936). 
232 GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY I24 (I994); see also DUXBURY, su- 
pra note 168, at 70-71. 
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assignment system threatens to create juries we might find intolerable 
- for example, the proverbial all-white jury, which, given our history, 
is unlikely to be welcomed by many.233 Indeed, a random assignment 
process will empower minority group members who do not often ap- 
peal to traditionally liberal academic sensibilities, like fundamentalist 
Christians or libertarians. One might well conclude, of course, that 
all-white juries have democratic value regardless of our preferences234 
and, in any case, are the necessary result of a design strategy intended 
to grant African Americans or Latinos decisive control elsewhere in 
the system. But the episodic nature of the jury offers an additional 
reason to discount this concern: the all-white jury is temporary in the 
strong sense. It is part of the cycle that second-order diversity pro- 
duces, but only part of that cycle. Like the Bobbitt metaphor compar- 
ing cycling to "the game of scissors/paper/stone with its circular hierar- 
chy that brings different values to a decisive but momentary 
preeminence and is then replayed,"235 juries are created and disbanded 
seriatim, ensuring that every jury enjoys only a "momentary preemi- 
nence" and that no type of jury is permanently entrenched within the 
system. 
Nonetheless, it is not difficult to imagine a parade of horribles - a 
set of decisionmaking bodies (totalitarians, racists) that we would find 
so intolerable that we would be reluctant to pursue a cycling strategy 
for any democratic institution that is randomly composed. We might 
prefer instead to seek second-order diversity in districting, since the 
tool for creating districts is self-conscious choice (by a legislature, in- 
dependent commission, or court) and we can avoid creating districts 
that will undermine our democratic aims. 
Similarly, we might favor seeking second-order diversity in districts 
if we are persuaded by the experimental justification for second-order 
diversity but expect the experiment to end. Because districts are not 
randomly assigned, we can better design our "experiment" - that is, 
we can seek a diverse portfolio that pursues a particular goal. Self- 
conscious design, in short, allows districters to choose among variants 
of second-order diversity. 
233 In the words of Albert Alschuler, "[f]ew statements are more likely to evoke disturbing im- 
ages of American criminal justice than this one: 'The defendant was tried by an all-white jury."' 
Alschuler, supra note 25, at 704. 
234 See supra sections III.A.I, pp. 1126-32; III.B.I, pp. 1142-52; III.C.I, pp. 1161-64. For an 
interesting analysis of similarly homogeneous private associations and the democratic benefits 
they afford, see ROSENBLUM, supra note I i6, at 3 I9-48. 
235 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 248 (1982). 
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E. Finding the Best Fit 
Having sketched out a conceptual framework for evaluating the 
choice between first-order and second-order diversity as a design strat- 
egy, the next questions are where and how to implement second-order 
diversity in practice. That is, how do we "manage" second-order di- 
versity? How do we take advantage of the benefits this design strat- 
egy offers while avoiding its more problematic costs? How do we 
identify those institutional contexts in which second-order diversity 
does, and does not, make sense? Below are a few preliminary 
thoughts. 
I. Balancing Costs and Benefits. - As the preceding discussion 
makes clear, the costs and benefits of second-order diversity not only 
vary from context to context, but often cannot be separated from one 
another; they are two sides of the same coin. As a result, we cannot 
reduce the costs associated with second-order diversity without relin- 
quishing some of its benefits. 
Consider, for example, the costs associated with variation in de- 
mocratic outputs. There are a variety of ex ante and ex post strategies 
for reducing the costs of variation. As an ex ante matter, for instance, 
we could seek modest rather than significant variation in decisionmak- 
ing bodies - that is, we could move a bit closer to the first-order end 
of the diversity spectrum.236 Even if we are reluctant to change the 
composition of a decisionmaking body, recent work on behavioralism 
suggests strategies for reducing variation in democratic outputs by al- 
tering the dynamics of the decisionmaking process.237 Alternatively, 
we could pursue ex post strategies to cabin the costs that second-order 
diversity engenders. As noted above, most disaggregated decision- 
makers are, like the jury, located in the lower tiers of the political hier- 
archy. There are a number of examples of formal strategies for polic- 
ing extremes in such contexts, such as judicial review of jury 
verdicts.238 There are also informal strategies for policing decision- 
making excesses by disaggregated institutions - the give-and-take be- 
tween institutional actors that we call politics.239 
236 This could be done subtly - for instance, simply increasing the size of juries and districts 
would reduce the extent to which any single jury or district will depart significantly from the 
population median. Or we could use less subtle means to reduce heterogeneity among these deci- 
sionmaking bodies by determining their composition in advance. 
237 See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 146, at 104-08; SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 164-65; infra 
section IV.B.I, pp. 1190-93. 238 Districting offers another example. To be sure, the legislature does not reject extreme can- 
didates. But the requirement of majority rule at the legislative level means that extreme candi- 
dates must persuade moderate representatives in order to pass legislation. 
239 Thus, a school committee that defies a state mandate or a legislative committee that ignores 
the commitments of the governing majority may find itself subject to a variety of political pres- 
sures that move those decisionmaking bodies closer to the middle. Discomfort with the outputs of 
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The problem with most ex ante and ex post strategies for reducing 
the costs of variation, however, is that we risk losing the benefits to 
second-order diversity as well. For instance, if we push the composi- 
tion of disaggregated bodies closer to the first-order end of the diver- 
sity spectrum, there will be fewer opportunities for turning the tables 
and engaging in experimentation. If decisionmaking bodies produce 
more moderate decisions, we lose some of the advantages associated 
with democratic visibility. Reducing the discretion granted to deci- 
sionmaking bodies or minimizing the political impact of their decisions 
may undermine some of the intrinsic and instrumental benefits associ- 
ated with participation in the decisionmaking process. Individuals 
may feel a greater sense of political agency if the decision matters240 
if electoral minorities are not merely getting a chance to play "Queen 
for a Day."241 Similarly, on the output side of the equation, the impor- 
tance of the decision may correlate with the visibility it offers to elec- 
toral minorities. 
Put differently, when we grant citizens the chance to exercise sig- 
nificant discretion or to resolve questions of considerable import, the 
arguments in favor of second-order diversity are generally at their 
strongest, and worries about the costs of second-order diversity simi- 
larly peak.242 The obvious solution in such cases is to balance. Bal- 
some decisionmaking bodies may also lead the central authority to reduce their discretion by de- 
fining the permissible "range" of outcomes more narrowly or taking certain functions away from 
the decisionmaker entirely. Consider, for instance, the history of the relationship between judge 
and jury. Scholars have long noted judicial reluctance to grant the jury significant decisionmak- 
ing authority and judges' concomitant efforts to take such authority away from juries. See, e.g., 
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939). For a 
more recent exploration of the decline of the jury's power due to "the courthouse crowd," see Al- 
bert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 (1994). See also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2ooo Term- 
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 100-02 (20oo01) (connecting this trend to the decline 
in popular constitutionalism); Solan, supra note 147, at 1282. For a quite different analysis of the 
history of the judge-jury relationship, see Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III 
Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587 (2001), which notes the many "modern adherents" to the view that the 
jury's power has been "ever-declining," but argues that "pre-modern federal control of ju- 
ries . . . exceeded the overall level of modern judicial controls." Id. at 592. 
240 Cf. Richard D. Parker, Power to the Voters, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 179, i85 (2000) ("If 
something really significant seems to be at stake, people are more likely to take part."); Maimon 
Schwarzschild, Pluralism, Conversation and Judicial Restraint, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 961, 961 (2001) 
(arguing that political conversation, one form of participation, "thrives best when it can actually 
make a difference to public decisions"). 
241 I am indebted to Sam Issacharoff for raising questions along these lines. 
242 I use the term "generally" because there may be some decisions that matter a great deal to 
the electoral minority but not much to the majority. Party politics, after all, depend on such a 
calculus. 
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ancing is, of course, a routine task for policymakers, even courts,243 
and there may be useful strategies for doing so. 
First, it might be useful to follow the lead of several scholars of 
federalism and local government law, two fields that have long been 
occupied with balancing the democratic values associated with local 
autonomy against its attendant costs.244 Some of the most interesting 
work in these areas has attempted to complicate the traditional story 
of a tradeoff between the values of centralism and localism - to by- 
pass the seemingly inevitable balancing test - by exploring the ways 
in which centralism and localism can complement or reinforce one an- 
other.245 There may thus be fruitful avenues of inquiry that explore 
strategies that can be "shown to promote local discretion even as [they] 
also limit[] it.'"246 
243 Legal scholars, perhaps unsurprisingly, have largely focused on judicial balancing. See, e.g., 
T Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitu- 
tion, iii HARV. L. REV. 54, 77-83 (1997); Pildes, supra note 218; Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights 
Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
725 (1998). 
244 Both literatures are preoccupied with what Roderick Hills has termed in the local govern- 
ment context the "inherent" tension "between [a] desire to promote democratic localism and [a] 
desire to avoid parochial localism." Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) 
Need a Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2025 (2000) (reviewing 
FRUG, supra note io). Similarly, much of the federalism literature focuses on how best to balance 
state and national power. For a noteworthy example of such an effort, see SHAPIRO, supra note 
69, at 107-40. Perhaps unsurprisingly, few are willing to advocate the wholesale abandonment of 
the values associated with local autonomy, despite its costs. Like Richard Briffault, most com- 
mentators have endorsed neither "complete ... dominance" by the central power nor "complete 
local autonomy," but instead have sought to blend "elements of both perspectives." Richard Brif- 
fault, Our Localism: Part II - Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 453 (1990); 
see also David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 432 
(200I). 
245 Akhil Amar, for instance, offers a vision of federalism he terms "converse-1983," where state 
and national governments check each other's intrusion upon citizens' individual rights. Amar, 
supra note 69, at 1230. Similarly, local government scholars like David Barron have argued that 
instead of seeking to replace "the local with the Leviathan," David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home 
Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2385 (2003), we ought to recognize that "no city or state is an is- 
land jurisdiction" and focus on legal rules keyed to the fact that "the local sphere is part and par- 
cel of a larger coordinated system of local jurisdictions that is structured by less visible back- 
ground central-law rules . . . ." Barron, supra note 244, at 378-79; see also Gerald E. Frug, 
Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1795 (2002) (favoring an EU model for 
regional government - one in which regional citizenship would supplement rather than replace 
local citizenship - because the EU "attempt[s] to build localism into the very fabric of European 
institutions, rather than simply to divide authority between a 'centralized government' and 'local 
control'"); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1276-80 (i999) 
(noting the ways in which the promotion of federal values depends on local institutions and argu- 
ing in favor of allowing the federal government to delegate powers to local governments even 
without explicit state authorization). 
246 Barron, supra note 244, at 389. To offer one possible example of the lines such analysis 
might take, consider the literature on democratic experimentalism. The seminal articles articulat- 
ing and developing the theory are Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyar- 
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Second, even in those instances in which we cannot avoid making a 
tradeoff, one way to think about this dilemma is to return to the meta- 
phor of the diverse portfolio. Just as risky stocks tend to be those with 
the greatest potential payoff, so too the sites where second-order diver- 
sity offers the greatest benefits will also pose the greatest democratic 
risks.247 If we wish to pursue a risk-averse strategy, we could "diver- 
sify" our portfolio of second-order diverse institutions - one might 
even be tempted to call it "third-order diversity" - so that those risks 
will seem less weighty in the aggregate. 
Nonetheless, there may be costs we simply find unacceptable. We 
might decide, for instance, that the danger of the all-white jury judg- 
ing a black criminal defendant is too great to seek second-order diver- 
sity on criminal juries, even if we are willing to foster heterogeneity 
among civil juries. We might be willing to promote second-order di- 
versity for some groups, such as racial minorities, but reluctant to cede 
decisionmaking power to members of a militia. 
2. Choosing Among Values. - The preceding discussion also sug- 
gests that while the primary values associated with second-order di- 
versity fit together neatly in theory, in practice they may involve im- 
portant tradeoffs. For instance, if we value second-order diversity 
because it turns the tables on the majority, we might prefer second- 
order diversity in institutions that foster an intense participatory ex- 
perience, like the jury, in the hope that it will produce a lasting effect 
on an individual's civic sensibilities. Yet the jury, with its "black box" 
decisionmaking process, may not offer the most conducive institutional 
forum for fostering democratic visibility. Similarly, the use of a ran- 
dom assignment process - which brings with it many experimental 
and normative benefits - may not promote other types of values, like 
ensuring a fair distribution of political power or making electoral mi- 
norities visible. 
chy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313 (1997); and Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democ- 
ratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1988). Proponents of democratic experimental- 
ism have identified important strategies for harnessing central authority in a fashion that facili- 
tates rather than trumps or counterbalances local autonomy. As Dorf and Sabel note, democratic 
experimentalism points to ways that "central authority and decentralized actors can together ex- 
plore and evaluate solutions to complex problems that neither alone would have been likely to 
identify, much less investigate or address, without the exchanges with the others." Michael C. 
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 831, 834 (2000); see also Dorf & Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen- 
talism, supra, at 291 (arguing that democratic experimentalism offers "mutually reinforcing solu- 
tions to central dilemmas of constitutional interpretation" at issue in debates over federalism and 
the separation of powers). For a consideration of some of the connections between second-order 
diversity and democratic experimentalism, as well as a critical analysis of the latter, see Gerken, 
supra note io4 (manuscript at 23-24). 
247 I am indebted to Anton Metlitsky for suggesting this line of analysis. 
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Several conclusions follow from these observations. First, our deci- 
sion as to whether and when second-order diversity makes sense may 
depend on which set of benefits we value most or which set of democ- 
ratic ills we think are most in need of a cure. And we will have to 
pursue different "types" of second-order diversity - seeking a different 
mix of decisionmaking bodies - depending on the values we primarily 
wish to pursue. 
Second, there may be areas that are, in effect, fora non conveniens 
for second-order diversity.248 We may be reluctant to pursue the no- 
tion of second-order diversity when its normative underpinnings con- 
flict with our understanding of what the decisionmaker is supposed to 
do. For instance, if we envision the disaggregated decisionmaker as 
serving the role of the "agent" of the central decisionmaker - as some 
view the legislative committee - second-order diversity, with its man- 
date for "overlapping majorities," may be a poor fit. Similarly, our as- 
sessment of whether second-order diversity is appropriate for juries 
depends largely on our view of the jury's role. It may be easier to rec- 
oncile the notion of second-order diversity with the conception of the 
jury as a check on prosecutorial abuse or legislative overreaching249 
than with the view that the jury performs a truth-finding role250 or 
that it ought to serve as a representative for the community as a 
whole. 
Finally, even when we find a good normative fit for second-order 
diversity, we may be reluctant to cede certain types of issues to institu- 
tions that are second-order diverse on purely substantive grounds. For 
instance, there may be situations when systematic political or economic 
inequalities undermine rather than buttress the case for second-order 
diversity. In this vein, some commentators, like Richard Briffault, 
have argued that abstract arguments in favor of localism fail to recog- 
nize that "local land use regulation and local responsibility for funding 
basic public services" are problematic given wealth inequalities among 
local governments.251 
248 I borrow this metaphor from Frank Michelman. See Michelman, supra note 132, at 469. 
249 See supra note 97 (discussing the difficulty many people have in conceiving of the jury as a 
political institution). 
250 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
251 Briffault, supra note 149, at 72; see also YOUNG, supra note io, at 94, 248-56 (expressing 
fears about local autonomy where distributive questions are at stake); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 
74, at 1345-46 (noting that there are strong arguments in favor of federal preemption when redis- 
tributive policies are at issue). For a general analysis of the difficulties involved in giving local 
officials responsibility to redistribute wealth, see PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (I98I); and 
PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM (1995). 
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IV. SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY AS A FRAMING DEVICE 
The discussion above is fairly theoretical in its scope. Even if it 
presents a plausible descriptive or normative account of current fea- 
tures of our democracy's design, one might ask whether the notions of 
first-order and second-order diversity tell us anything new about exist- 
ing, real-world controversies. This Part offers a sampling of doctrinal, 
policy, and academic controversies in which the notions of first-order 
and second-order diversity may help recast the debate, or at least offer 
a vocabulary for analysis and critique that has not yet been deployed 
in these contexts. 
Section IV.A returns to the examples with which this Article began. 
It argues that the notion of second-order diversity can help resolve a 
longstanding puzzle in the doctrine governing jury discrimination 
claims, thereby lending some coherence to a much-criticized Supreme 
Court decision and revealing a set of unexplored connections between 
the doctrines governing jury discrimination claims and vote-dilution 
claims. It similarly suggests that the notion of second-order diversity 
provides a different angle on a debate currently raging about the best 
strategy for implementing the Voting Rights Act. Section IV.B 
sketches connections between the arguments explored in this Article 
and two seemingly unrelated literatures on democratic design: recent 
work on institutionalizing dissent and writings on multiculturalism. 
A. Juries and Districts: A Redux 
I. Juries, Swain v. Alabama, and Vote-Dilution Claims. - Con- 
sider the first example offered at the beginning of this Article. The no- 
tion of second-order diversity might help resolve a longstanding doc- 
trinal puzzle in the law governing jury discrimination claims. As 
noted above,252 the puzzle in the law governing the composition of the 
jury is this: the law demands that jurors be drawn from a "fair cross 
section of the community," yet it forbids parties from using peremptory 
challenges to remedy the type of racial and gender imbalances on indi- 
vidual juries that the cross-section doctrine is designed to eliminate 
in the pool from which juries are drawn.253 Most criminal law schol- 
ars who write on the subject either favor juries that are first-order di- 
verse or begrudgingly accept second-order diversity as an unfortunate 
necessity.254 
The bate noire in the eyes of the many criminal procedure scholars 
who favor first-order diversity on the jury is the Supreme Court's deci- 
252 See supra pp. 1113-15. 
253 See supra pp. 1113-15. 
254 See supra pp. 1115-17. 
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sion in Swain v. Alabama,255 in which the Court refused to allow an 
equal protection claim based on the composition of individual juries. 
In a passage overruled in part by Batson,256 the Supreme Court held 
that one could not establish a discrimination claim based solely on the 
makeup of "a particular jury."257 It insisted that the defendant must 
"show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges against 
Negroes over a period of time."258 
The notions of first-order and second-order diversity dovetail nicely 
with this controversy. Few criminal procedure scholars can envision a 
plausible theory for wanting juries to be diverse in a second-order 
sense - indeed, almost any theory that would explain why we care 
about a venire that reflects the population similarly favors a jury that 
is first-order diverse.259 And the intuition in favor of first-order diver- 
sity - the sense that every jury is, like a legislature, rendering "the" 
law260 - makes Swain's conclusion that one cannot challenge the 
makeup of an individual jury hard to defend. After all, on this view 
the injury is quite clear: members of a particular group lack a seat at 
the table when the law is established. 
The notion of second-order diversity reframes this debate. First, it 
provides an affirmative account in favor of a random assignment sys- 
tem for juries. It thus reveals what we would lose should we heed the 
suggestions of many criminal procedure scholars and move toward a 
jury system that is more first-order diverse. 
Second, the notion of second-order diversity suggests a plausible ra- 
tionale for the Court's decision in Swain. The theory suggests that 
each individual jury is best understood as one part of a larger institu- 
tion that establishes what the law is. If we think of individual juries 
as part of a larger, disaggregated system, then it does not matter 
whether every group is represented on every jury so long as their rep- 
resentation on juries in the aggregate is fair - hence the Court's re- 
quirement that the pool from which juries are drawn mirror the popu- 
lation and its otherwise puzzling refusal to impose the same 
requirement on individual juries. 
Swain thus mirrors the established rule in vote-dilution cases that 
an individual group member cannot challenge her placement in a par- 
ticular district if her group collectively enjoys a fair share of political 
255 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
256 476 U.S. 79, 89-96 (1986). 
257 Swain, 380 U.S. at 222-23. 
258 Id. at 227 (emphasis added). Batson overruled this portion of Swain when it allowed for 
challenges under the equal protection clause to the makeup of individual venires. 476 U.S. at 95- 
96. 
259 See supra note 27. 
260 See supra p. II137. 
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power.261 The reason for these rules is the same. Fairness cannot be 
assessed by looking at the composition of an individual jury any more 
than fairness in a districting scheme can be measured by examining 
the makeup of a single district.262 In both instances, we would expect 
to see juries - or districts - with a wide range of compositions. It is 
only in the aggregate - when we consider the composition of all 
the juries or districts put together - that we can evaluate whether 
political power has been distributed fairly among members of the 
electorate.263 
Finally, the notion of second-order diversity could offer an alterna- 
tive path for conceptualizing the injury in jury discrimination claims, 
an alternative that presses hard on the jury's democratic underpin- 
nings. Specifically, the theory suggests that there is a nested set of 
harms when a juror is excluded from a jury on the basis of race. First, 
there is the harm to the individual juror, who has been excluded from 
participating on the basis of his identity. This is presumably the injury 
with which Batson is concerned. Second, when the exclusion of that 
juror is part of a systematic skew, there is an injury potentially shared 
by all members of the racial group in a given jurisdiction when their 
participatory opportunities or decisionmaking power, in the aggregate, 
have been diluted. The "fair cross-section" requirement could be un- 
derstood to address this problem. 
Should we conceive of jury discrimination claims in this fashion, 
we could imagine bringing jury "dilution" challenges to the composi- 
tion of jury districts, as we see in the districting context.264 Indeed, 
this type of analysis might lead us to think differently about a wide 
261 See Gerken, supra note 98, at 1681-88. Vote dilution and cross-section claims are not simi- 
lar in every respect, of course. One crucial difference is that vote-dilution claims do not involve 
the direct interests of a third party, whereas decisions about the jury's composition are of great 
relevance to a criminal or civil defendant. This reframing of Swain would thus push toward the 
notion, supported by some scholars and Court opinions, that the "injury" in a cross-section or Bat- 
son case is suffered by those who are denied the chance to participate in jury service. See, e.g., 
AMAR, supra note 6, at 273-74; Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, su- 
pra note 55, at 204, 209; Underwood, supra note 25, at 742-50. But see Sheri Lynn Johnson, The 
Language and Culture (Not To Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2 I, 
22 (1993) (arguing that nondiscrimination in jury selection should be understood primarily as the 
right of the criminal defendant). 
262 For a detailed exploration of this notion, see Gerken, supra note 98, at 1681-88, 1700-02. 
263 For a quite different argument drawing connections between the group-based underpin- 
nings of jury discrimination claims and vote dilution claims, see Amar, Jury Service as Political 
Participation Akin to Voting, supra note 55, at 206-07. 
264 Although jury districting is not yet a significant source of civil rights litigation, several au- 
thors have called for more attention to the question. See FUKURAI ET AL., supra note 17, at 29- 
30; Forde-Mazrui, supra note I9, at 389-95 (proposing jury subdistricts built around communities 
of interest); Note, supra note 31, at 548 (proposing drawing jury districts along the boundaries of 
identifiable black communities). For a rare example of a successful equal protection challenge to 
a jury district, albeit with unusual facts, see Spencer v. State, 545 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1989). 
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variety of jury design strategies, including the size of the jury265 and 
the use of peremptory challenges.266 
2. Georgia v. Ashcroft. - Returning to the second example offered 
at the beginning of this Article, the notion of second-order diversity 
provides a framing device for thinking through the choices at stake in 
Georgia v. Ashcroft. As noted above, coalition districts - which move 
districts closer to the first-order end of the diversity spectrum - are 
rapidly becoming the new "third way" in redistricting circles.267 To 
many, they seem like a better tool than majority-minority districts for 
empowering electoral minorities. By spreading out African American 
or Latino voters, coalition districts help them increase their legislative 
influence while still ensuring that those voters are able to elect a "can- 
didate of choice." If we focus solely on the number of legislative seats 
beholden to racial minorities, the question in Georgia v. Ashcroft might 
seem like an easy one. 
The analytic frame offered here, with its emphasis on disaggrega- 
tion, helps flesh out this debate by envisioning majority-minority dis- 
tricts as something more than byproducts of a particular strategy for 
empowering minorities at the legislative level. Indeed, the notion of 
second-order diversity - with its emphasis on the importance of mak- 
ing electoral minorities visible, its concern about assigning group 
members to the role of permanent junior partner, its emphasis on 
symmetry in distributing participatory opportunities, its conception of 
some districts as mini-governance units, and its vision of heterogeneity 
as a strategy for dealing with group conflict - points to costs resulting 
265 The Supreme Court has traditionally addressed challenges to a jury's size by considering 
whether the jury would be large enough for effective group deliberation, would result in an accu- 
rate expression of the community's views, and would avoid undue variation in verdicts. See, e.g., 
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (concluding that juries must be made up of at least six 
people). See generally HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 146, at 165-71 (canvassing debate about jury 
size); LEVINE, supra note 61, at 27-28 (same). To the extent the Court has considered the rela- 
tionship between jury size and the participation of electoral (here, racial) minorities, it has consid- 
ered only whether the jury would be so small as to preclude "the representation of minority 
groups in the community." Ballew, 435 U.S. at 236. The notion of second-order diversity re- 
frames this debate. The smaller the jury, the more variation in composition is possible, and the 
easier it is to generate juries in which members of an electoral minority dominate. Therefore, 
while the Court has thus far lauded larger juries for helping racial minorities, the notion of sec- 
ond-order diversity underscores potential costs of increasing the size of juries that have thus far 
largely been overlooked. 
266 Specifically, peremptory challenges undermine the values associated with randomness as a 
strategy for achieving second-order diversity. See supra pp. 1159-60. Moreover, depending on 
how they are administered - for example, depending on whether they result in a systematic skew 
against a particular group - they may result in a set of juries that is closer to or farther away 
from the second-order side of the diversity spectrum. Second-order diversity, then, does not 
firmly favor or disfavor peremptory challenges, but it adds a new set of questions that should be 
answered in evaluating their appropriateness. 
267 See supra pp. 1119-20. 
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from the wholesale abandonment of majority-minority districts, costs 
which have not yet been systematically explored in the voting rights 
literature or the case law.268 
These benefits, of course, must be balanced against the costs asso- 
ciated with second-order diversity - particularly, the tradeoff between 
"influence" and "control" - described above.269 The point here is 
simply that the costs associated with the influence/control tradeoff 
have been thoroughly documented in the commentary on Ashcroft. 
The notion of second-order diversity fills a gap in that literature by 
suggesting a different set of costs and benefits that ought to be consid- 
ered in making such assessments. As described in great detail 
above,270 in some cases - for instance, when legislative control is at 
stake - the benefits of first-order diversity in districts may swamp the 
costs. In other instances - such as when legislative control is not at 
stake, when the minority group is small, when the group's interests do 
not align closely with either party, or when representatives wield sig- 
nificant independent power - the calculus may favor moving closer to 
the second-order end of the diversity spectrum when drawing district 
lines. While the notions of first-order and second-order diversity do 
not resolve this tradeoff, they offer a framing device that allows us to 
consider a wider set of values associated with districts than control of 
a unitary legislature. These ideas offer a vocabulary for a more com- 
prehensive debate about the costs and benefits of the districting 
choices at stake in Ashcroft. 
B. Theories of Institutional Design 
Finally, the notion of second-order diversity connects up with ongo- 
ing debates that are more general than the doctrinal and policy con- 
troversies described above. Scholars in many fields have long been 
preoccupied with questions regarding the appropriate treatment of 
electoral minorities, and at least some of those debates can usefully be 
recast as explorations of the tradeoffs between first-order and second- 
order diversity. This section offers a quick sketch of two instances in 
which the notion of second-order diversity complements or complicates 
a current debate about democratic institutional design. The examples 
offered below are necessarily superficial and take a somewhat carica- 
tured form, but they should at least give a flavor for the ways in which 
the notions of first-order and second-order diversity might provide a 
framing device for thinking more systematically about a variety of 
democratic design strategies. 
268 For more detailed exploration of these tradeoffs, see Gerken, supra note Io4. 
269 See supra section III.A, pp. 1124-42. 
270 See supra section III.A.3, pp. 1139-42. 
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i. The Dynamics of Dissent. - Dissent has long been a preoccupa- 
tion of democratic theorists.271 Due to the work of Cass Sunstein and 
others,272 legal scholars have begun to focus on the dynamics of group 
decisionmaking and the importance of institutionalizing mechanisms 
for fostering dissent within democratic institutions. Sunstein, for in- 
stance, has pointed to the dangers of homogeneous decisionmaking 
bodies, which tend to polarize and reach incorrect answers due in part 
to the failure of individual participants to express a contrary view.273 
He thus favors what could roughly be cast as a first-order design strat- 
egy: ensuring that at least one potential "dissenter" sits on each deci- 
sionmaking body. 
Sunstein's theory of dissent274 provides an important counterweight 
to the arguments in favor of second-order diversity. After all, to the 
extent we believe that one's identity as an electoral minority makes it 
more likely that one can serve the role of dissenter - bringing a new 
perspective or a different type of information to the table - first-order 
diversity guarantees the presence of at least one member of any size- 
able electoral minority on every decisionmaking body.275 Because sec- 
ond-order diversity creates some decisionmaking bodies that are ho- 
mogeneous in order to ensure heterogeneity in the aggregate, 
Sunstein's concern about the dangers of polarization are well taken. 
Second-order diversity similarly sheds some critical light on the dy- 
namics of dissent. Setting aside the fact that the theory points to a set 
of democratic values that Sunstein's arguments are obviously not in- 
tended to address, the notion of second-order diversity - with its em- 
phasis on the relationship between power and participation - high- 
lights the importance of determining how the dynamics of dissent play 
out with regard to certain types of minority groups. As Sunstein notes 
in several parts of his book, the research that has been done on the 
dynamics of dissent reveals that members of a minority group are less 
likely to influence others' views if the minority group "clearly consists 
of social outsiders."276 Sunstein thus proposes creating "deliberating 
271 Mill, of course, has authored the seminal defense of dissent. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY 58-1oo (Edward Alexander ed., 1999) (1859). 
272 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 62; see also Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Parti- 
sanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, o07 
YALE L.J. 2 155 (1998). 
273 SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at I113-14, 18, I24-27. 
274 Rather than discuss the theories of all of those who have written on dissent, I focus here on 
Sunstein's, both for simplicity's sake and because his recent work in this area focuses on mecha- 
nisms for institutionalizing dissent and thus dovetails with some of the themes of this Article. 
275 For example, Sunstein argues in favor of creating as many panels with a mix of Democrat- 
and Republican-appointed judges as possible. SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at i88. 
276 Id. at 31; see also id. at 158-61. 
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enclaves"277 - groups consisting entirely of members of the electoral 
minority. Sunstein envisions that after deliberating in this fashion, 
members of such groups will then resume contact with the polity with 
clearer arguments and more confidence in them.278 
The notion of second-order diversity raises questions about the suf- 
ficiency of homogeneous deliberative enclaves as a corrective to the 
dynamics of dissent. As an initial matter, it suggests that one's sense 
of political efficacy may be associated with the power to decide.279 
Taking part in a deliberative group may not provide as empowering a 
political experience as being in charge of a governmental decision. 
Nor is it likely to provide the same type of educative experience. Dis- 
cussing, after all, may involve a different set of participatory skills 
than deciding.280 For these reasons, private deliberation in small en- 
claves may not do as much to help electoral minorities gain their par- 
ticipatory sea legs as turning the tables in bodies that wield real de- 
mocratic power. 
The notion of turning the tables, with its emphasis on generating 
productive participatory habits among members of both the majority 
and minority, also reminds us that the problem with existing dissent 
dynamics is not only that dissenters do not speak up. As Sunstein 
himself observes, the problem is also that members of the majority do 
not listen as well to traditionally disempowered groups.281 Even if the 
creation of deliberative enclaves changes the participatory habits of 
disempowered groups, they still may not be able to dissent effectively 
because members of the majority are not used to listening to them. 
Turning the tables, in contrast, is an institutional strategy that creates 
incentives for the majority - at least those who want to have any po- 
litical influence - to listen to members of the electoral minority. It is, 
in that sense, consistent with Sunstein's overall project of identifying 
the best strategy for institutionalizing dissent. 
Finally, the notion of second-order diversity highlights an impor- 
tant tradeoff at stake in Sunstein's theory of dissent, at least with re- 
gard to disaggregated bodies like juries and appellate courts. Sunstein 
identifies three decisionmaking phenomena for which dissent may 
provide a needed corrective: conformity, polarization, and cascades.282 
"Conformity" refers to the human tendency to do what everyone else is 
doing. The presence of a dissenter, say, on a corporate board or in an 
277 Id. at 16o-6i. 
278 Id. at 159. 
279 See supra section III.B.i, pp. 1142-52. 
280 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 144, at 30-31, 35-36. 
281 SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 31. 
282 See id. at io-I (defining all three terms). The descriptions that follow in this paragraph 
are drawn entirely from Sunstein's work. 
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investment group can reduce the pressure to conform and thus free in- 
dividuals on a decisionmaking body to share information or challenge 
the wisdom of a particular course of action. "Polarization" takes place 
when a group of people who agree upon an outcome reinforce each 
other's views during the decisionmaking process. As a result, the 
group takes a more extreme position than one would predict given its 
members' predeliberation tendencies. "Cascades" take place over time; 
a set of decisionmakers makes a choice, and subsequent decisionmak- 
ers, influenced by the apparent agreement of the first movers, make 
the same choice even if they would have not reached such a decision 
independently. 
The notions of first-order and second-order diversity suggest that 
these phenomena may require different institutional cures. First-order 
diversity - the presence of one or more potential dissenters on every 
decisionmaking body - seems the natural cure for conformity and po- 
larization. The presence of one or more dissenters in every group 
seems likely to reduce the chances that the group will reach the 
"wrong" decision. But second-order diversity - ensuring that would- 
be dissenters can exercise control over some subset of decisionmaking 
outcomes - may be necessary to avoid cascades. That is because it 
ensures that dissent is visible at the aggregate level to subsequent deci- 
sionmaking bodies. It destroys the appearance of unanimity by offer- 
ing an alternative view - a competing paradigm - for subsequent 
decisionmakers to consider. 
Put differently, the notion of second-order diversity suggests that it 
is precisely when dissenters speak up and the majority listens - that 
is, precisely when the dynamics of dissent are working properly 
throughout the system, on Sunstein's view - that one of the primary 
dangers associated with conformity can arise. Ensuring the presence 
of dissenters on every decisionmaking body (first-order diversity) re- 
duces heterogeneity among decisionmaking bodies (second-order diver- 
sity). Thus, while we will have dissent within individual decisionmak- 
ing bodies, there may be less dissent in the aggregate. 
As a result, it is precisely the homogeneous groupings of which 
Sunstein is rightly wary that may produce visible dissent in the system 
as a whole, and it is the heterogeneous groupings that Sunstein lauds 
that submerge dissent at the aggregate level. For instance, in the con- 
text of appellate panels - one of Sunstein's primary examples - if 
every judicial panel were to contain a member of the other party, as 
Sunstein proposes, it would push appellate panels toward the first- 
order end of the diversity spectrum and we would expect the decisions 
those panels render to be relatively homogeneous.283 From the per- 
283 Sunstein terms this phenomenon "ideological dampening." Id. at 167 (emphasis removed). 
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spective of individual cases, one might think this is all to the good. 
But if one is worried about the health of the entire system, it may be 
useful to have the perspective that an "ideologically amplif[ied]"284 de- 
cision from an all-Democrat- or all-Republican-appointed panel would 
provide to offset the "precedential cascade" that might otherwise take 
place were all appellate decisions to resemble one another.285 In sum, 
second-order diversity suggests a tradeoff embedded in the dynamics 
of dissent: guaranteeing dissent within individual decisionmaking bod- 
ies may systematically submerge dissent within the system as a 
whole.286 
2. Multiculturalism. - Finally, and perhaps most controversially, 
the notion of second-order diversity may also complement recent 
scholarship criticizing the theory of multiculturalism. A number of 
scholars have begun to raise a rich and varied set of challenges to mul- 
ticulturalism and the "politics of recognition."287 Richard Ford, for ex- 
ample, has expressed concern that the cultural "difference" approach 
that has come to dominate much equality discourse may result in 
models of racial identity that are too narrow, partial, or unidimen- 
sional.288 Similarly, Anthony Appiah and Janet Halley worry that cur- 
rent debates about racial identity and sexual orientation limit the 
number of identity "scripts" available to individuals.289 Such scholars 
argue in favor of more opportunities for individuals to experiment - 
or "play"290 - with identity categories. 
Second-order diversity provides a different perspective on the 
strengths and weaknesses of multiculturalism, one that echoes some of 
these arguments and points to other avenues for criticism that have not 
284 Id. at 179. 
285 Id. at 59. Sunstein may be correct that dissenting opinions can serve that role. See id. at 
71. In order to answer that question in this context, we would want to know whether dissents are 
more moderate when written for a mixed panel and whether, in the presence of significant agree- 
ment among two-judge panels, dissenting opinions constitute effective dissent. For speculation as 
to why dissents might be less likely to short-circuit cascades, see Gerken, supra note 104 (manu- 
script at 14-15). 
286 Thus, we ought to seek a "diverse portfolio" of appellate panels for many of the same rea- 
sons that scholars have called for a "diverse portfolio" of judges. See RICHARD A. POSNER, 
LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY I19-2 I (2003); ADRIAN VERMUELE, THE JUDICIARY 
IS A THEY, NOT AN IT, 24-26 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Public Law and Legal Theory Working 
Paper No. 49, 2003); cf. Ifill, supra 
note 187, at I19-28 (arguing in favor of racial diversity among 
state trial court judges to achieve "structural impartiality"). 
287 For a thought-provoking analysis of multiculturalism and race issues that sounds some simi- 
lar themes but is more wide-ranging in its analysis, see Ford, supra note 15, at 38-79. For an 
equally provocative account of some of these questions as they relate to gay rights, see Halley, su- 
pra note i5. 
288 Ford, supra note 15, at 47-48. 
289 Appiah, supra note 15, at 97-99 (race); Halley, supra note 15, at 115-18 (sexuality). 
290 Appiah, supra note 15, at lo4; see also MINOW, supra note 14, at 94-98 (arguing that the 
state should create opportunities for individuals to identify with groups temporarily). 
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yet been fully explored. If one considers implementation strategies, the 
politics of recognition would produce a set of decisionmaking bodies 
that is first-order diverse and thus is subject to challenge based on 
values associated with second-order diversity. 
For instance, the politics of recognition envisions a standard of 
fairness that involves representation - voice - on every decisionmak- 
ing body. If one thinks concretely about implementing such a strategy, 
it would presumably require us to ensure the presence of at least one 
member of the group in question on each decisionmaking body. The 
result is likely to be a set of decisionmaking bodies in which racial mi- 
norities, for instance, are always numerical minorities. The notion of 
second-order diversity, in contrast, emphasizes the need for voice at 
the aggregate level. It thus flags the possibility that the politics of rec- 
ognition may result in the systematic submergence of minority perspec- 
tives in the aggregate. 
Similarly, the notion of second-order diversity offers a countervail- 
ing argument to the dignitary claims associated with the politics of 
recognition. It counters the dignity associated with recognition or 
voice291 with the dignity associated with the power to decide or con- 
trol. It suggests that we ought to value the chance to grant tradition- 
ally disempowered groups the opportunity to be in charge, to enjoy the 
sense of political efficacy and autonomy usually enjoyed solely by 
members of the majority. 
The notion of second-order diversity, with its emphasis on partici- 
patory values and destabilizing political experiences, also fits neatly 
with the arguments of those who place emphasis on the fluidity of 
identity categories and experimentation.292 Second-order diversity can 
destabilize the dynamics of group interaction, allowing members of the 
majority and minority to try on each other's shoes. It creates a distinct 
political space in which members of a minority group are present not 
to voice dissent from a particular perspective, but to decide on behalf 
of the polity. Thus, rather than putting into place a permanent "solu- 
tion" to group divisions, second-order diversity allows members of 
groups to revisit questions of politics and identity in different contexts 
and different times as the decisionmaking bodies cycle and reconstitute 
themselves. 
The notion of second-order diversity also suggests a path for gener- 
ating "visibility" that may sit more comfortably with the views of mul- 
ticulturalism's critics. "Visibility" does not involve announcing a pre- 
existing view. In a structure that is second-order diverse, visibility 
291 See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 1 4, at 39-41 (arguing that the "politics of presence" affirms 
the dignity of individuals in the political process). 
292 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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takes the form of a pattern, not a point. Second-order diversity thus 
provides a kaleidoscopic view. It reveals differences when they exist, 
but does not identify what "the" minority perspective is. 
CONCLUSION 
Small, disaggregated political institutions - though quite common 
within our democratic system - remain surprisingly understudied. 
Perhaps as a result, we often extend theories about diversity derived 
from unitary institutions to disaggregated ones without giving ade- 
quate thought to that decision. Our conception of diversity is, counter- 
intuitively enough, too uniform. 
This Article represents an initial attempt to think systematically 
about the potential democratic possibilities associated with the disag- 
gregated portions of democracy and about the design strategy best 
equipped to take advantage of them. It tries to build a normatively 
attractive theory in favor of heterogeneity we already see, and take for 
granted, in our current system. It then uses those arguments to pro- 
vide an analytic framework - organized around the notions of first- 
order and second-order diversity - for examining a set of recurring 
tradeoffs embedded in a wide variety of debates about democratic 
design. 
While the notions of first-order and second-order diversity cannot 
definitively resolve the tradeoffs we encounter when designing disag- 
gregated institutions, they at least provide a useful tool for systemati- 
cally identifying the costs and underappreciated benefits of an existing 
feature of our democratic design. Further, by moving these debates up 
by one level of generality, this Article offers a conceptual framework 
that enables us to play off a divergent set of literatures and ideas 
against one another, and it puts some meat on the bones of a common, 
but undertheorized, design practice in our democracy. 
Much work remains to be done in developing this framework. 
Most obviously, this Article is a conceptual and normative project, not 
an empirical one. Throughout this Article, I have tried to flag the 
theoretical nature of the claims I have been making by using phrases 
like "may" or "likely." While I have offered examples of why I think 
the empirics are likely to support my hypothesis, more empirical work 
is plainly necessary. 
Moreover, this Article is pitched at a fairly high level of generality, 
as its purpose is to delineate the conceptual structure of the argument. 
Future work should offer a more contextual, fine-grained exploration 
of how these arguments play out in a given institutional context. 
Finally, a full exploration of these ideas would demand not only a 
more detailed map of the institutional terrain, but also a bird's-eye 
view. Many of the values described here depend on an interinstitu- 
tional perspective - a sense of how differently designed democratic 
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institutions interact with one another and how an individual's partici- 
patory experiences vary over the course of a civic life. Questions of 
whether and where we ought to seek second-order diversity will thus 
turn on an assessment of the democratic process as a whole. 
